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ABSTRACT 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has invested considerable resources to 
improving aviation security. Despite technology and procedural improvements, passenger 
screening remains subject to much criticism. Challenges to the current approach include 
the assumption that all passengers pose a risk; the reactive responses to new threats that 
are applied broadly to all passengers; high levels of threat uncertainty; a focus on objects 
versus people; and time constraints on completing the screening process. Combined, 
these challenges adversely impact performance and result in poor public acceptance of 
government efforts to protect the commercial aviation sector from terrorist attacks. 
Questions persist regarding the long-term efficacy and sustainability of the current 
approach and the availability of a better model. 
The approach used by Israel and a risk-based approach that calibrates security 
measures to groups of passengers based on risk are two frequently offered alternative 
screening models. This thesis evaluates the current and alternative models using security 
effectiveness, risk mitigation, constitutional permissibility, social acceptance, and 
political feasibility as evaluation dimensions. This evaluation of policy options allows a 
side-by-side comparison of the three models and demonstrates that adopting a risk-based 
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Over 90 percent of the nation’s $5.3 billion annual investment in the TSA 
goes to aviation—to fight the last war. The money has been spent mainly 
to meet congressional mandates to federalize the security checkpoint 
screeners and to deploy existing security methods and technologies at 
airports. The current efforts do not yet reflect a forward-looking strategic 
plan systematically analyzing assets, risks, costs, and benefits. Lacking 
such a plan, we are not convinced that our transportation security 
resources are being allocated to the greatest risk in a cost-effective way. 
Kean et al., 2004, p. 391 
A. BACKGROUND 
The overall effectiveness of airport security screening at passenger checkpoints, 
and the individual performance of employees performing this function, has been the 
subject of much criticism for nearly two decades. Reasons cited for poor performance 
include: 1) individual employee aptitude, 2) insufficient employee training, and 3) 
reduced vigilance due to job monotony (Dillingham, 2001, p. 7). Since al Qaeda attacked 
the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has invested considerable 
attention and resources to resolving these deficiencies. Immediately following the 9/11 
attacks, Congress enacted and President Bush signed into law the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) in an effort to address many of the problems 
previously identified with checkpoint screening effectiveness. The most fundamental 
change was the creation of the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) and the transfer of 
responsibility for aviation security screening from commercial air carriers to the federal 
government. ATSA also mandated several other changes to address causes of poor 
performance with the passenger security screening layer of the aviation security system. 
Among these changes were improved employment standards, preemployment aptitude 
testing, formalized initial training and certification, recurrent training, and annual 
proficiency evaluations (ATSA, sec. 111). 
Despite these changes, continuing problems with checkpoint security performance 
were identified by the 9/11 Commission (Elias, 2005, p. 3). The commission’s final 
report recommended that the TSA address the human factor issues at checkpoints that 
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inhibit performance and improve the ability to detect explosives (Kean et al., 2004, p. 
393). In 2007, the former inspector general for the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) reported that checkpoint performance had essentially not increased since 2001 
(Ervin, 2007). Although reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) state 
that considerable progress has been made in improving aviation security (Berrick, 2008, 
p. 21), an ever-growing list of prohibited items in response to new threats, combined with 
the on-going challenge of balancing passenger delays and long queues at airport 
checkpoints, presents an environment of increasing complexity for the TSA (Kutz & 
Cooney, 2007, p. 5). As recently as 2008, covert testing of checkpoint performance by 
GAO investigators found continuing deficits in identifying prohibited items hidden on 
passengers or in accessible property. GAO noted that these performance deficiencies 
existed even when transportation security officers (TSOs) followed established 
procedures and correctly used the security technology available to them at checkpoints 
(Kutz & Cooney, 2007, p. 4). 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 
Commission) recommended that the TSA employ a system of interconnected security 
layers to deter, detect, and prevent exploitation of commercial aviation by terrorists 
(Kean et al., 2004, p. 392). Since 9/11, the TSA has implemented an aviation security 
program that includes the 21 different layers shown in Figure 1. 
As depicted in Figure 1, the ability of transportation security officers to detect 
explosive devices during the passenger screening process remains a critical link in this 
layered security approach (Dillingham, 2001, p. 6). Results of covert testing of 
transportation security officers demonstrate that achieving and sustaining high levels of 
performance in detecting explosive devices remains a concern (Ervin, 2007).  
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Figure 1.   Layers of U.S. Aviation Security1 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Several challenges associated with the current approach to passenger screening 
raise questions about the effectiveness and sustainability of this aspect of aviation 
security. These concerns include 1) an underlying assumption that all passengers pose 
risk, 2) changes to procedures and technology in response to specific threats or incidents, 
3) a high level of threat uncertainty, and 4) the limited amount of time that transportation 
security officers (TSOs) have to screen passengers and property without creating 
unacceptably long wait times that would negatively impact the aviation system.  
 
                                                 
1 Graphic, found at the TSA website http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/index.shtm, depicts the 21 
layers that make up the aviation security approach used by the TSA (emphasis added). According to the 
TSA, “Each one of these layers alone is capable of stopping a terrorist attack. In combination their security 
value is multiplied, creating a much stronger, formidable system. A terrorist who has to overcome multiple 
security layers in order to carry out an attack is more likely to be pre-empted, deterred, or to fail during the 
attempt.” 
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Combined, these challenges adversely impact TSO performance and result in poor public 
acceptance of the government’s efforts to protect the commercial aviation sector from 
terrorist attacks.  
1. Equal-Risk Assumption  
Underlying the current TSA approach to aviation security screening of 
passengers, crew members, and airport workers is an assumption that every individual 
boarding a commercial aircraft poses a risk to aviation (Poole, 2006, p. 2). With very few 
exceptions, current TSA security regulations require that every individual who presents 
himself at a TSA checkpoint to board a commercial aircraft undergo primary physical 
security screening at screening checkpoints. In fact, the National Strategy to Combat 
Terrorist Travel reinforces this assumption and lists screening of all passengers and crew 
members as a critical element of denying terrorist entry into the aviation system (Redd, 
2006, p. 31).  
The equal-risk assumption drives checkpoint security screening to focus primarily 
on finding objects identified as prohibited for carriage aboard commercial aircraft and 
accessible in the passenger cabin. Reliance on the cognitive ability of security personnel 
to recognize and detect these objects in the face of increasingly sophisticated 
concealment techniques, or to recognize and react to something that experience indicates 
may be out of the ordinary, adds complexity to the passenger screening process that 
terrorists can exploit. Because all restrictions and primary screening measures are applied 
equally, and anyone can be subject to random additional measures to avoid profiling, the 
public views airport security screening and the TSA with derision.  
The TSA states that, beginning in 2005, the agency has shifted the focus of airport 
security away from concentration on finding prohibited objects and toward a focus on 
intent and people, primarily through the Screening Passengers by Observation 
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Techniques (SPOT) program2 (Simons, Brewer, & Szul, 2009). Despite this claim and 
the introduction of the SPOT program, checkpoint security screening has essentially not 
changed since 9/11 (Kutz & Cooney, 2007, p. 7). This is not to say that improvements in 
aviation security and checkpoint screening have not occurred. Changes in deployed 
technology, prohibited-items screening procedures, employee training, and covert testing 
have combined to improve overall passenger security screening effectiveness as 
compared to pre-9/11 (Berrick, 2008, p. 21). However, even when considering these 
improvements, it is the fundamental approach to checkpoint security screening that 
remains constant. All passengers are viewed as potential threats and subject to the same 
basic screening methods (including behavioral detection screening, X-ray screening of 
property, magnetometer screening for metallic objects) and secondary screening to 
resolve anomalies or alarms (Morgan, 2001, p. 2; Dillingham, 2001, p. 5). With the 
exception of behavioral detection screening, the focus of transportation security officers 
remains that of finding threat objects (Kutz & Cooney, 2007, p. 4). 
2. Reactive Security Measures  
The TSA applies the professional experience of its employees to periodically 
reassess checkpoint screening procedures and to review the list of prohibited items. These 
reviews are driven by specific intelligence information, world-wide terrorist incidents 
targeting commercial aviation, passenger complaints, analysis of overall aviation risk, 
and efforts at harmonization with foreign governments (Kutz & Cooney, 2007, p. 6). 
Changes in terrorist tactics result in specific mitigation measures, including changes in 
procedure, additions to the prohibited-items list, focus areas for security personnel, or 
implementation of new screening technologies. Exceptions and alternative screening 
procedures adopted to address the concerns of specific stakeholder groups create 
exploitable vulnerabilities. Since the TSA assumed responsibility for aviation security 
                                                 
2 The SPOT program is reflected in Figure 1, as the “behavior detection officer” layer. According to 
TSA, “The Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) program utilizes non-intrusive behavior observation and 
analysis techniques to identify potentially high-risk passengers. … BDO-trained security officers are 
screening travelers for involuntary physical and physiological reactions that people exhibit in response to a 
fear of being discovered.” http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/bdo/index.shtm  
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screening in 2002, a number of reactive adjustments to checkpoint screening procedures 
and prohibited items have been implemented in response to these pressures.  
• Shoes: Following the unsuccessful shoe bombing attempt by Richard Reid 
in December 2002, the agency required that passengers remove their shoes 
prior to undergoing security screening. Following passenger complaints, 
the TSA relaxed the 100 percent removal policy and suggested that 
passengers remove shoes. In 2008, the agency reverted to requiring 
removal of all shoes, and in May 2009, it shifted to having shoes placed 
directly on the X-ray belt to remove clutter and improve prohibited-item 
detection by security officers (Transportation Security Administration 
[TSA], 2011a). 
• Jackets and coats: In response to the simultaneous destruction of two 
Russian aircraft by suicide bombers in August 2004, the TSA required the 
removal of all outer garments prior to checkpoint screening in November 
2004 (Croft, 2004, p. 1). 
• Scissors: In December 2005, the TSA removed from its prohibited-items 
listing small scissors and tools to improve the focus of security personnel 
on finding improvised explosive devices (Kutz & Cooney, 2007, p. 6). 
• Liquids: Immediately after British authorities foiled a plot to destroy U.S. 
commercial aircraft using peroxide-based liquid explosives disguised as 
sports drink, the TSA banned all liquids, aerosols, and gels from passing 
through security checkpoints. This total ban was subsequently relaxed to 
the current 3-1-1 policy.3 
• Advanced imaging technology: Following the failed attempt to detonate 
an explosive charge sewn into the underwear of a suicide bomber on 
December 25, 2009, the TSA immediately accelerated the deployment of 
advanced imaging technology equipment to detect nonmetallic threats 
hidden beneath clothing. 
• Toner and ink cartridges: When the plot to destroy cargo aircraft using 
printer cartridges concealing explosive devices surfaced in November, 
2010, the TSA banned large-size printer and ink cartridges from all 




                                                 
3 The TSA’s 3-1-1 policy now permits containers of 3 ounces or less in a 1-quart, clear, zip-top plastic 
bag, one bag per passenger, with the bag removed from carry-on luggage and placed separately for x-ray 
inspection. Additional exemptions of medicines, infant-care needs, and personal hygiene were also 
implemented (TSA, 2011f). 
 7 
Regularly implementing new security layers, adding items to the prohibited list, 
and educating transportation security officers on new concealment techniques result in a 
process highly susceptible to threat uncertainty,4 with institutionalized vulnerabilities; it 
is an unsustainable strategy over time (Jackson, 2008, p. 7). 
3. Threat Uncertainty  
As the terrorist threat evolves and new tactics are discovered, the TSA provides 
that information to checkpoint personnel to be alert for and detect these additional items. 
This reactive approach—expanding the list of items and concealment techniques that 
checkpoint security personnel must be cognizant of, without causing additional delays to 
all travelers—is not sustainable (Jackson, 2008, p. 6). Jackson refers to this concept as a 
“hyper-vigilant approach,” where each threat results in a specific prevention response that 
is applied to all individuals. The end result is overall disruption to existing security 
measures and potential discredit to the DHS and the TSA (Jackson & Frelinger, 2009, 
p. 4) Furthermore, the level of performance required by this reactive approach is not 
achievable within the limitations imposed by current technology and the U.S. 
Constitution, privacy and civil liberties concerns, and social norms. Terrorists and 
criminals have a significant advantage in their attempts to defeat existing checkpoint 
detection methods by disguising prohibited items so that they appear as innocent or 
ordinary objects to security personnel (Jackson, 2008, p. 5). The overall effect of changes 
to checkpoint security since 9/11 represents what some critics call “security theater” 
(Schneier, 2007).5 
4. Increased Risk and Cost  
Another real concern about the current checkpoint screening process is the 
attractiveness of large crowds of passengers waiting for security screening as targets for 
terrorists (Poole, 2006, p. 22). Three events highlight the concern about the vulnerability 
                                                 
4 Threat uncertainty refers to the fact that it is difficult to distinguish through X-ray screening everyday 
benign objects from similar items concealing improvised explosive devices.  
5 Security consultant Bruce Schneier defines “security theater” as cost-ineffective measures that look 
good and create an impression of security without actually improving it. 
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of passengers in public areas at airports. In June 2007, al Qaeda–linked operatives 
crashed into the front of the airport terminal in Glasgow Scotland and attempted to 
detonate a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). In November 2008, 
terrorists from Lashkar-e-Taiba attacked several commercial buildings in Mumbai India, 
including the crowded central railway terminal. More recently, a suicide bomb attack in 
the lobby of Domodedova Airport in Moscow on January 24, 2011, killed 35 and 
wounded another 168 individuals waiting for arriving passengers (Barry, 2011). The 
current checkpoint screening approach increases the risk of a suicide bomb attack aimed 
at the large queues of passengers waiting for checkpoint screening (Poole, 2006, p. 22). 
Beyond creating additional vulnerabilities and adding complexity to the security 
process, the current passenger screening process creates significant opportunity costs. 
The resources required to screen every passenger and X-ray every carry-on bag, shoes, 
coat, and electronic device for possible threat objects pulls resources away from 
addressing other airport or transportation security vulnerabilities (Jackson, 2008, p. 7). 
The approach also limits the amount of time that can be spent evaluating each X-ray 
image for possible threat items without creating excessive wait times and even larger 
queues. In 2008, when many air carriers began charging fees for checked baggage, the 
TSA experienced a near immediate impact. Not only were more items of accessible 
property being brought through passenger screening checkpoints, the carry-on baggage 
was more densely packed, and X-ray images were significantly more cluttered. This 
combined effect creates an even greater challenge to the transportation security officer, 
who must spend more time evaluating images and must encounter more images per 
passenger. This situation raises the overall risk that a prohibited item will be missed or 
that large queues will become more attractive targets for Mumbai-, Glasgow-, or 
Moscow-style terrorist attacks. 
5. Public Acceptance  
In addition to baseline security measures applied to all passengers, TSA employs 
a concept of randomness to create unpredictability in the process in an effort to hamper 
terrorist preoperational planning and surveillance. While randomness provides greater 
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unpredictability, it also creates frustration in frequent travelers who want to know what to 
expect and what to do to get through checkpoint screening as quickly as possible. 
Additionally, the random process for selecting who receives additional security also 
results in the TSA’s being the subject of derision and ridicule when grandmothers are 
required to stand spread-eagle in secondary screening booths at checkpoints while 
undergoing handheld metal-detector screening and physical pat down (Jackson, 2008, 
p. 7). Public sentiment and opposition to TSA screening methods intensified when more 
invasive physical search procedures were introduced in November 2010 (Kravitz, 2010). 
6. Summary 
A study of airport security effectiveness completed in 2005 used probability 
statistics to model the likelihood that a terrorist would go undetected and successfully get 
aboard an aircraft. The study recommended several measures to enhance overall airport 
security: 1) improved effectiveness of checkpoint security personnel, 2) improved 
performance of checkpoint technology, and 3) positive identification of passengers at 
various steps in the process from ticket counter to boarding gate (Schneidewind, 2005, 
p. 36). This study was not the first analysis of aviation security to conclude that there was 
a need for these improvements. The 9/11 Commission reached the same conclusions, and 
GAO reports from before 9/11 urged the FAA to improve personnel selection and 
training, raise performance of the process in detecting explosives, and improve passenger 
identification.  
Since 9/11, the TSA has implemented a number of changes and additional layers 
to improve the overall security of commercial aviation. Although significant emphasis 
has been placed on improving the three recommendations identified by Schneidewind, 
many of the changes are intended to improve performance of a process largely unchanged 
since before 9/11. Checkpoint security personnel remain primarily focused on finding 
threat objects. As Poole pointed out in 2006, the underlying assumption that all 
passengers pose a risk to aviation security remains the cornerstone of the current 
passenger screening approach (Poole, 2006, p. 2). As a result, all passengers are subject 
to the same primary security measures. This approach is susceptible to threat uncertainty, 
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is highly reactive to changes in threats and tactics, is inefficient in its use of limited 
personnel and technology resources, and is poorly accepted by the American people. The 
existing approach also results in large crowds queued in front of security checkpoints, 
vulnerable to attack by a suicide bomber. Under the current passenger screening strategy, 
terrorists retain a decided advantage by devising more clever concealment and innovative 
devices designed to circumvent security procedures.6 The combined challenges and 
continuing problems with passenger security screening raise questions about the long-
term efficacy and sustainability of the current approach. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Research Question 
What passenger screening model for commercial aviation might be best to address 
aviation security needs with respect to security effectiveness, risk mitigation, 
constitutional permissibility, social acceptance, and political feasibility? 
Secondary Research Questions 
What screening models are used in other domains that could provide the basis for 
a different model to apply to the aviation passenger screening process? 
What legal, social, and civil liberty concerns might inhibit the adoption of a 
different model for passenger screening in the aviation security domain?  
D. ARGUMENT 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is charged with the daunting 
mission of protecting commercial aviation from terrorist attack. Executing the TSA 
mission requires front line transportation security officers to interact with and effectively 
screen between 1.7 million and 2 million airline passengers each day. Built upon the 
premise that every airline passenger and flight crew member poses some level of risk of 
perpetrating a terrorist attack, the current process focuses on finding prohibited items and 
                                                 
6 The attempted destruction of Delta Airlines flight 263, on December 25, 2009, over Detroit provides 
a recent example of this point. The device sewn into the underwear of Umar Farouk Abdulmulltalab was 
purposely constructed and concealed to avoid detection by technology and procedures used during 
passenger screening. 
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broadly applies security screening procedures to nearly every individual who boards an 
aircraft (Poole, 2006, p. 2). The many changes to technology, procedures, and prohibited 
items implemented by the TSA in the intervening years since 9/11 reflect the highly 
reactive nature of the current security regime (Jackson & Frelinger, 2009, p. 4). 
Separating passengers into four basic risk categories can improve overall aviation 
security while operating within the time and resource constraints of the total passenger 
security screening process. Implementing this type of risk-based screening system is not 
only possible; adopting such a system is imperative to protecting commercial aviation 
from terrorist attack over the foreseeable future. There are several potential benefits to the 
TSA’s consideration of an improved risk-based passenger security model.  
The primary reason for adopting a risk-based security approach is that such an 
approach can improve overall security effectiveness of passenger screening. Improved 
security results from shifting the focus of TSO personnel from broadly searching for 
objects to focusing more intently on people assessed as unknown or high risk. 
Categorizing passengers into four risk groups allows an increased level of scrutiny to be 
applied to individuals in higher risk groups. Several mathematic models demonstrate that 
even random categorization of passengers results in an improved overall security level of 
the system (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2006, pp. 640–43; McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 2005, 
pp. 189, 194). Advancing these models to the next logical step by applying what we 
know about the individual to determine the category to which they are assigned allows 
the TSA to better determine the appropriate mix of security measures needed to 
maximize the probability of detecting threats from these individuals. This approach also 
minimizes false positive and false negative rates while reducing the ability of terrorists to 
defeat the system. 
A second reason arguing for risk-based passenger screening is that such a system 
will improve TSO performance. Covert testing results made public in the past few years 
continue to demonstrate TSO performance deficits in detecting explosive devices. 
Reports by the Government Accountability Office and the DHS inspector general both 
conclude that aptitude, training, and vigilance are the root causes of this performance 
deficiency (Kean et al., 2004, p. 393; Elias, 2005, p. 3; Dillingham, 2009, p. 7). With 
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each passenger viewed as a potential threat, and faced with increasingly sophisticated 
concealment techniques, the TSO focus on finding prohibited objects increases job 
complexity, creates fatigue, adds time pressures to completing the screening process, and 
results in diminished vigilance (Kutz & Cooney, pp. 4, 5). TSO performance will not 
improve while system constraints remain constant or become more constrained and job 
complexity increases. This outcome is true even with better TSO aptitude assessments 
and improved training. Grouping passengers by risk allows low-risk passengers to be 
removed from many security measures, reduces TSO job complexity, and provides 
additional time to complete the screening of passengers categorized as unknown or high 
risk. The fact that the TSO knows that these individuals present an elevated risk will 
enhance their vigilance during the screening process. With more time available to 
thoroughly screen these individuals and their accessible property, and the knowledge that 
these passengers present an elevated risk to aviation security, TSO performance in 
detecting threats will improve.  
A third reason why TSA should begin grouping passengers into risk categories is 
that this security process is less susceptible to negative impacts resulting from changes to 
airline business practices. This higher level of resilience results from fewer passengers 
being required to undergo the full spectrum of security measures at the airport. A recent 
example of negative impact as a result of airline decisions is the implementation of 
checked baggage fees by most carriers because they are exempt from the 7.5 percent 
excise tax. While this business decision generated $2.5 billion in increased revenue 
during 2009, it had collateral consequences on TSA checkpoint security operations 
(Dillingham, 2010, p. 5). A significant negative impact was the decrease in hourly 
screening lane throughput as a result of more passengers bringing bags through the 
checkpoint to avoid these fees. In addition, passenger-accessible property is now more 
densely packed, presenting more complex X-ray images for security officers to evaluate 
and requiring more time to complete bag searches. Because security equipment and 
personnel resources are finite, the amount of time available for X-ray image 
interpretation has decreased, making detection of prohibited items more difficult. Another 
consequence of this decision is increased passenger wait times during peak hours and 
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extended peak operational periods throughout the day. The time pressure exerted on the 
process is also greater as queuing lines have become longer and these larger crowds are 
more attractive targets for suicide bombers.  
Another reason that TSA should consider grouping passengers into four risk 
categories is the cost savings possible for overall passenger screening. As most 
passengers present no true threat to aviation, the many alarms that must be resolved 
throughout the system each day are in fact false alarms that drive costs to create capacity 
needed to resolve these alarms (McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 2008, p. 5). Broadly 
implementing new technology throughout all 450 commercial airports requires a 
significant financial investment to modify checkpoints and to purchase and install 
equipment. As an example, the TSA plans to deploy 1,800 advanced imaging technology 
(AIT) units over the next four years. The estimated cost to purchase, install, staff, and 
maintain these units is expected to reach $700 million (Aviation Security Market, 2010). 
Even if categorizing passengers by risk permitted reducing this deployment plan by just 
10 percent, DHS would save $70 million. Spreading this same reduction across other 
checkpoint technologies could result in direct savings exceeding $100 million. 
Reductions in TSO staffing at checkpoints is also possible as other security measures no 
longer need to be applied to every passenger, thus reducing the resources required to 
resolve false alarms on passengers posing no credible threat.  
A final potential reason for adopting this approach is that it may be more 
constitutionally acceptable within the framework of the special-needs search exception 
carved out by the courts. Applying the same primary security measures to all passengers 
not only raises questions regarding the necessity of this approach but its constitutionality 
as well (Kraus, 1973, pp. 402, 409, 410). In various rulings on the constitutionality of 
warrantless special-needs airport searches, the courts have asserted that the level of 
intrusiveness should be minimal and only conducted to the extent necessary to combat 
the present danger (Power, 2006, p. 56). As categorizing passengers into groups based on 




unnecessary. Subjecting passengers who can be determined to pose less risk to more 
intrusive search measures than are necessary to address that risk may well be in conflict 
with the courts “minimally intrusive” standard. 
Terrorist plots revealed since 9/11 demonstrate the persistence of al Qaeda and its 
affiliate organizations in targeting commercial aviation, and the sector remains a high-
priority target. These plots also show that al Qaeda is highly innovative in devising 
explosive-device concealment methods specifically designed to circumvent existing 
aviation security measures. The underlying assumption of the existing aviation security 
process is that every passenger is considered to pose a threat (Poole, 2006, p. 2). This 
assumption drives a focus on finding objects versus the more risk-based approach of 
focusing on individuals. Since 9/11, aviation security has been largely reactive in 
response to the latest terrorist methodology. Reacting to changes in tactics and methods 
with new technology and more intrusive procedures creates a costly and unsustainable 
security model fraught with institutionalized vulnerabilities and frustrating to the 
traveling public. By adopting a system that groups passengers into four risk categories 
and tailoring security measures to the risk associated with each category, the TSA can 
more effectively and efficiently apply resources to address the intent component of threat 
and to avoid the costs and threat uncertainty attendant to the current approach. Adopting 
a risk-based security approach raises the overall security level of the system while 
improving TSO performance. Such a system is also more resilient to changes in airline 
practices, less expensive overall, and more constitutionally supportable. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH  
The significance of this research is that it provides an evaluation of different 
policy options for passenger screening in the aviation domain. Since the formation of the 
TSA in November 2002, several different approaches to passenger screening have 
surfaced. The most common call is for the United States to adopt the Israeli model—
often heralded as the “gold standard” of aviation security. Several groups, including the 
Airline Pilots Association and the 9/11 Commission, have called for the United States to 
adopt a risk-based approach to aviation security screening (Kean et al., 2004, p. 391; Air 
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Line Pilots Association [ALPA], 2010). Arguments supporting both these options have 
been largely based on anecdotal evidence and supposition. Nothing in the literature 
contains an analytical comparison between these alternative policy options and the 
current passenger screening approach. The literature on aviation security deals broadly 
with matters of constitutionality, criticisms regarding the effectiveness of the current 
system, and several risk-based mathematic models. However, the literature is devoid of 
analytical comparison between the various options. This thesis seeks to fill that gap by 
analyzing the three approach options—the status quo, the Israeli model, and a proposed 
risk-based passenger security model—to assess whether an alternative approach would 
better address the criticisms discussed in the problem statement above. Since the TSA 
recently announced the intent to shift to a risk-based security approach for passenger 
screening, this research will provide some empirical basis to support that decision and 
potentially identify specific elements that the agency should consider adopting as part of 
the design of that model. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We must find ways of reconciling security with liberty, since the success of one 
protects the other. 
Hamilton & Gorton, 2004 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since al Qaeda attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, the 
effectiveness of airport security processes has garnered a great deal of public, academic, 
and political attention. An array of literature exists regarding how the federal government 
should approach aviation security to protect the nation from terrorism. Similarly, a vast 
amount of literature is devoted to related topics of privacy, government surveillance, civil 
liberties, and technology to enable better security. The scope of this literature review is 
limited to four topics with potential to impact any decision to change the current 
passenger screening approach: 1) risk management, 2) constitutional questions, 3) 
operations research modeling, and 4) risk-based screening approaches. Sources include 
federal policy documents, congressional research papers, scholarly journal articles, 
academic research, and papers from think tanks.  
B. RISK MANAGEMENT 
The DHS Risk Lexicon defines “risk management” as a “process of identifying, 
analyzing, assessing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or 
controlling it to an acceptable level at an acceptable cost” (Schwien & Jamison, 2008, 
p. 27). This closed-loop process provides policy makers with the ability to weigh 
tradeoffs between accepting the risk or implementing specific measures to reduce or “buy 
down” risk. Two important factors in this tradeoff consideration are the potential 
effectiveness of the measure to reduce the risk and the cost effectiveness of the reduction 
measure being considered (Jamison, 2009, p. 9).  
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Risk management influences security decisions for two reasons: 1) the cost-
prohibitive nature of equally securing all assets and 2) the need to balance security with 
individual civil rights and liberties. Federal methods for evaluating risk provide an 
objective approach to address these realities when allocating limited resources. The 
National Strategy for Homeland Security explicitly states that uncertainty and risk of 
another terrorist attack will persist and outlines measures to manage that risk by 
prioritizing resources and broadening responsibilities for protecting critical assets (Bush, 
2002, p. 25). The principles of deterring terrorist attacks, reducing vulnerabilities, and 
mitigating the consequences form the foundation of the Homeland Security Management 
System (HSMS) (Bush, 2002, pp. 25–30, 44–46). 
Building on these risk management principles, the National Infrastructure 




Figure 2.   NIPP Risk Management Framework (from Chertoff, 2009, p. 27) 
Defining risk as the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, the model 
recognizes that risk results from the interaction of these factors (Chertoff, 2009, p. 27; 
Masse, O’Neil, & Rollins, 2007, p. CRS-6). The NIPP requires federal departments to 
use this common method to enable “cross-sector” comparisons to determine where and 
how to apply limited homeland security resources (Chertoff, 2009, p. 27). Broad 
guidance for using the methodology recognizes unique differences between critical 
infrastructure and key resource (CIKR) sectors dominated by “physical assets” and those 
with more “accessible and distributed systems.” For asset-heavy sectors, the NIPP  
 
 19 
recommends a “bottom-up, asset by asset” method, where assets are ranked based on risk. 
More open sectors should use a “top-down” continuity approach that considers critical 
system nodes and interdependencies to determine risk (Chertoff, 2009, p. 28). 
Building on the NIPP model, in January 2009, DHS published an Interim 
Integrated Risk Management Framework, the model reflected in Figure 3. This guidance 
again emphasized the need for “a common and consistent approach to risk management” 
that united and standardized the efforts of all “organizations responsible for homeland 
security” (Jamison, 2009, p. 1). The intent of the risk-management framework was that it 
would be compatible with other approaches, including the NIPP, recommendations by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the method used in the Target 
Capabilities List. This risk-management framework provides a general model that can be 
adapted to many different risk-management applications across the DHS enterprise 
(Jamison, 2009, p. 9). Comparing the NIPP and risk-management models in Figures 2 
and 3 shows that, while they use slightly different terminology, both models contain 
essentially the same six components.  
What both of the federal risk-management models lack are the specific details on 
how to apply these models to open systems like transportation and how to adapt these 
methods to reflect the top-down continuity approach identified as appropriate for these 
distributed networks. This lack of implementation detail provides significant latitude to 
alter the risk-management approach that threatens to undercut the benefits of a common 
framework. Without consistent application of these principles, it becomes impossible to 
compare risk across sectors and systems and to determine the appropriate policies to 




Figure 3.   DHS Risk Management Process (from DHS, n.d., p. 8) 
Critics of the federal risk management approach note that the classified nature of 
threat and consequence information prevents transparency, and federal grants funds 
prioritize buying down risk in major urban areas, which leaves state and local 
governments to address other vulnerabilities. (Masse, O’Neil, & Rollins, 2007, pp. CRS-
9–10). These criticisms reflect the distinction between “asset-based” and “geographic-
based” risk and create partisan political positioning for limited grant funds (Masse, 
O’Neil, & Rollins, 2007, p. CRS-20). Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins argue that, without a 
“cohesive risk strategy” and common terminology, the nation will be maladapted to 
“changing threats” and subject to greater impact from “political influence” and uncertain 
future funding (Masse, O’Neil, & Rollins, 2007, p. CRS-25). 
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
The escalating intrusiveness of increased aviation security measures continues to 
raise questions about the appropriate balance between security effectiveness and erosion 
of civil liberties. Rather than remaining a unique post-9/11 phenomenon, the debate over 
where this balance point should be set has been going on for several decades. Literature 
on this subject comes primarily from several types of sources: 1) law review articles that 
provide interpretation of various court decisions regarding constitutional protections, 2) 
analysis of constitutional provisions and their impact on security initiatives by think 
tanks, and 3) the judicial decisions themselves. Additional information is found in 
targeted academic research, including dissertations and theses for postgraduate and 
doctoral degree work. The two sections of the U.S. Constitution that primarily impact 
permissible security measures in the aviation security environment are the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. 
1. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guards against 
unreasonable search and seizure by the government, and holds that 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
A good body of literature exists on the impact of the Fourth Amendment on 
aviation security practices, and most of this literature asserts that the idea of 
“reasonableness” evolves over time and is highly dependent on how seriously the courts 
and public perceive the threat. The evolution of various court cases supports the idea that 
reasonableness of government searches is highly situational, dependent and subject to 
three varying levels of court review. A report by the Markle Foundation in 2002 outlined 
these levels in an analysis of legal constraints on profiling and government watch lists. 
According to the report’s authors, the legal hurdle is easiest to overcome when the search 
involves no “individualized suspicion” (Breverman & Ortiz, 2002, p. 150). In general, the 
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courts have included in this category routine administrative searches, such as those 
currently occurring at airport security checkpoints or international border searches. The 
next higher hurdle involves searches following reasonable suspicion. Searches of 
individuals stopped and detained by police officers and searched for weapons, commonly 
referred to as “Terry stops,” fall into the category of reasonable-suspicion searches.7 The 
most significant hurdle involves probable cause searches. These searches invoke the 
highest burden of proof by government officials and usually require a warrant as 
specified in the Fourth Amendment (Breverman & Ortiz, 2002, pp. 151, 154). 
Following 9/11, Viscusi and Zeckhauser’s survey of Harvard law students in 2002 
reflects this valuation of liberty in balance with perceived risk and personal impact on 
public attitudes. Their hypothesis regarding civil liberties was not whether searches of 
aviation passengers was appropriate but rather how individuals perceived the erosion of 
civil liberties if these searches targeted specific groups of passengers. Analysis of the 
survey results led the authors to the conclusion that by and large U.S. citizens do not view 
“many legal rights and liberties” as inviolate, but rather attitudes change depending on 
perceptions of risk and individual impact (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 2003, pp. 101–102, 
105). In a Widner Law Journal article, Power makes the similar point that Fourth 
Amendment protections are changeable based on how “society expect[s] government to 
respond to terrorism” (Power, 2006, p. 43). Similar to the findings in the Harvard study, 
Power concluded that, as public perceptions of risk change, expectations of privacy also 
change “with the result that the Fourth Amendment no longer applies to some very 
intrusive governmental actions” (Power, 2006, p. 48). As an example of how court and 
public perceptions of reasonableness have altered interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment, Power notes that prior to the ruling in United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 
(2d Cir. 1972), even magnetometer searches were perceived as “unreasonable” intrusions 
and justified only by the wave of hijackings occurring throughout the world (Power, 
2006, p. 56). Minert, in a Brigham Young University Law Review article, also cites the 
                                                 
7 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court ruled that “a police officer is 
entitled, for the protection of himself and others in the area, to conduct a carefully limited search of the 
outer clothing of individuals in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer, 
and such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.” 
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Bell ruling and notes that in United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972), the 
Fourth Circuit ruled that a “warrantless search” using magnetometers was essentially not, 
unlike a Terry search, an exception to the requirement to obtain a search warrant (Minert, 
2006, p. 1642).  
A University of Chicago Law Review article written shortly after the Bell 
decision, analyzed the constitutionality of airport searches. Citing the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), Kraus notes that “the Supreme 
Court has protected the right of persons to travel from state to state and overseas” and 
asserts that it is “constitutionally impermissible” to place a “double burden” on airline 
passengers by forcing passengers to chose between their right against unreasonable 
search or their right to travel. Krause further asserts that requiring every passenger to 
submit to even the minimally invasive magnetometer search is “constitutionally suspect” 
(Krause, 1973, pp. 409–10). While acknowledging that Terry permits warrantless 
searches to address immediate danger, Krause argues that extending the officer safety 
exception to any warrantless search beyond that need is a violation of constitutionally 
protected rights (Krause, 1973, p. 402). Referencing Bell three decades later, the Fourth 
Circuit reinforced the warrantless special-needs searches at airports, ruling in Epperson 
that these searches are essentially no different than officer safety searches of subjects 
permitted under Terry (Minert, 2006, p. 1642). 
2. Due Process and Equal Protection 
Constitutional arguments against profiling for security or law enforcement 
purposes by federal officials stem from the implied guarantee of equal protection under 
the law contained in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states:  
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.  
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Despite constitutionality questions, under certain circumstances profiling is 
permissible. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that the use of appearance, including one’s race, can be a permissible factor 
for police officers to consider in a reasonable-suspicion search when the officers “are 
aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts.” 
Most recently, the First Circuit ruled in United States v. Ramos, 629 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 
2010), that “in a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a person’s appearance is not per se an 
impermissible or irrelevant consideration.” The Ramos ruling further found that 
circumstances including apparent race do not “forbid the officers’ consideration of the 
information that at least two of the van’s occupants appeared to be Middle Eastern. 
Groups claiming to be affiliated with Middle Eastern terrorist groups had made a specific 
threat to the United States just weeks earlier … and concern about terrorism was intense.”  
The Department of Justice (DOJ) believes profiling—including the use of race—
is permissible by federal employees involved in law enforcement or aviation security 
duties to address “national security” or border integrity concerns. (United States 
Department of Justice [DOJ], 2003, p. 12). Justifying this position, the DOJ asserts that 
“no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” a rationale 
that permits federal personnel to use profiling to prevent “catastrophic events.” This 
national-security exception must be within the boundaries established by law and cannot 
be a “pretext for invidious discrimination” (DOJ, 2003, pp. 12–13). 
Department of Justice guidelines regarding profiling do permit the use of race by 
federal personnel involved in law enforcement or aviation security duties when involved 
in “threats to national security or the integrity of the nation’s borders” (DOJ 2003, p. 12). 
The stated justification for this exception is that “it is obvious and unarguable that no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation,” (Haig v. Agee, 
453 U.S. 280 (1981); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)). This 
guidance provides authorization for federal personnel to use all means permitted by law 
to prevent “catastrophic events” but cautions that the claim of a national security 
compelling interest must not be a “pretext for invidious discrimination” (DOJ, 2003, pp. 
12–13). 
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The DOJ position is supported by several studies. Markle Foundation researchers 
similarly conclude that profiling is constitutionally permissible and that neither Fourth 
Amendment hurdles of “reasonableness” nor Fifth Amendment equal protection 
considerations constrain profiling to any great extent except in limited situations 
(Breverman & Ortiz, 2002, p. 153). In their analysis, the authors concluded that none of 
the three hurdles of “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment “imposes meaningful 
constraints on profiling” except in limited situations (Breverman & Ortiz, 2002, p. 153). 
Citing the unanimous Supreme Court ruling in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 
813–18 (1996), the analysis notes that the intent of the individual engaged in profiling 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. What does impact the potential constitutionality 
of profiling is the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment (Breverman & Ortiz, 
2002, p. 152). Herzog, in the Florida Coastal Law Review, also concludes that profiling 
is constitutionally permissible when “the profiled person is more likely to cause harm” 
and when profiling meets the “compelling government interest” to protect the nation from 
terrorist attacks (Herzog, 2005, p. 386).  
In a Yale Law Review analysis of the constitutionality of the federal government’s 
“no-fly list,” Florence identifies three individual liberty areas of judicial concern with 
respect to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. These constitutional concerns 
involve impacts on an individual’s travel, occupation, and personal reputation (Florence, 
2006, p. 2159). With respect to aviation passenger screening, the freedom to travel and 
personal reputation are applicable. Florence asserts that, while the constitution does not 
specifically guarantee freedom of travel, this freedom is a “fundamental right” within the 
commerce clause in Article IV; he references United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 
(1966), in which the court presented the idea that “a right so elementary was conceived 
from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution 
created” (Florence, 2006, p. 1160). He also cites the ruling in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 
116 (1958), in which the court ruled that “the right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of 
which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law” (Florence, 2006, p. 
2161). Herzog argues a similar position, citing Kent and the majority opinion in Zemel v. 
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), wherein the Supreme Court noted that “the right to travel within 
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the United States is of course also constitutionally protected” but can be limited by the 
government when there is an overriding and compelling national interest that warrants 
restrictions. (Herzog, 2005, p. 386). 
Power and Herzog both provide substantive analyses of profiling. Power notes 
that the courts by and large “pretend” that the negative impacts on society as a result of 
profiling “do not exist.” To bolster that claim, Power cites the Supreme Court decision in 
United States v. Sokolov, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988), in which the court took a neutral stance 
regarding whether or not the use of racial profiling helped or hindered the determination 
of reasonable suspicion (Power, 2006, p. 63). Herzog posited a similar argument that 
profiling is not inherently in conflict with the equal protection clause if airport searches 
are “analogous to boarder searches” because the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985), had ruled that such searches are 
permissible “without individualized suspicion even if the stop is based largely on 
ethnicity” (Herzog, 2006 p. 390). Breverman and Ortiz support this same contention and 
note that in United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1992), the court found that, 
even when race was the predominate reason for stopping a suspect, this profiling did not 
find any conflict with guarantees of equal protection (Breverman & Ortiz, 2002, p. 155). 
Although this literature supports the contention that Fourth Amendment rights are 
not inviolate and that Fifth Amendment guarantees of equal protection can be diminished 
in the face of compelling national security interests, it does not address the limits of 
government action when exercising special-needs searches. Since 9/11, the level of 
intrusiveness for special-needs searches has increased substantially, and the literature 
fails to address whether it is appropriate to apply these intrusive warrantless search 
methods broadly to individuals without any suspicion that they pose a threat. Similarly, 
the literature does not discuss how alternative methods to determine the level of risk 
posed by an individual passenger and the application of varying levels of intrusive search 
to mitigate that risk could be impacted by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Finally, the 
literature fails to address how the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause impacts the 
government’s power to engage in profiling and to place restrictions on air travel for 
compelling national security reasons.  
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D. OPERATIONS RESEARCH MODELS 
In the intervening years since 9/11, several mathematic models have emerged 
from the fields of operational research and industrial engineering to improve passenger 
screening methods. These models can be grouped into two basic categories: 1) those that 
assume that the threat posed by an individual passenger is unknown and 2) those that 
attempt to classify passengers into categories by risk. The objective of both approaches is 
to maximize the security level8 of the entire passenger screening system. This 
overarching objective is achieved by maximizing the overall system probability of 
detecting threats while minimizing false positives and false clears.9 Underlying both 
approaches is the premise that security methods are divided into primary screening 
measures applied to all passengers and secondary measures applied in various 
combinations to classes of passengers generally reflecting risk.  
1. Unknown Threat Level 
Models that assume that the threat posed by individual passengers is unknown 
mirror the current TSA screening process. Like the current TSA practice, these models 
randomly assign passengers to some level of secondary screening, based on an 
underlying premise that a random and unpredictable process improves the deterrent effect 
of passenger screening. Where these models differ from the current U.S. approach is in 
their focus on improving process efficiency by reducing the percentage of false positive 
alarms while maximizing the security level of the system.  
An example of the unknown or constant threat probability model approach was 
published by researchers from the Institute for Safety and Security in Transportation at 
the University of Buffalo. Under this model, passengers are randomly grouped into 
different subcategories based on an assessment of the overall threat probability, while 
                                                 
8 For the purposes of this thesis, “security level” is defined as the probability of detecting a threat 
object when the threat object is actually present. The security level is dependent on the capability of 
security equipment to detect various threat objects and assumes that there is an equal likelihood that the 
threat object will be present in the property carried aboard the aircraft by the passenger or is on the 
passenger proper. 
9 A false positive is a threat alarm when no threat is present. A false clear is no threat alarm when a 
threat is present. 
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factoring in the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of the 
equipment used for each screening method (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2006, pp. 643–44). The 
authors hypothesize that it is possible to improve the overall efficiency of the process 
without sacrificing security effectiveness by treating passengers as if they pose different 
degrees of threat even when that difference is not known (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2004, 
p. 643). The random selection process used in the model avoids profiling passengers 
based on any specific categorization, thereby minimizing civil rights and liberties 
concerns.  
The researchers base their model on the following assumptions: 1) all passengers 
pose an equal threat; 2) a maximum of 30 minutes is available to screen the passenger; 3) 
the total time required to pass through all stations is under 30 minutes; 4) space is 
sufficient for required security equipment; 5) primary methods apply to all passengers 
with random assignment to secondary measures; and 6) an alarm at any station in the 
system is considered a system alarm (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2004, pp. 634, 638, 641, 644). 
The model uses eight check stations, four stations as primary and the remaining four as 
optional for secondary searches. Primary stations include 1) check in, 2) checked baggage 
screening with X-ray, 3) passenger screening with imaging or metal detector, and 4) X-
ray screening of accessible property. Optional measures are 1) physical search of checked 
baggage, 2) thorough search of passenger, 3) physical search of accessible property, and 
4) gate search of passenger and property (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2004, p. 640). Threats are 
broken down into four broad types—false identification, explosive in checked baggage, 
weapons on person, and weapons in accessible property. 
Using nominal detection values derived from open sources and a 0.1% probability 
that a passenger possesses a threat item, the model was run for an estimated 1,000 
passengers to determine an optimal percentage of passengers that should be assigned to a 
varying number of groups (from one to four) (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2004, p. 641). The 
authors concluded that efficiency of the process is improved when four random groupings 
are used and assigned to different combinations of the optional secondary screening 
methods. This result achieves a system security level between 0.94 and 0.99 with the 
lowest false alarm value (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2004, pp. 641, 643). The authors postulate 
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that the sensitivity of the model solution can be altered to reflect desired reductions in 
false clear rate limits during higher threat conditions by altering equipment sensitivity 
and TSO attention levels (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2004, p. 640–42). 
Unlike the current U.S. approach, maximizing efficiency and effectiveness under 
the equal-threat model results in a significant increase in the percentage of passengers 
assigned to secondary screening for reasons other than alarm resolution. The model 
results reflect just 22.9 percent of passengers processing through only the four primary 
screening stations. Nearly 30 percent of all passengers would be subject to hand searches 
at the checkpoint, with an additional 30 percent selected for random searches of their 
accessible property and their body during gate screening. These percentages represent 
dramatic increases above current resource levels and would require additional capacity 
and personnel to achieve an optimum security level for the entire system. What the 
results of this model do show is that the current TSA approach to implementing the 
equal-risk assumption philosophy is inadequate to achieve optimum security 
effectiveness through random and unpredictable assignment to secondary screening 
methods.  
2. Assigned Threat Level 
Models that assign passengers to different threat levels based on assessed risk are 
formulated as system optimization models. Two such models are the Multi-level 
Allocation Problem (MAP) and the Sequential Stochastic Passenger Screening Problem 
(SSPSP). Under the MAP methodology, passengers are grouped by threat level scores 
assigned prior to their arrival at the airport. The model then optimizes the screening 
process based on fixed and variable costs (McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 2006, p. 184) In 
the SSPSP model, the threat level for a passenger is not assigned until they check in for 
their flight; the Markov Decision Process10 is used to assign passengers to different 
screening measures based on the remaining capacity in the system at the time of  
 
                                                 
10 Markov Decision Process is a random process where the outcome is dependent on the current state 
of the process. 
 30 
assignment (McLay, Jacobson, & Nikolaev, 2008, p. 577). In both models, the objective 
is to maximize the security level for the system while concurrently maximizing the 
efficiency level of the process by using all search positions to maximum capacity. 
Both models are structured as discrete optimization or knapsack problems11 and 
have several common assumptions (McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 2006, p. 185; McLay, 
Jacobson, & Nikolaev, 2008, p. 577) These common assumptions include 1) that 
adequate procedures and capacity exist to resolve system alarms; 2) that adequate space 
exists to install the necessary quantity of security equipment at all search positions; 3) 
that a method such as CAPPS12 or Secure Flight13 exists to identify and assign individual 
passenger threat levels; and 4) that all passengers arrive in sufficient time to clear the 
screening process (nominally 60 minutes prior to departure) (McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 
2006, pp. 184, 185; McLay, Jacobson, & Nikolaev, 2008, p. 578). 
Unique aspects of the MAP model include independent threat-level assignment 
prior to the passenger’s arriving at the airport, variable number of passenger threat 
groupings (3, 5, and 8), and the assumption that all passengers have exactly one checked 
bag and one item of accessible property (McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 2006, pp. 185–88). 
The unique assumptions in the SSPSP model are that all passengers check in sequentially, 
are assigned a threat value at check-in resulting in their being placed into either the 
selectee or non-selectee group, more screening measures are applied and equipment 
allocated to the selectee group, and sufficient non-selectee capacity exists for all 
passengers (McLay, Jacobson, & Nikolaev, 2008, p. 578). 
 
                                                 
11 A knapsack optimization problem looks at the capacity existing in the system and assigns reward 
values to each item about to enter the system so that the maximum total reward is attained while using as 
much system capacity as possible. For security screening, the capacity constraint is the capacity of the 
selectee class, and the reward is the assigned risk level for each passenger. Maximum reward is determined 
by the highest overall security level for the system. 
12 CAPPS is a Computer Aided Passenger Prescreening System used by the airlines to identify higher 
risk passengers based on a number of preset profile criteria. 
13 Secure Flight is the replacement process for CAPPS operated by the Transportation Security 
Administration and is used for vetting passengers against terrorist watch lists and no-fly lists.  
 31 
The MAP model seeks to maximize total security while satisfying budget and 
capacity constraints. MAP assumes that 80 percent of passengers are assessed as low risk. 
Assignment of N passengers to M security classes is determined by the budget allocation 
for each class of passengers based on the fixed and marginal costs14 associated with the 
screening method used for that group of passenger (McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 2006, 
pp. 185, 186).The authors use seven security methods for the MAP model and designate 
metal detector passenger screening and X-ray accessible property screening as primary 
measures applied to all passengers. The remaining five security methods are grouped in 
various combinations depending on the number of threat classes selected (McLay, 
Jacobson, & Kobza, 2006, p. 189). 
The researchers show the results of running the MAP model using the 3, 5, and 8 
threat groupings for three different projections of passenger volume. The authors 
conclude that fewer threat classes are better since they produce the highest security level 
at the lowest total cost. The security level for higher risk passenger groups is between 
0.927 and 0.964 with the false clear level below the FAA established level and the total 
cost for each class optimized (McLay, Jacobson, & Kobza, 2006, pp. 189, 194). This 
result suggests that by differentiating passengers according to threat level and applying 
varying security methods based on the assessed threat, it is possible to improve both the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of the passenger screening process as opposed to the 
current TSA approach that assumes each passenger represents an equal threat and applies 
the same level of screening to all. 
Although another discrete optimization problem, the SSPSP model differs from 
the MAP approach in several important ways. While MAP optimizes security levels 
while minimizing costs, the goal of SSPSP is to optimize security levels by maximizing 
the assignment of passengers to the selectee group while not exceeding the capacity 
constraints of the associated selectee screening methods. SSPSP achieves this goal by 
assigning the passenger to either the selectee or non-selectee groups as he checks in at the 
                                                 
14 Fixed costs equal the purchase cost of each component associated with the class. Marginal costs 
reflect the direct cost to screen each passenger or bag through the equipment assigned to each class and 
include salary, consumables, and other noncapital expenses that can be allocated on a per capita basis. 
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airport. SSPSP uses a real time Markov Decision Process (MDP) for assignment to the 
selectee group depending on the high-risk capacity remaining in the system at the time of 
assignment and the expected number of arrivals in the future (McLay, Jacobson, & 
Nikolaev, 2008, pp. 577, 578). The overall screening system security level is determined 
by the conditional probability of a true alarm and the conditional probability of detecting 
a threat item on a passenger irrespective of their assigned risk level (McLay, Jacobson, & 
Nikolaev, 2008, p. 578). Running the SSPSP model with an expected 1,000 passenger 
arrivals resulted in a total security level score of between 0.71 and 0.74 (McLay, 
Jacobson, & Nikolaev, 2008, p. 586). 
The SSPSP model biases passengers into the selectee category at the beginning of 
the cycle as the method of maximizing the overall security level. This approach 
maximizes the use of designated selectee screening methods but drives resource 
requirements upward because several search methods are used continuously instead of 
solely for alarm resolution. Two aspects of the SSPSP model leave the approach 
vulnerable to gaming the system by terrorist groups. First, a known high-risk passenger 
may be assigned to the non-selectee group when a high number of future arrivals is 
expected as some selectee capacity is reserved for these future arrivals. Second, the 
model is vulnerable to a large number of high-risk passengers all arriving at the same 
time late in the cycle when most selectee capacity is already in use (McLay, Jacobson, & 
Nikolaev, 2008, pp. 581, 582). An example would be the large number of terrorists 
similar to the 9/11 attacks arriving simultaneously at the end of any designated cycle, 
resulting in some likely being assigned to the non-selectee group even though the 
intelligence information indicates that they present a higher risk. 
Several problems arise in the practical application of risk-based screening models 
not addressed in this literature. Some models appear to drive a requirement for more 
resources than currently required as larger numbers of passengers are screened by 
methods currently used for alarm resolution only. Additionally, the literature shows that 
some of these approaches are susceptible to “gaming” by terrorists timing their arrival at 
an airport or arriving in larger groups, which can increase the probability that some will 
be designated as low risk even though their actual risk level may be elevated. Finally, any 
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risk-based passenger screening approach requires security and airline personnel to be able 
to identify and track passengers from check-in to boarding to ensure that they undergo the 
appropriate level of screening. The literature is devoid of any review of risk evaluation, 
methods to identify and track passengers at airports, or the costs associated with the 
implementation and operation of such systems.  
E. RISK-BASED SCREENING 
The expectation that all passengers and their property will be screened prior to 
boarding commercial aircraft stems from the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 
(ATSA), P.L. 107-71, Sec. 101. However, the legislation recognizes the potential benefits 
of “trusted passenger programs” that apply varying levels of scrutiny to passengers based 
on the risk they may pose to aviation ATSA, Sec. 109. Despite this latitude, 100 percent 
screening is firmly entrenched in our aviation security strategy, with the National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorist Travel citing screening of “all passengers, operators, 
crew members, and baggage” as critical to strengthening transportation security (Redd, 
2006, p. 31). 
Several studies note that applying the same level of screening to all passengers 
results in “substantial costs” and the approach is likely unsustainable over time. Cost 
considerations include direct costs for equipment and personnel and indirect costs 
associated with passenger delays and opportunity costs where resources are not available 
to address “other security measures” (Jackson, 2008, p. 7). The opportunity cost 
consideration is important when determining how to allocate scarce resources across 
competing homeland security demands—even within the transportation sector alone 
(Jackson & Frelinger, 2009, p.1). To provide a more efficient and cost-effective screening 
model, several risk-based passenger screening concepts have surfaced based on the idea 
that passengers should be separated into different risk categories with different screening 
requirements applied to each category.  
Since the late 1990s, the United States has used some version of an automated 
profiling system to improve aviation security. The initial system was recommended in the 
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security report, which called for 
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“developing an automated profiling system tailored to aviation security … and 
implementation of such a system” (Gore, 1997, Sec. 3.19). This recommendation became 
the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS), implemented in 1998, 
which was used to identify passengers believed to pose a higher risk to aviation. While 
the exact listing of the 40 or so characteristics from which suspicious travelers are 
identified for increased screening is classified, the criteria is believed to include travel 
history, cash or credit purchase, one-way purchase, date of purchase and departure, and 
address (Fiske, 2010, pp. 180–81). Although viewed as a significant improvement in pre-
screening passengers as a means of identifying individuals who would be subject to 
greater security scrutiny, the CAPPS system relied entirely on the passenger’s providing 
accurate information and avoiding patterns that could indicate abnormal traveler behavior 
(Fiske, 2010, p. 181). The CAPPS program did successfully identify half of the 9/11 
hijackers, but the program at that time required only increased screening of checked 
baggage and not the passengers themselves (Kean et al., 2004, p. 392). 
To strengthen the pre-screening process, the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act (ATSA) required the newly established TSA to improve CAPPS (ATSA, Sec. 136). 
The enhanced passenger pre-screening system was named CAPPS II and represented 
several improvements over the original CAPPS approach. These improvements included 
validating the identity of every passenger during the reservation/ticketing process and 
conducting an individual risk assessment of every passenger using a combination of 
information from commercial and government databases (Kite, 2004, p. 1391). This 
combination of identity verification and assigning a risk score to every passenger was 
intended to change the equal-risk assumption underlying the current passenger screening 
regime (Von Rochow-Leuschner, 2004, p. 144). The output of the CAPPS II process 
provided the air carrier with the passenger’s risk score and color code, which would place 
the passenger into one of three risk categories for appropriate screening. While the 
specific details behind the risk algorithm were classified, the program reportedly created 
the passenger’s risk profile based on factors other than race, religion, or ethnicity 
(DeGrave, 2004, p. 131). Early opposition to CAPPS II came from civil rights groups, 
who were fearful that the program would infringe upon the civil rights and liberties of 
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many American citizens and resident aliens. These groups were also concerned about the 
vague reference to using CAPPS II information for “other purposes” contained in the 
January 15, 2003, Notice to Amend a System of Records (Kite, 2004, p. 1396; DeGrave, 
2004, p. 132). In the end, the TSA scrapped the CAPPS II program and implemented a 
scaled-down version called Secure Flight that validates passenger identity and conducts 
checks against the government’s no-fly and selectee screening lists. Secure Flight 
operates in conjunction with the original CAPPS program to identify passengers for more 
security screening. 
Risk-based screening programs are already used in several other areas. Within the 
aviation domain overseas, even the much heralded Israeli aviation security program 
contains a registered traveler component, where registered travelers receive “less 
cumbersome security” methods and clear security nearly eight times faster than other 
passengers (Poole & Passantino, 2003, p. 8). The former head of security for the Israeli 
Airport Authority noted that the difference between the U.S. and Israeli approaches is 
that the United States focuses on finding objects while Israel focuses on individuals with 
ill intent (Ran, 2002, p. 2). The Israeli approach focuses on people and applies a level of 
search commensurate with the risk category of the passenger. This approach avoids 
“wasting our attention on the ‘low risk’ passenger” so that more resources and time are 
available for screening ‘high risk’ passengers” (Ran, 2002, p. 4). An early risk-based 
proposal asserted the futility of inspecting “the entire ‘haystack’ of passengers … [to] 
search for the proverbial needle” (Golaszewski and Levine, 2001, p. 1). In January 2010, 
Israel started to implement a biometric-based identity system for passengers called 
Unipass Airport Management System, which is intended to speed enrolled passengers 
through security screening processes (Hellman, 2010, p. 2). Amsterdam also uses a 
registered traveler program, called Privium, at Schiphol Airport to speed enrolled 
passengers to their flights. Like the Israeli program, Privium uses biometric-based 
identity verification and provides expedited movement through check-in and screening 
processes (Poole and Passantino, 2003, p. 9).  
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Risk-based screening is also employed in programs such as the DHS Global Entry 
initiative. Under this program, approved participants “considered low risk” are allowed to 
proceed directly to claim their baggage and avoid primary customs screening after finger-
print-based identity verification (United States Customs and Border Protection [CBP], 
2009). Beyond accommodating “low risk” U.S. citizens, Global Entry now includes 
participants in foreign “trusted traveler” programs such as Privium and Germany’s 
Automated and Biometrics-Supported Border Controls (ABG) program.” (DHS, 2010b). 
DHS also employs risk-based methods in other border-entry programs like Free and 
Secure Trade (FAST), Pre-enrolled Access Lane (PAL), and Secure Electronic Network 
for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI). (DHS, 2006, p. 19). 
F. CONCLUSION 
Federal risk-management guidance provides a standardized method to manage the 
need to balance security with civil liberty concerns in a cost-effective manner. The NIPP 
requires federal departments to use this common framework to enable cross-sector 
comparisons and policy decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources to areas of 
greatest risk. While adopting a common framework is a sound approach with many 
potential benefits, the literature lacks specific implementing detail, which threatens to 
undercut these benefits.  
Since 9/11, a body of literature from various disciplines has discussed the 
application of the risk-management framework to passenger screening within the aviation 
domain. The literature points to the use of risk-based screening principles in other 
applications and in foreign countries that are potentially more cost effective and 
sustainable over time. These risk-based screening approaches are supported by several 
mathematic models that demonstrate that it is possible to improve the overall security 
level of the process by dividing passengers into three or four different risk categories and 
applying varying combinations of optional screening methods to these different groups. 




system and the need to track individual passengers from the time of check-in until they 
have boarded their flight to ensure that they receive the designated level of optional 
security screening. 
Adopting a risk-based approach to the passenger screening process will raise 
questions regarding unreasonable government searches and the equal protection 
guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. However, the literature demonstrates 
that a foundation for accepting such changes is in place in previous court decisions. The 
literature shows that both the courts and the general public view the definition of 
reasonableness as changeable, based on perceptions of the risk and the individual impact 
of more intrusive government search methods. Arguments that airport passenger 
screening methods create a situation where individuals must choose between their right to 
freedom from unreasonable government search and their right to air travel have generally 
been rejected by the courts, which have sustained warrantless searches as constitutional 
and necessary. Similarly, the literature supports subjecting groups of passengers to 
different screening procedures as appropriate when certain individuals or groups of 
individuals are more likely than others to cause harm. Two areas that the literature does 
not address are the limits on the government when devising special-needs search 
procedures, and the impact of profiling passengers according to risk on the guarantee of 
the equal protection clause under the Fifth Amendment. 
In the intervening years, several mathematic models have emerged from the fields 
of operational research and industrial engineering to improve passenger screening 
methods. These models can be grouped into two basic categories: 1) those that assume 
that the threat posed by an individual passenger is unknown and 2) those that attempt to 
classify passengers into categories by risk. The aim of both approaches is to maximize 
the security level of the entire passenger screening system. This overarching objective is 
achieved by maximizing the overall system probability of detecting threats while 
minimizing false positives and false clears. Underlying both approaches is the premise 
that security screening methods are divided into primary screening measures applied to 
all passengers and secondary measures applied in various combinations to classes of 
passengers, generally reflecting risk. While these models demonstrate the utility of 
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assigning passengers into different risk groups, some approaches drive an increase in 
resources and others create an opportunity for a terrorist group to defeat the system by 
timing arrival at the screening checkpoint to increase the likelihood of being assigned to a 
low-risk group. 
From the information gleaned during this literature review, several specific 
criteria are defined that will be used to compare and evaluate the three different policy 
options available to address passenger security screening needs within the United States. 
The five criteria identified as most applicable to this analysis are 1) security 
effectiveness, 2) risk mitigation, 3) constitutional permissibility, 4) social acceptance, and 
5) political feasibility. Chapter III provides an overview of the methodology to be used 
during the evaluation.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Hard choices must be made in allocating limited resources. The U.S. 
Government should identify and evaluate transportation assets that need to 
be protected and set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the 
most practical and cost effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan 
budget and funding to implement the effort. 
Kean et al., 2004, p. 391 
A. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
Regardless of the approach taken to ensure the security of commercial aviation, 
the challenge that must be addressed remains constant: preventing terrorists from 
smuggling explosives and other prohibited items aboard passenger aircraft. While some 
level of risk is inherent in the passenger screening environment, the degree of risk we are 
willing to accept can be varied depending on 1) the level of resources we are willing to 
devote to the issue, including funding, personnel, and technology; 2) the level of 
inconvenience and delay that we as travelers are willing to endure; 3) the location of the 
balance point between security on the one hand and privacy and civil liberties on the 
other; and 4) the philosophical underpinnings of the passenger screening system. This 
challenge must be addressed without sacrificing the fundamental principles that define us 
as a nation and in a way that the American people will accept and support. The primary 
research method for this thesis is the policy options analysis approach, which supports an 
objective evaluation of the current U.S. approach, the Israeli security model, and a 
proposed new risk-based security (RBS) method against a common set of criteria. 
1. Policy Options 
The following provides a brief description of the three policy options being 
evaluated in this thesis. A more detailed overview of each approach is provided in 
Chapter IV. 
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a. Option A—The Current U.S. Security Model  
Option A reflects the status quo assumption that all passengers pose 
roughly an equal risk to aviation security. Passenger screening is one of 21 different 
layers of security that comprise the aviation security regime. With few exceptions, all 
passengers traveling aboard commercial aircraft are required to submit to security 
screening. This approach supports the underlying assumption that all passengers pose a 
potential risk to aviation security. As a result, a basic set of security measures is applied 
to these individuals at the checkpoint, including identity and boarding pass verification, 
magnetometer screening, and X-ray inspection of all accessible property. To facilitate the 
search for prohibited items, passengers are required to remove their shoes, hats, and 
outerwear (coats and jackets), as well as many electronic items from their accessible 
property. Restrictions on liquids apply to all passengers, and they must be removed for 
separate inspection. Passengers are also subject to random selection for additional 
security measures including screening passengers by observation techniques, advanced 
imaging technology, explosive trace detection of property or individuals, and physical pat 
down. The list of prohibited items generally applies to all passengers, as does alarm 
resolution procedures. Transportation security officers concentrate on searching for 
prohibited items hidden either on the passenger or in their accessible property, which 
drives the focus of recurrent training, including X-ray image interpretation, procedural 
compliance, and concealment techniques. Passenger processing requirements and process 
efficiency standards require screening of more than two passengers per minute.  
b. Option B—The Israeli Security Model 
Option B involves some use of demographic profiling to identify high-risk 
passengers, who are subject to extensive security interviews and screening procedures. 
The long-term success of Israel’s aviation security approach has resulted in recurring 
calls to adopt this model from various U.S. government policy makers. A primary 
difference between the methods of the two countries is Israel’s focus on people versus a 
search for objects. In the Israeli model, every passenger is subject to an interview by 
security personnel trained to detect suspicious behaviors and physical indicators of 
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deception. Passenger identity is verified, and each passenger is checked against a variety 
of intelligence and law enforcement databases. Profiling of passengers based on their 
nationality, religion, national origin, and/or travel patterns is used to identify individuals 
who may be considered a security concern. Passengers of concern are subject to extensive 
security screening and additional interviews by security personnel that can last up to two 
hours. All other passengers are subject to standard magnetometer screening and X-ray 
inspection of their accessible property, and luggage is sent through a barometric chamber 
to simulate altitude pressures that could trigger an explosive device. Screening of 
passengers not deemed suspicious can take up to 15 minutes each, whereas the time to 
complete the screening process for the typical passenger traveling in the U.S. aviation 
system is less than 5 minutes. 
c. Option C—A New Risk-Based Security Model 
Option C proposes a new passenger security approach that assigns each 
passenger into one of four risk groups, based on what the government knows or does not 
know about the individual, and then calibrates security measures to address the risk level 
associated with each group. Some passengers would be categorized as no risk and would 
receive no security screening beyond identity verification. Low-risk passengers would 
voluntarily provide the personal information necessary to allow the U.S. government to 
complete a security background investigation. Once categorized as low risk, these 
passengers would undergo minimal X-ray and magnetometer screening but would be 
permitted to keep all items in their accessible property and would not be required to 
remove shoes, hats, or outer garments. Additionally, low risk passengers would be 
exempt from many prohibited-item restrictions. Passengers categorized as high risk 
would undergo far more extensive security screening than currently applied to individuals 
identified by the government as selectees. This level of screening would include physical 
bag search, X-ray inspection of all electronics separately from other items, inspection and 
testing of all medically necessary liquids, interview by security personnel trained to 
identify suspicious behavior and signs of deception, advanced imaging technology or 
equivalent physical search of their person, and explosive trace detection screening of both 
the passenger and his property. Any passenger who could not be placed in one of these 
 42 
three categories would be assessed as an unknown risk passenger and would undergo the 
same level of primary screening as currently applied to all passengers. Transportation 
security officers would not be time constrained in completing the screening process for 
any passenger assigned to the unknown or high risk categories. 
2. Evaluative Criteria  
This thesis will evaluate each of these policy options against the following five 
criteria: 1) security effectiveness, 2) risk mitigation; 3) constitutional permissibility; 4) 
social acceptance; and 5) political feasibility. The specific components of each of these 
evaluative criteria are detailed below. 
a. Security Effectiveness 
Security effectiveness assesses the probability of finding an object capable 
of damaging or destroying an aircraft when such an object is actually present or in 
deterring a terrorist attack. Effectiveness is determined by the security level of the 
screening process, whether or not a terrorist operative is identified for secondary 
screening, and considers the number of false positives and false negatives. Two models 
are used to determine the effectiveness of the passenger screening process.  
b. System Effectiveness 
Estimating the probability of detecting the explosive charge or detonator 
during primary and/or secondary screening, or of detecting a terrorist, is critical to 
defining the P1 and P2 parameters above. This probability is conditioned on several 
factors. The first factor is the number of opportunities to identify the potential terrorist 
and direct him to both primary and secondary screening. A second factor considers the 
effectiveness of primary screening methods in detecting an explosive device concealed in 
a passenger’s accessible property or hidden beneath their clothes. The final factor is the 
effectiveness of finding the explosive during the required secondary screening, either 
because the passenger was identified as a higher risk or because of an alarm at a 
previously identified screening station. For the purposes of this thesis, under both the 
Israeli and proposed RBS models, any alarm during the screening process is considered a 
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system alarm, and the effectiveness of secondary screening methods are considered 
equal, regardless of why the individual was processed through secondary screening 
measures. Figure 4 depicts the opportunities to identify a potential terrorist during the 
various primary screening measures and direct that individual to secondary screening.  
 
Figure 4.   Terrorist Identification Event Diagram (adapted from Schneidewind, 2005, 
p. 44) 
This model uses the following parameters and definitions: 
• P1 = Conditional probability of identifying a terrorist operative during 
screening;  
• P2 = Conditional probability of detection an explosive device during 
screening; 
• 1 – P1 = Probability of not detecting the terrorist. 
Information regarding the estimated probability of detecting a threat when 
a threat is actually present is contained in Table 1 for both primary and secondary 
security screening methods. The probability of detection for each security device or 
 44 
method has been set at the unknown level of 0.5 for illustrative purposes. This value will 
be adjusted upward or downward as appropriate during the detailed evaluation provided 
in Chapter V, which also provides an explanation as to the rationale for how these values 




Device/Method  p1 Detection 
Terrorist Identification Primary Secure Flight 0.5 
 Primary Behavior Detection 0.5 
 Primary Ticket Document Check  0.5 
Explosive Detection  Secondary Physical Bag Search 0.5 
 Secondary Explosive Trace Detection 0.5 
 Primary X-ray 0.5 
 Primary Advanced Imaging 0.5 
 Secondary Physical Pat Down Search 0.5 
Table 1.   Security Method Effectiveness  
 Table 2 reflects the representational data set that will be used for 
estimating the detection level of the security device or method. 
When the security process is predicated on any alarm, being a system 
alarm that triggers the full extent of screening of both the person and their property, the 
overall system effectiveness increases as more security measures are applied to the 
individual and their property. Under this criteria, it is possible to compute the conditional 
probability of the overall security level of terrorist identification (P1) and explosive 
 





Almost Certain 0.95 
Highly Probable 0.85 
Probable 0.75 
More Likely Than Not 0.6 
About Even 0.5 
Less Likely Than Not 0.4 
Probably Not 0.25 
Highly Improbable 0.15 
Almost Certainly Not 0.05 
Impossible 0.0 
Table 2.   Estimated Detection 
Using this formula and the representational data sets contained in Tables 1 
and 2, the computed security levels for  and  are as follows: 
P1 = [1.0 – [(1.0 – 0.5) (1.0 – 0.5) (1.0 – 0.5)] = 0.875 
P2 = [1.0 – [(1.0 – 0.5) (1.0 – 0.5)] = 0.75 
Where alarms at any given screening station are not viewed as system 
alarms, and therefore do not result in full secondary screening of both the individual and 
his property, the maximum security effectiveness of the overall process is limited to the 
highest level of security effectiveness of the individual component methods. As an 
example, if the probability of detecting an IED using explosive trace detection is 50 
percent and using X-ray inspection is 60 percent, then the overall system security level is 
60 percent. 
c. Probability of Deterring Terrorist Attack 
As noted in Chapter II, operations researchers have published a model to 
calculate the probability that a terrorist attempt would be deterred by the passenger 
screening process (Martonosi & Barnett, 2006, pp. 1–8). The model holds that the 
probability of deterring a terrorist attempt “Q” is determined by: Q = [P1 + (C + (1 – C) 
r) e] and uses the following parameter definitions (Martonosi & Barnett, 2006, pp. 2, 6): 
Q =  The probability that a terrorist attempt is stopped by the screening process. 
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C =  The a priori probability that an actual terrorist is classified as a high-risk 
passenger by the passenger screening process. 
r =  The proportion of passengers categorized as low risk who are selected at 
random for secondary security screening measures. 
P1 =  The conditional probability of detecting an explosive device during 
primary security screening of passengers, given that the passenger 
undergoes only primary security measures. 
P2 =  The conditional probability of detecting an explosive device during 
secondary security screening of passengers, given the passenger also 
completed primary screening. 
ε =  The opportunity of sending a terrorist operative to secondary security 
screening by correctly identifying him through a risk assessment process 
and reflected as the difference between P2 and P1 (P2 – P1). 
The authors provide the following example: If the probability of 
identifying a terrorist during prescreening is 50 percent (C = 0.5); and the conditional 
probability that an explosive device will be detected during primary screening is 20 
percent (P1 = 0.2); and the probability of detecting the explosive device during secondary 
screening is 50 percent (P2 = 0.5); where e = 0.3 (P2 – P1); and the proportion of low risk 
passengers sent to primary screening only is 0 (r = 0); then the probability of deterring a 
terrorist attack is 35% (Q = 0.35), as follows (Martonosi & Barnett, 2006, p. 7): 
Q = [0.2 + (0.5 + (1 – 0.5) 0) 0.3] = 0.35 
As noted by the authors, as “C” gets closer to 1, the more likely it is that 
the terrorist will be sent to secondary screening. Increasing “C” by improving the 
identification of terrorist operatives during the prescreening process is one of three ways 
to increase the probability of deterring a terrorist attack. The other ways are 1) to increase  
P1 by improving the effectiveness of primary screening processes for potential terrorists; 
and 2) to increase P2 by improving the effectiveness of secondary screening applied to 
high-risk potential terrorist subjects (Martonosi & Barnett, 2006, pp. 3, 7). 
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3. Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation assesses the reduction likelihood that an attack is attempted using 
an improvised explosive device (IED) brought on board a commercial passenger aircraft 
and hidden in a passenger’s accessible property or on their person and that the IED was 
successfully detonated, destroying the aircraft in flight. This criterion uses the standard 
DHS definition of risk, where Risk = Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence. 
a. Threat 
Threat [T] is determined by assessing the intent [I] and capability [C] of a 
terrorist organization to attack a commercial passenger aircraft using an IED (DHS, 
2010a, p.36). Threat will be calculated by T = [I*C], using the values in the following 
table. 
 Intent Capability Threat Score 
THIGH 0.95 0.95 0.903 
TUNKNOWN 0.5 0.95 0.475 
TLOW 0.15 0.95 0.143 
TNO 0.05 0.95 0.048 
Table 3.   Threat Values 
Since this method of attack has already been demonstrated in several 
attacks on commercial aircraft, both the intent and the capability components are assessed 
as “almost certain,” using the scale from Table 2, and the corresponding value of 0.95 
will be used for high-threat passengers. This assessment results in a computed threat 
score for passengers assigned to the high-risk group of 0.903.  
 
b. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is defined as the likelihood that the security system will fail 
and allow the attack to succeed (DHS, 2010a, p. 38). When calculating risk throughout 
this thesis, the vulnerability of a passenger aircraft to attack by an IED will be set at 0.25, 
assuming that each of the three policy options is “probably not” going to fail and applies 
the corresponding value from Table 2. 
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c. Consequence 
For the purpose of this thesis, consequences are defined as the direct 
financial impact of the catastrophic loss of a commercial aircraft resulting in the death of 
all on board, and a 10 percent decrease in commercial air travel over a two-year time 
span. Financial consequences not considered include the impact of any legislative, policy, 
or regulatory changes that increase the funding appropriated to aviation security 
programs by Congress, increase the costs to commercial air carriers, or increase security 
fees imposed on individual passengers. This thesis will use both direct and indirect 
economic impact. Direct consequences include loss of life and loss of property impact. 
The direct impact estimates are computed using standard program management 
estimation techniques, using the formula CN = [CH + CL + (4*CE)]/6 where C = Nominal 
Consequence; CH = High Estimate; CL = Low Estimate; and CE = Expected Consequence. 
The total direct consequence estimate is $1,615 (million) based on the preliminary 
estimates reflected in Table 4 (all dollar values shown are in millions).  
 
 Low Estimate High Estimate Expected Nominal 
Aircraft15 $72.85 $261.98 $164.18 $165.26 
Deaths16 189 550 270 303 
Value of Life17 $2 $10 $5 $5.33 
Table 4.   Consequence Estimates 
Indirect consequences reflect the economic impact of a 10 percent drop in 
air travel for two years following a successful terrorist attack and the financial impacts 
across the 20 business sectors identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce that have 
direct dependence on the commercial air transportation sector. This value is estimated at 
                                                 
15 Aircraft replacement cost estimates are based on the average replacement costs of $72.85M for a 
B737; $261.98M for an B777; and $164.18 for a B767. Retrieved on March 25, 2011, from 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/prices/index.html  
16 Estimates on the number of deaths resulting from the destruction of a passenger aircraft while in 
flight are based on the following: a low estimate equals the capacity of a B737 aircraft; a high estimate 
equals the capacity of a B777 aircraft; and the expected figure is based on the number of actual deaths in 
the Pan Am 103 attack over Lockerbie Scotland (Schneidewind, 2005, p. 40, and 
http://archives.syr.edu/panam/). 
17 Value-of-life estimates found in von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan, 2006, p.67. 
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$42,064 million (Von Winterfeldt and O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 67). The combined 
consequence impact of a successful IED attack aboard a commercial passenger aircraft is 
estimated at $43,679 million. 
A weighted average of risk will be used when computing total risk based 
on the individual risk assessed for various combinations of passengers. As an example, 
assuming that 3 percent of all passengers are considered high threat, and the remaining 97 
percent are an unknown risk, the total risk for this passenger group is computed as: 
High Risk Group: R = [0.903*0.25*43,679] = 9860.53 
Unknown Risk Group: R = [0.475*0.25*43,679] = 5186.88 
Total Weighted Risk = [(9860.53*0.03) + (5186.88*0.97)] = 5327.09 
 
d. Constitutional Permissibility 
Both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have a 
potential impact on any approach to passenger screening. Under the Fourth Amendment, 
citizens are guaranteed freedom from unwarranted searches by the government, whereas 
the Fifth Amendment implies a guarantee of equal protection under the law for all 
individuals. This criterion assesses how well the policy options conform to both 
amendments. As discussed in the literature review, the following elements will be used to 
evaluate this criterion: 
• Is the measure minimally invasive, as needed to address the threat and prevent 
a catastrophic event? 
• Are individuals more likely to cause harm subject to higher levels of scrutiny? 
• Which of the categories that govern Fourth Amendment searches is the 
measure based upon: no individualized suspicion, reasonable suspicion, or 
probable cause? 
• Does the measure implicate the liberty concerns associated with 1) undue 
restrictions on travel; 2) impacts on occupational choice; or 3) impacts on an 
individual’s reputation? 
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e. Social Acceptance 
The traveling public interacts with the TSA more frequently than any 
other government agency, and passenger screening is viewed as an inconvenience and a 
delay to many. The social-acceptance criterion assesses the degree to which the American 
people will accept the security approaches associated with each policy option.  
• Does the screening program make sense to the average passenger, or do the 
measures seem arbitrary and unnecessary? 
• Is the screening program a cost effective approach to aviation security? 
• Does the program minimize the inconvenience for the vast majority of 
passengers, who are in fact at low risk of committing a terrorist act? 
• Do travelers understand what to expect in the screening process? 
f. Political Feasibility 
Because security screening directly impacts so many citizens and private 
sector entities alike, this topic is politically charged. Any approach to passenger screening 
must be approved and funded by Congress and the administration. This criterion assesses 
how difficult it would be, from a purely political perspective, to implement any passenger 
screening option. 
• Is the screening process resource neutral, or does it require greater or fewer 
resources (e.g., funding, equipment, staffing)? 
• Is the screening process likely to increase performance in detecting explosives 
as the nature of the explosive and methods of concealment change? 
• Does the screening process achieve the objectives behind the 
recommendations contained in the 9/11 Commission report? 
4. Expected Outcomes 
Based on an understanding of the five evaluation criteria from review of the 
applicable literature and the brief description of the various policy options, the following 
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reflects the initial evaluation of the expected outcomes for each model. A more precise 
and detailed analysis is provided in Chapters V and VI. 
a. Option A: The Current U.S. Model 
Absent changes in technology or screening procedures, the current status 
quo approach will result in no change in overall security effectiveness or additional risk 
mitigation. While some court cases have challenged the constitutionality of recent 
advanced imaging technology and enhanced pat down procedure changes, the courts have 
carved out a special-needs exception to the Fourth Amendment for aviation security, and 
the overall constitutionality of the current process is well established. Social acceptance 
of additional security measures is likely to become more difficult and resistance to these 
measures more vocal. Political support for passenger screening exists, and while 
philosophical differences between the political parties is present, these differences focus 
on technology and privatization and not the underlying equal-risk approach.  
b. Option B: The Israeli Model 
The Israeli security model would improve the security effectiveness of the 
passenger screening process because more time would be provided to complete primary 
screening. This option would also effectively mitigate risk from the current threat 
stemming from Islamic terrorists by profiling passengers for additional security 
measures. However, this approach would create significant constitutional problems and 
would result in the courts’ rejecting the measures. Social acceptance would be mixed, 
with some advocating profiling and others objecting on civil rights grounds. Political 
support would not be present for two primary reasons: first, the public backlash against 
profiling would prevent bipartisan consensus for adopting this method; second, full 
implementation would increase the overall cost of passenger screening. 
c. Option C: New Risk-Based Security Model 
Using risk-assessment information to determine the level of security 
measures applied to individual passengers would raise the security effectiveness of the 
screening process. Similarly, by concentrating more security scrutiny on passengers 
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evaluated as higher risks, the level of risk mitigation as compared with the current 
process is expected to improve. The risk-based approach is constitutionally permissible 
for two reasons: first, it applies the minimal level of intrusiveness to mitigate the threat 
that the courts have held as the standard for the special-needs exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, but it does so in a more targeted manner; second, the fact that individuals 
voluntarily provide the information needed to categorize them as no- or low-risk 
passengers, overcomes the equal protection concerns of the Fifth Amendment. Because 
passengers will have the option of getting a background check to be placed in the low-
risk category and less intrusive security measures can be applied to a large group of 
travelers, this option is expected to be well accepted by the public. The expected broad 
level of public support for this option is also expected to make implementing this model 
politically feasible.  
5. Outcome Likelihood 
Based on the preliminary expected outcomes of each policy option, the 
information below provides an assessment regarding the likelihood that those outcomes 
would materialize. 
a. Option A: The Current U.S. Model 
Although additional procedures and technology are anticipated as the 
government reacts to changes in threat and terrorist tactics, the overall effectiveness of 
the process is unlikely to change. Similarly, the broad application of security measures to 
all passengers absent consideration of risk will not improve the ability of the process to 
further mitigate risk. The courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
passenger screening under the special-needs exception to the Fourth Amendment, and the 
fact that measures are broadly applied to all passengers meets the equal protection 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. These interpretations are unlikely to change and 
undermine the constitutional permissibility of passenger screening. As security measures 
continue to become more thorough in response to terrorist tactics and methods and these 
measures are broadly applied to all passengers, the social acceptance for aviation security 
is likely to continue to decline. Fundamental political support for passenger screening in 
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general is unlikely to change, although politically imposed restrictions on technology and 
procedures may occur as public acceptance becomes more vocal. 
b. Option B: The Israeli Model 
Overall, the constitutionality of this option and its lack of social 
acceptance make the approach politically infeasible. Although this option is expected to 
provide the greatest level of security, with the best risk mitigation, it is not expected to be 
accepted by the American people. This likely outcome is based on the lack of acceptance 
of current procedures that are less disruptive and intrusive on the traveling public than 
those entailed in the Israeli approach. 
c. Option C: New Risk-Based Security Model 
As several mathematic models demonstrate improved security 
effectiveness through even random assignment of passengers into risk categories, this 
expected outcome is highly likely. Absent time constraints during screening of 
passengers categorized as high or unknown risk, shifting the focus of transportation 
security officers from finding objects to concentrating on people will effectively mitigate 
overall risk. This approach is likely to withstand constitutional challenge due to the 
voluntary feature of the program (absent intelligence or law enforcement information to 
the contrary, passengers can decide to remain in the unknown-risk category). Further, 
government officials can articulate the case for the level of intrusiveness of screening 
measures to address the specific risk posed by each category of passenger, which may be 
overall more acceptable to the courts under the special-needs exception. Varying the 
nature of screening measures based on risk at the individual passenger level is likely to 
gain better social acceptance and support for passenger screening overall. Similarly, the 
increased security effectiveness and greater social acceptance, combined with the 
potential to free resources to address other transportation security vulnerabilities, are 
expected to gain bipartisan political support.  
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B. COMPARISON OF OPTIONS AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES 
Table 5 reflects the expected outcomes of the five evaluative criteria against each 
of the three options.  
Each criterion is assigned a relative ranking against the three policy options, 
where 1 reflects the best option for achieving the desired evaluative criteria outcome and 
3 reflects the least attractive option to achieve this outcome. For example, under the 
social acceptance criteria, option C is considered the most socially acceptable choice and 
is assigned a value of 1. Conversely, option B is the least socially acceptable and is 
assigned a relative value of 3.  
 










OPTION A 3 3 2 2 1 
OPTION B 1 1 3 3 3 
OPTION C 2 2 1 1 2 
Table 5.   Policy Options Matrix 
This use of relative rankings permits comparison of each option against the 
evaluative criteria by adding the respective numbers, where the option with the lowest 
total score is potentially the best policy choice. For Table 5, the total score for option A is 
11; for option B, 11; and for option C, 8. Although options A and B have identical 
relative ranking scores, questions regarding the constitutional permissibility of option B 
make this the least preferred choice, even though the approach is expected to result in the 
greatest improvement in security effectiveness and best overall risk mitigation. 
C. CONCLUSION  
Based on the projected outcomes of the selected evaluative criterion, the best 
option appears to be to adopt a risk-categorization screening system. Although this option 
may not provide the greatest improvement in security effectiveness or risk mitigation, it 
is projected to be the most acceptable to the American people and potentially more 
constitutionally supportable than either the status quo or the Israeli model.  
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A more detailed analysis of the three passenger screening models is necessary to 
validate the preliminary judgments and conclusions. In order to support that level of 
evaluation, a more descriptive overview of each of the policy options is necessary. Those 
descriptions are provided in Chapter IV. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF PASSENGER SECURITY SCREENING 
MODELS 
What the tragic security failures of September 11 reveal is that the 
continual piecemeal imposition of new technologies, rules, and processes 
can compromise security and erode public confidence in the government’s 
ability to ensure it. 
Downey and Menzies, 2002 
A. U.S. AVIATION SECURITY MODEL 
The layered-security concept employed by the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) to secure commercial aviation from attack by terrorist groups 
consists of 21 different measures. Underpinning these measures is the belief that any one 
of the measures is sufficient to deter or disrupt a terrorist plot, and when interleaved, the 
totality of these measures provides a resilient and robust defense in depth. According to 
the TSA, “in combination their security value is multiplied, creating a much stronger, 
formidable system” (Transportation Security Administration [TSA], 2011a). These 
measures can generally be grouped into categories based in general by type or location of 
the security steps. Categories include 1) intelligence; 2) checkpoint screening of 
passengers and accessible property; 3) checked-baggage screening; 4) random security 
measures; and 5) security measures on board the aircraft.  
Aviation security begins with intelligence information collected by the 
intelligence community, information provided to the United States by foreign intelligence 
partners, and counterterrorism investigations conducted by the FBI and their Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). This information feeds the Secure Flight system. At the 
time a passenger makes a flight reservation with an air carrier, he is required to provide 
some personal information that is used to conduct a comparison of the passenger’s 
identity against intelligence databases, including the no-fly and selectee lists. Depending 
on the results of this intelligence database check, the passenger is currently placed into 
one of three categories: 1) passengers identified as “no-fly” individuals will be denied a 
boarding pass and restricted from passing through security screening and boarding an 
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aircraft; 2) individuals identified as “selectee” passengers will be required to undergo 
additional primary screening measures prior to entering the sterile area and being allowed 
aboard an aircraft; and 3) normal passengers are subject to just primary screening 
measures that apply to all passengers but may be subject to a variety of random security 
measures while at the airport. In addition to Secure Flight, the airline-operated Computer 
Assisted Passenger Pre-screening Systems (CAPPS) also reviews several unspecified 
passenger criteria to designate certain passengers for additional screening by adding them 
to the “selectee” category.  
In addition to intelligence checks through Secure Flight, several primary 
screening measures are applied to all passengers and their property. The first primary 
measure is the ticket document checking (TDC) process. The TSA added this security 
layer when the agency assumed responsibility for travel document verification from the 
airlines in an effort to reduce the possibility of a terrorist’s using another individual’s 
identification or boarding pass to gain access to an aircraft. Since the TDC measure was 
added in June 2007, all passengers over the age of 18 are required to provide both their 
airline-issued boarding pass plus one government-issued photo identification to a 
transportation security officer for inspection. The TSA does provide an alternate means 
of validating passenger identity for individuals who have lost or misplaced their 
identification. If the TSA is unable to validate the passenger’s identity, then the 
individual will not be permitted to process through checkpoint security screening or to 
board an aircraft.18 All checked baggage is subject to screening for explosives using 
either explosive detection system (EDS) equipment or through explosives trace detection 
(ETD) technology.  
Following the TDC security measures, passengers proceed to the familiar 
passenger screening checkpoint. During checkpoint screening, all accessible property 
must be submitted for inspection by X-ray screening equipment, and all passengers are 
subject to screening by either walking through a magnetometer or through advanced 
                                                 
18 A list of acceptable government-issued photo identification can be found at 
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/airtravel/acceptable_documents.shtm  
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imaging technology.19 An array of technologies and procedures is also available at 
passenger screening checkpoints to address either unique screening situations or to 
resolve alarms or anomalies, based on established TSA procedures. These technologies 
include bottle liquid scanners, used to screen liquids exempt from the current 3-1-1 
restrictions (primarily medical and infant/child-care liquids), and cast scopes, which 
support the noninvasive screening of casts and prosthetic devices to ensure that they are 
not concealing weapons or explosives. In addition, all checkpoints are configured with 
explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment, which is used to screen both property and 
individuals for the presence of trace amounts of explosive residue. Beyond this 
technology, checkpoints use both physical inspections of property and people to search 
for weapons and explosives, and the TSA deploys explosives security specialists to assist 
with response and evaluation of suspect items and equipment alarms.20 
During checkpoint security screening, the focus of the transportation security 
officer is on finding prohibited objects, and primary screening measures are applied 
broadly to all passengers under the assumption that all passengers pose some level of risk 
to commercial aviation. As noted in Chapter I, the success of this methodology depends 
heavily on the capabilities of available screening technology and the TSOs who operate 
this equipment. In particular, X-ray image interpretation, which requires the TSO to 
search for a host of dissimilar prohibited object types (liquids, knives, firearms, 
explosives) among significant clutter and distracting items of everyday use, increases 
reliance on the cognitive abilities of the TSO workforce. Factors such as the time 
constraints to evaluate each X-ray image, the impacts of satisfaction of search (SOS) and 
dual target cost (DTC) phenomena, high levels of object ambiguity, and the susceptibility 
of X-ray screening to threat uncertainty combine to impact performance. The overall 
security level of the passenger screening process is also impacted by the fact that all  
 
                                                 
19 The TSA has made the use of AIT technology optional. Passengers selected for AIT screening who 
do not want to proceed through this screening technology will be subject to equivalent alternative screening 
including physical pat-down. http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/privacy.shtm  
20 For a brief overview of this technology and its primary application, see 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech2/sec_tech.shtm#eds  
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alarms are not viewed as a system alarm that triggers the full scope of security measures 
and technology applied to both the passenger and all of his property. As a result, alarm 
resolution measures are generally focused on resolving only the specific alarm at hand. 
A variety of random and unpredictable security measures are employed 
throughout U.S. airports. Passengers may begin to encounter these measures when first 
arriving at the airport. These measures include 1) visible law enforcement presence in the 
public areas of the airport, including explosive detection canine teams; 2) behavior 
detection officers conducting observations of passengers and looking for suspicious 
activities; 3) random security screening measures, such as requests for consent searches 
of property away from screening checkpoints or ETD screening of passengers’ hands 
while in the queuing area prior to the TDC position; and 4) closed-circuit television 
coverage. These measures may be encountered both in the public areas of the airport, 
including curbside, outside of the terminals, in the ticketing or baggage claim lobbies, 
and past security checkpoints, within the concourse areas and at departure gate areas. 
The final security measures occur aboard the aircraft themselves. These measures 
consist of 1) pilots trained and armed under the Federal Flight Deck Officer program;21 
2) hardened cockpit doors; 3) federal air marshals aboard selected aircraft; 4) flight crew 
members trained to handle security incidents on board an aircraft, and some who have 
volunteered to receive self-defense training; and 5) fellow passengers who have in the 
past assisted with subduing threatening passengers and are likely to resist any attempted 
repeat of a 9/11-type attempt to turn the aircraft into a weapon of mass destruction. 
As new search technologies and capabilities become available to improve 
detection performance, the TSA incorporates them within this process and develops the 
associated standard operating procedures used by the TSOs to employ these capabilities. 
Procedural changes are also made to address newly identified threats, methods to further 
improve detection performance, or risk assessments that indicate changes in risk levels 
for certain individuals. As example, the TSA recently announced two changes to better 
                                                 
21 Federal flight deck officers are deputized and armed federal law enforcement officials within the 
limited jurisdiction of the flight deck; they are authorized to defend the flight deck from acts of criminal 
violence or hijacking. The program was established by 49 U.S.C. § 44921. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/49/usc_sec_49_00044921----000-.html  
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address risk and minimize unnecessary procedures for certain groups of individuals 
processing through security checkpoints. One of these changes, titled “Known Crew 
Member,” changes the manner in which certain airline pilots and co-pilots are screened.22 
The other change involves procedures for screening children 12 and under.23 The various 
security measures used by the current U.S. model to screen passengers and their property 
are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   United States Aviation Security Model 
Random measures that may or may not be used for passenger screening and 
security purposes are noted in red, while static measures that apply to all passengers and 
their property are reflected in blue. These measures are: 
 
 
                                                 
22 Known Crew Member is a program sponsored by the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) and Air 
Transport Association (ATA), implemented in partnership with the TSA. For information on this program, 
see http://www.knowncrewmember.org/Pages/Home.aspx  
23 See TSA statement on this change at http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening_under12.shtm  
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1. Secure Flight; 
2. Armed law enforcement, including explosive detection canine teams; 
3. Random TSA security measures including behavior detection officer 
screening; 
4. Ticket document checking; 
5. Walk-through magnetometer; 
6. Advanced imaging technology; 
7. X-ray screening of accessible property; 
8. Bottle liquid scanners and CastScope technology; 
9. Explosive trace detection; 
10. Explosive detection systems; 
11. Random gate screening; 
12. Hardened cockpit doors; 
13. Federal flight deck officers and trained crew members; 
14. Federal air marshals. 
B. ISRAELI AVIATION SECURITY MODEL 
Although similar in nature to the U.S. layered-security approach, the Israeli model 
relies on concentric rings of security, with significant emphasis placed on personal 
interaction with passengers, beginning from the perimeter of the airport to the aircraft. It 
is this focus on personal interaction, including an interview of every passenger by at least 
one security staff member, that provides the most striking difference in comparison to the 
approach adopted by the United States and most other Western countries. Rather than 
concentrating resources and technology to broadly screen all passengers and property in a 
search for weapons, the goal of the Israeli method is identifying individuals with ill intent 
and subjecting those individuals to more intense security scrutiny. Other prominent 
features of the Israeli model are the continuous monitoring of everything happening 
throughout the airport terminal and security screening technology that checks for 
explosives and weapons, including placing some cargo in a decompression chamber to 
screen for altitude initiated explosive devices (Hellman, 2010, p. 2). According to 
Raphael Ron, “You must look at the problem of security from 360 degrees and develop 
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procedures that go beyond looking for weapons” (quoting Ron in Ficks, 2003, p. 1). 
While many of the specific measures employed by Israel for aviation security are 
classified, sufficient details are available in open sources to create a reasonable 
understanding of the elements that make up the entire aviation security regime.  
Passengers encounter the first visible layer of security at the perimeter of the 
airport. All automobile traffic entering the airport must come to a complete stop at a 
vehicle checkpoint on either of the two roads leading to the airport, located 
approximately a mile from the terminal. These checkpoints are configured with license 
plate recognition systems and armed security personnel and are monitored by a closed-
circuit television camera (CCTV) system. Each vehicle is examined, its license plate 
checked against a national database, and the driver and occupants may be asked several 
simple questions while the security personnel look for suspicious indicators or reactions. 
If the security personnel see or sense something suspicious, the driver and/or passengers 
are questioned further, and the vehicle may be searched, including screening for 
explosives using under-vehicle cameras. The commuter rail line that serves the airport 
also has armed security personnel on each train who are looking for suspicious 
individuals, and explosive detection canine teams are used throughout the airport rail 
station.  
Perimeter security at BGA also includes a five-meter-high fence equipped with 
motion detection sensors, fence integrity detectors, and buried fence. Closed circuit pan-
tilt-zoom cameras are placed approximately every 300 meters around the entire perimeter 
and are synched to the alarm sensors to automatically shift the camera’s aim point to the 
spot of the alarming sensor. Behind this outer fence is a second layer of fencing outfitted 
with razor wire outcroppings. The physical barrier provided by the perimeter fencing is 
augmented by armed security personnel who patrol the fence line and respond to breach 
alarms, with plans to field unmanned ground vehicles to enhance surveillance (Lowery, 
2010, p. 1; Hellman, 2010, p. 2; Fried, 2008, p.1; Tucker, 2003, p. 6; Kelly, 2009, p. 1–2; 
Ficks, 2003, p. 2). 
 
 64 
Upon reaching the parking garage, bus debarkation point, or BGA train station, 
travelers encounter the next layers of security. Armed security guards roam throughout 
the public and exterior areas of the terminal buildings, scrutinizing individuals for 
suspicious behavior as they approach the terminal entrances. Stationed at each terminal 
entrance is a second layer of armed security personnel, who conduct a brief check of 
documents, continue to observe individuals for suspicious behavior, and may randomly 
select some for magnetometer screening. Armed plainclothes security personnel are also 
present (Hellman, 2010, p. 1–2; Kelly, 2009, p. 2; Lowrey, 2010, p. 1; Tucker, 2003, p. 2; 
Fried, 2008, p. 1). 
As previously noted, the most significant difference between the U.S. and Israeli 
systems is the intense focus that Israel places on identifying people with ill intent rather 
than the search for prohibited objects that dominates the U.S. system (St. John, 1991, 
p. 85; Walker, 2010, p. 2; Hellman, 2010, p. 2; Tucker, 2003, p. 6; Lowrey, 2010; CNN, 
2011). The backbone of the process is the personal interview of every individual and an 
assessment of risk based on that interview and any information from intelligence agencies 
“because it is impractical to subject every passenger to a high level of security” according 
to David Harel, a former member of Shin Bet24 (quoting Harel in Tucker, 2003, p. 6). 
Passengers encounter this fifth layer immediately after entering the passenger terminal.  
Similar to the U.S. system, passengers are screened against a variety of 
intelligence databases, and individuals with suspect ties to terrorist organizations are 
identified prior to their arrival at the airport. Documents and passports are checked for 
travel trends and visits to countries of interest, and this information is used to assist with 
developing the line of questioning used by the highly trained interviewers. Items in the 
passenger’s possession can be checked against the responses provided to the interview 
questions, and throughout the interview process, the security personnel are assessing the 
passenger for suspicious behaviors and physical indicators of deception. It is not 
uncommon for some passengers to be interviewed by more than one security personnel in 
                                                 
24 Shin Bet, or Shabak, is the Israeli Security Agency (ISA). It is one of three agencies that make up 
Israel’s intelligence community. The ISA is responsible for internal state security, counterterrorism, and 
counterintelligence. http://www.shabak.gov.il/english/pages/default.aspx  
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order to check for consistency in responses. These interviews can take as little as a few 
minutes or can extend to more than an hour for passengers selected for more security 
scrutiny (Lowrey, 2010; Tucker, 2003, p. 6–7; Hellman, 2010, p. 2; Kelly, 2009, p. 2; 
Passenger Screening Israelis, 2001; St. John, 1991, p. 88). 
Although profiling based on race, religion, and nationality has been denied by 
Rafael Ron as being “professionally stupid” (quoting Ron in Ficks, 2003, p. 3), 
subjecting Arab passengers to greater security scrutiny is a common practice 
acknowledged by Israel’s transportation minister when announcing that the practice of 
placing different colored stickers on the luggage of Arab travelers would shift to 
assigning a unique number that would flag the luggage for enhanced security checks 
(Hellmann, 2010, p. 2; Lowrey, 2010; Blumenkrantz & Stern, 2007, p. 1; Passenger 
Screening Israelis, 2001). In addition to profiling using unspecified demographic criteria, 
the interview process is used to profile passengers based on behavior, signs of stress, and 
other indictors of deception (Pickett, 2008). Passengers of concern are subject to 
extensive security screening and additional interviews by security personnel that can last 
up to two hours. Baggage carried by these individuals is opened for hand search and the 
bag and contents tested for explosives (Lowrey, 2010). The fact that passenger interviews 
are conducted while they are still in possession of all of their property allows the security 
personnel to review the content of the bags to verify that they are consistent with the 
passenger’s responses (Picket, 2008).25  
On completion of the interview process, passengers proceed to the ticket counter 
for check-in and to receive their boarding passes. This stage in the passenger process 
includes luggage scanning in specially designed areas outfitted with blast containment 
boxes capable of withstanding an explosion from up to 100 kilos of explosives. Security 
personnel are trained to quickly place a suspect explosive device inside the container to 
reduce the risk of death and injury to individuals nearby (Fried, 2008, p. 2). Following 
                                                 
25 The success of non-demographic profiling was demonstrated on April 17, 1986, when a bomb 
hidden in the luggage of Ann Marie Murphy was discovered prior to boarding an El Al flight from London 
to Tel Aviv. The bomb was planted by Ms. Murphy’s boyfriend, later identified as a PLFP member 
attempting to destroy the aircraft. See http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/History/Affairs/Pages/Anne-
MarieMurphyCase.aspx 
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the scanning of luggage, passengers are issued their boarding passes, tender their checked 
baggage to the airlines, and then proceed to the security checkpoint, where they are 
subject to standard magnetometer screening and X-ray inspection of their accessible 
property (Kelly, 2009, p. 3). 
The next step in the security process is submitting checked baggage to explosive 
detection system screening and placing some luggage in a barometric chamber to 
simulate at altitude pressures that could trigger an explosive device (Weiss, 2010, p. 2). 
Prior to entering the concourse leading to the departure gates, international passengers 
proceed through passport control; all passengers go through a final inspection of boarding 
documents and passports to verify that they have the appropriate markings indicating that 
they have cleared through all security measures. The final security measures within the 
passenger terminal are the presence of both overt and covert armed security personnel 
who constantly monitor passengers, looking for individuals who are exhibiting suspicious 
behaviors and who are then subjected to additional security scrutiny (Hellman, 2010, 
p. 4).  
 
Figure 6.   Israeli Aviation Security Model 
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The visible security layers are shown in Figure 6 as:  
1. Vehicle inspection checkpoint; 
2. Airport perimeter security; 
3. Exterior security guards; 
4. Terminal entrance guard and magnetometers; 
5. Document review, security interview, and behavioral observations; 
6. Luggage scanning and check-in; 
7. Security checkpoint X-ray and magnetometer; 
8. Passport control (for travelers leaving the country); 
9. Passport and boarding pass check prior to entering the concourse; 
10. Overt and covert interior armed security guards. 
Four additional measures complete the system and extend to the aircraft itself. 
Each El Al flight has undercover armed sky marshal personnel on board (measure 11) 
(Walker, 2010, p. 2; Tucker, 2003, p. 7; Weiss, 2010, p. 2; St. John, 1991, p. 71). All 
aircraft are modified to provide hardened cockpit doors to prevent a breach of the flight 
deck and fortified cargo hold areas to minimize damage in the event of an onboard 
explosion from checked baggage (measures 12 and 13) (Weiss, 2010, p. 2; Passenger 
Screening Israelis, 2001, p. 1). El Al aircraft are also outfitted with an anti-missile system 
called “flight guard” to defeat anti-aircraft missiles (measure 14) (Walker, 2010, p. 2; St. 
John, 1991, p. 71). 
In January 2010, the Israel Airports Authority (IAA) implemented a biometric-
based security enhancement program called UNIPASS to speed cleared passengers 
through the security process. At each stage in the security process, enrolled travelers 
enter their issued smart card into a kiosk and are processed through that stage in the 
process under the watchful eye of security personnel who are ready to assist and are 
looking for signs of suspicious behavior. Although UNIPASS automates several steps in 
the process and continuously verifies the traveler’s identity at each step, according to the 
IAA, Israel is “not giving up on human interaction,” which provides the undergirding of 
the Israeli security approach (Lappin, 2010, p. 1–2).  
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C. RISK-BASED PASSENGER SECURITY MODEL 
Two basic approaches to implementing a risk-based passenger screening program 
have regularly surfaced since 9/11. The first approach reflects the Israeli model, which 
applies more screening measures above a predetermined baseline of measures to 
passengers identified as posing an elevated risk to aviation security. As noted in the 
description of the Israeli model above, this approach places a great deal of emphasis and 
devotes significant resources to identifying higher-risk travelers so that they can be 
singled out for increased security. A second option regularly proposed is to identify 
individual travelers who pose less risk and apply lower levels of primary screening to 
these individuals (Jackson, Chan, & Latourette, 2011, p. 1). Variations of this second 
approach have generally been referred to as “trusted traveler” programs. The proposed 
third option evaluated in the thesis represents a combination of these two approaches, 
where passengers are categorized by risk to receive either less or more security screening 
from a notional baseline applied to any passenger with unknown risk, and is referred to as 
risk-based passenger security. The proposed risk-based passenger security entails 
grouping passengers into four risk categories, based on what we know or don’t know 
about them as depicted in Figure 7. 
Under this proposal, travelers assigned to either of the first two groups—trusted 
and low risk—would be subject to reduced screening, based on the thoroughness of the 
associated background investigation. In order to be allowed into the “trusted traveler” 
group, passengers would be required to undergo and successfully complete an extensive 
background investigation. This comprehensive background investigation would include a 
face-to-face interview; checks on immediate family members, friends and neighbors; and 
fingerprint-based criminal records checks, along with checks against terrorism data bases. 
Beyond this background check and a periodic reinvestigation, travelers assigned to the 
trusted traveler group would undergo only two other security measures when traveling 
aboard a domestic commercial flight. These measures would consist of checks via the 
Secure Flight system and identity-based security checks at the airport. This final security 
measure would validate the identity of the traveler using some method of biometric 
identification card and verify that their travel documentation was valid and a match to 
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their identity. Passengers assigned as a trusted traveler would generally include 
individuals with top secret security clearances granted by the U.S. government (both 
government and contractor personnel), sitting members of Congress, airline pilots, and 
other flight deck personnel.  
 
 
Figure 7.   Risk-Based Security Passenger Categories 
Individual allowed into the “low risk” group would also be allowed to undergo 
less security scrutiny from the established baseline measures following successful 
completion of a less comprehensive background investigation than that required for the 
trusted traveler group. Passengers seeking approval as low risk would be required to 
voluntarily provide personal information necessary for the purposes of completing a 
security background investigation that could be similar in nature to the type of 
information and background checks currently implemented under the Global Entry 
program operated by Customs and Border Protection. In addition to the background 
investigation, Secure Flight systems check, and identity-based security measures, 
passengers approved as low-risk travelers would be subject to behavior detection 
screening, would be required to submit to walkthrough metal detector screening and X-
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ray of their accessible property, but they would be permitted to keep all items in their 
accessible property and would not be required to remove shoes, hats, or outer garments. 
Additionally, low-risk passengers could be exempt from many prohibited-item 
restrictions, such as liquids in excess of the 3-1-1 rule. In order to guard against the risk 
of coercion or threats that could induce a trusted traveler to carry an explosive device 
aboard the aircraft, low-risk passengers would be subject to additional periodic random 
security measures such as explosive trace detection screening of the passenger’s hands or 
property. As a further safeguard, any alarm during the security screening process (i.e., a 
possible weapon or explosive identified during X-ray screening, or an alarm at the 
walkthrough metal detector) would trigger the full scope of security screening measures 
defined for high-risk passengers.  
At the upper boundary of the risk spectrum are passengers categorized as high 
risk due to identified or suspect ties to terrorist organizations or individual terrorists. 
Under this risk-based passenger security screening proposal, high-risk passengers would 
undergo far more extensive security screening than is currently applied to individuals 
identified by the government as selectees. This level of screening would begin with 
Secure Flight, which would identify the individual as high risk. Upon arrival at the 
airport, the high-risk passenger would process through the ticket and identity document 
check. Once travel documents were confirmed, the passenger would proceed to the 
security interview and physical bag search position. This measure would function very 
similarly to the passenger interview process used by Israel, and the interview would occur 
while the passenger was still in possession of his accessible property to allow the 
interviewer to review the contents of the bags to validate the responses to security 
questions. All electronic items would be removed from the passenger’s property at this 
stage and submitted for X-ray inspection, searching for explosives. All other contents of 
the individual’s accessible property would be submitted for X-ray inspection.  
Following these security steps, the passenger would proceed for screening of their 
person using advanced imaging technology (AIT) to screen for explosives and weapons 
hidden beneath the passenger’s clothing. AIT screening would be followed by an ETD of 
the passenger’s hands, looking for explosive residue, and a physical pat down of the 
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individual to ensure that no weapons or explosives were undetected during primary AIT 
screening. The final step in the high-risk passenger screening process is the ETD of all 
electronics to detect trace amounts of explosive particles that would trigger closer 
examination of these items. Similar to the Israeli model, transportation security officers 
would not be time constrained in completing the screening process for any passenger 
assigned to the unknown or high-risk categories, and they would be aware that the 
property they were inspecting belonged to individuals identified as high risk. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Risk-Based Security Model 
Any passenger who could not be placed in one of these three categories would be 
assessed as an unknown-risk passenger and would undergo the same level of primary 
screening as currently applied to all passengers and described above. Three fundamental 
changes would be introduced to improve the security effectiveness of the screening 
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process in two ways. First, all unknown passengers would be subject to passive screening 
for suspicious behaviors by trained behavior detection officers. This measure improves 
the ability of the security process to identify individuals with ill intent. The second 
improvement over the current U.S. approach would be a shift to a systems alarm 
philosophy and away from mere alarm resolution.  
As noted in the Israeli model, treating every alarm as a systems alarm improves 
the overall security effectiveness of the process by subjecting passengers who alarm for 
any reason to the full measure of secondary screening methods. Primary screening 
methods applied to passengers in the unknown-risk category form the baseline security 
approach and consist of Secure Flight, behavior detection officer screening, travel 
document checks; X-ray screening of accessible property, screening of the passenger 
through AIT equipment (or equivalent physical pat down if the passenger refuses AIT 
screening), and ETD screening of electronic items. Passengers in the unknown-risk 
category would also be subject to additional random security screening methods, such as 
ETD of hands, footwear, or property, and physical search of accessible property.  
The security processes applied to the passengers assigned to the various risk-
based security categories are depicted in Figure 8 and Table 6. In addition to the 
passenger checkpoint screening processes, other security measures include explosive 
detection system screening of checked baggage, federal flight deck officers (item 13), and 
federal air marshals aboard certain unspecified flights (measure 14). 
The risk-based passenger security screening model seeks to strike an appropriate 
balance between the emphasis on identifying individuals with ill intent inherent in the 
Israeli model and broadly applied searches for weapons and other prohibited items 
inherent in the current U.S. approach. This approach also seeks to combine the elements 
of the two broad methods for developing trusted-traveler-type programs by 
simultaneously reducing primary screening measures for individuals assessed as lower 
risk and applying greater security measures to passengers identified as high risk. By 




security, the risk-based security approach should increase the overall security level of the 
passenger screening process while providing acceptable risk reduction to the domestic 
aviation sector.  
Understanding each of the three security models at this high level allows 
evaluation of the models against the five criteria identified in Chapter III. This evaluation 
is provided in the following chapter, along with a side-by-side comparison of these policy 
options. 








Group 1. Background Investigation Yes Yes No No 2. Secure Flight Yes Yes Yes Yes 3. Identity and Travel Document Verification Yes Yes Yes Yes 4. X-ray Property Screening No Yes26 Yes Yes27 5. Walk Through Metal Detector No Yes No No 6. Advanced Imaging No No Yes Yes 7. Behavior Detection Screening No Yes Yes No 8. Physical Property Search No No No Yes 9. Security Interview No No No Yes 10. Explosive Trace Detection of Property No No Yes Yes 11. Explosive Trace Detection of Passenger No No No Yes 12. Physical Pat Down No No No Yes 
Table 6.   Primary Security Measures for Each Risk Group 
                                                 
26 All items would be left in the accessible property. 
27 All electronic items would be removed and x-rayed separately. 
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V. POLICY EVALUATION 
One cannot live free if one lives in fear because people are more able to 
exercise their freedoms if they feel safe. But the need to be safe, the need 
to be free from fear should not be used, as it sometimes has been, to justify 
policies or actions that ignore our rights. It does not mean that our efforts 
to secure civil rights, liberties, and privacy must be partially rooted in the 
need to secure our nation. 
Janet Napolitano, 2010 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter evaluates a selection of quantitative and qualitative criteria with 
direct application to each of the three passenger screening approaches described in 
Chapter IV. Within the broad category of quantitative criteria, the two areas of relevance 
chosen for evaluation are security effectiveness and risk mitigation. These measures are 
selected because they provide an effective gauge of the efficacy of the three policy 
options and allow for some direct comparison and relative ranking of the models. This 
section takes several arithmetic formulas from the field of operations research and shifts 
their application from theoretical to practical, using the primary and secondary security 
measures contained in each of the proposed approaches. Some assumptions regarding 
security measures will be made in order to support a viable comparison, and the rationale 
behind these assumptions will be explained. Additional information regarding any 
supporting research, where available, is provided along with an explanation of how that 
research informed these assumptions.  
Following the quantitative analysis, the evaluation moves to several key 
qualitative criteria that have the potential to enable or inhibit the successful 
implementation and sustainability of any policy decision. This qualitative analysis 
addresses just three criteria that are arguably the most fundamentally important to 
evaluating any aviation security policy option. These criteria are constitutional 




overview of the pertinent information identified during the research, followed by a 
discussion of how each policy option under consideration in this thesis is potentially 
impacted by that information. 
B. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 
One constant throughout human history is that no defensive security program is 
impenetrable. This reality is certainly true in the commercial aviation passenger screening 
context. Security policy within U.S. commercial aviation seeks to strike a balance 
between the efficacy of the program and the efficiency of the system, while 
simultaneously safeguarding the civil rights of passengers. This balance is reflected in 
how the TSA defines its mission to “protect the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure 
freedom of movement for people and commerce (TSA, 2011b). The two quantitative 
measures used in this thesis—security effectiveness and risk mitigation—are intended to 
determine where this balance point is set with respect to these individual policy options 
so that they can be arranged in a relative rank ordering. Once the notional effectiveness of 
the three models is determined using a common methodology, it is then possible for 
policy makers to assess these security benefits against more qualitative factors.  
Although the models used in this analysis are straightforward, the values used for 
each of the factors are not. It is important to stress that this analysis does not attempt to 
develop a pinpoint value of effectiveness or risk score for any of the policy options 
because it is not a definitive computed value that is most important to the conclusions. 
Rather, it is the relative ranking and the differences between the computed values for the 
different models that are important, as these differences illuminate how the policy options 
compare against each other with respect to security effectiveness. It is also important to 
understand that this analysis is approached in a manner that avoids direct disclosure of 
security sensitive information regarding the actual effectiveness of specific security 
measures or technologies employed in the current U.S. passenger screening approach that 
could be exploited by terrorist groups. To meet academic objectives and to allow this 
thesis to be broadly available, actual values are not used; unless otherwise noted, 
assigned values used in this analysis are representational. In some instances, the values 
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used are adopted from academic literature, and the source of this data is noted where 
applicable. Where representational values were not found in open source literature, they 
are derived from the author’s direct experience in aviation security but have been 
adjusted either upwards or downwards and then aligned with the scale presented in 
Table 7 so as not to reveal actual system performance.28 The reader should not conclude 
that the computational results from this use of representational data reflect actual security 
effectiveness or performance characteristics, and any depiction of actual performance is 
accidental and unintentional. 
1. Security Effectiveness 
This section begins with assessing the overall security effectiveness of the three 
passenger screening approaches. It is divided into two major categories—detection and 
deterrence. Detection is computed by determining the conditional probabilities of 
locating the targeted object through the combination of primary and secondary security 
measures used in each approach. This section will lay out the conditional probabilities for 
each model and then apply those probabilities to assessing the deterrence value of the 
respective options.  
Throughout this analysis, security effectiveness is limited to just two areas. The 
first component is a determination of how effective the system is in detecting a threat. For 
the purposes of this evaluation, threat is narrowly defined as either a potential terrorist 
operative with intent to commit a terrorist act aboard a commercial aircraft or an 
improvised explosive device concealed on the individual or within the property he is 
carrying through the passenger security screening checkpoint. The second component 
explored is the deterrence effect of the security process—in other words, how the 
effectiveness of the system might be perceived by the terrorist as a means of dissuading 
him from attempting to penetrate the checkpoint to commit a terrorist act. In essence, 
successful deterrence represents a lack of attempt to breach the passenger security 
process to attack a commercial aircraft using an explosive device carried onboard the 
                                                 
28 The author has nearly nine years’ direct experience in the field of aviation security since 9/11, with 
more than six years in leadership positions as the assistant federal security director for screening operations 
and deputy federal security director at two of the nation’s largest commercial airports.  
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passenger cabin of an aircraft.29 The computed security effectiveness will then be used as 
an input for determining the deterrence value for each of the policy options. 
With respect to system effectiveness, it is possible to disrupt and prevent an 
attempted terrorist attack during passenger screening by one of two means—by detecting 
the operative and preventing him from entering the aviation system or by detecting the 
object intended to be used as a weapon during the screening process. Although there are a 
variety of objects that could be used as weapons and which pose a risk to individual 
passengers or the aircraft as a whole, the most significant threat object is an explosive 
device. For this reason, and because the many security layers implemented since 9/11 
have reduced the number of objects that can result in catastrophic failure of the aircraft 
and the death of all on board, the conditional probability of object detection is limited to 
just explosive devices. Therefore, the detection component of security effectiveness is 
assessed separately for these two sub-elements—detecting people with intent to commit a 
terrorist act against the aircraft and detection of an explosive device. Because an 
explosive device can be hidden either on the passenger or within his accessible property, 
these two concealment methods provide two additional sub-components of this aspect of 
effectiveness. The overall effectiveness of the security process is reflected by the 
conditional probabilities of detection and the response of the security program to alarms 
that indicate the potential presence of a true threat.  
Conditional probabilities are aligned to the ten-point probability scale reflected in 
Table 7 below. This table provides both a qualitative description and assigned detection 
probability value. The approach taken to assign a specific value to any individual security 
measure in the process was first to assess the qualitative descriptor based on judgment. 
This process requires some reasonable conclusions to be drawn with respect to both the 
probability of deterring a terrorist attack and the probability of identifying a terrorist 
operative or explosive device during the security process. For example, open source 
                                                 
29 Success in the deterrence realm includes 1) a terrorist arriving at the airport and then departing 
because of fear of discovery during security screening; 2) a suicide bomber electing to detonate an 
explosive device prior to or during checkpoint because of fear of discovery; 3) a suicide bomber 
prematurely detonating his explosive device during the security screening process when on the cusp of 
discovery; and 4) a terrorist shifting his plot to attack a non–aircraft target due to the perceived difficulty in 
defeating security measures.  
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reporting highlighted in Chapters I and III regarding the effectiveness of X-ray operators 
in finding prohibited objects indicates that, while detecting prohibited objects during X-
ray screening is not impossible, neither is their detection almost certain. However, it is 
reasonable to expect that finding sophisticated and well-concealed explosive devices 
during X-ray inspection is highly probable, or this method would not be used; therefore a 
probability of detection of 0.85 is assigned to this security step. 
 
Description Probability 
Almost Certain 0.95 
Highly Probable 0.85 
Probable 0.75 
More Likely Than Not 0.6 
About Even 0.5 
Less Likely Than Not 0.4 
Probably Not 0.25 
Highly Improbable 0.15 
Almost Certainly Not 0.05 
Impossible 0.0 
Table 7.   Probability of Detection (adapted from Lewis, 2006, p. 206)30 
In order to effectively compare the relative effectiveness of the three policy 
options, the assigned descriptors and associated detection probabilities from Table 7 are 
generally held constant for security measures that are common across the three policy 
options under evaluation. Where different values are used for a like process, an 
explanation of the rationale used to arrive at these differences is provided. As an example, 
not all security measures are used in the same way under each model, with some applied 
broadly to every passenger in one approach and randomly to some passengers in another 
option. These differences in how the security measures are applied leads to the judgment 
                                                 
30 This table is adapted from a scale by Lewis used to illustrate the probability of a successful attack. 
The descriptive labels and corresponding probability value are those of the author. 
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that the probability of detection should be different when computing the security 
effectiveness of those different models. 
a. System Effectiveness 
As noted above, system effectiveness is one of two elements that make up 
overall security effectiveness. System effectiveness represents the overall effectiveness of 
the passenger security screening system and is defined as the probability of either 
identifying a terrorist operative or detecting the explosive charge or detonator from an 
explosive device during primary and/or secondary screening of the passenger or his 
property when such a device is actually present. System effectiveness is conditioned by 
several factors: 1) the number of opportunities to identify the potential terrorist and direct 
him to secondary screening; 2) the probability of detection of an explosive device when 
such a device is actually present; 3) the rate of false clear when a terrorist operative in 
possession of an explosive device is not successfully detected and is allowed to pass into 
the sterile airport area still in possession of the device; and 4) the condition of whether or 
not the policy views every alarm as a systems alarm that triggers the full measure of 
security processes being applied to both the passenger and his property.  
Table 8 provides a listing of the various security measures detailed in 
Chapter IV that are used to identify terrorist operatives and assigns each measure an 
estimate of their detection probability from Table 7. It is important to emphasize that the 
probability of detection estimates is reflective of that security measure’s operation as a 
stand-alone function in identifying a terrorist operative. These detection probabilities do 
not reflect the increased effectiveness of security measures when applied in combination. 
When multiple security measures are combined, the overall effectiveness of the systems 
increases. This amplifying effect is particularly true when these measures are combined 
to form a system of primary security screening, as will be demonstrated in the 














Passenger Background Investigation NA NA 0.85 
Intelligence Databases 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Vehicle Checkpoint NA 0.5 NA 
Exterior Surveillance NA 0.5 NA 
Security Interview NA 0.75 0.75 
Behavior Observation 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Overt/Covert Surveillance 0.4 0.6 0.4 
Identity and Travel Document 
Checks 
0.15 0.15 0.15 
Table 8.   Probability of Terrorist Identification 
As noted in Table 8, the estimated probability of detection for behavior 
observation and overt/covert surveillance measures is not consistent across the three 
policy options, even though the underlying assumption is that performance is equal when 
considered at the individual level of the personnel performing these duties. The rationale 
for this difference stems from the fact that under the existing U.S. process both of these 
security measures are applied in a random and unpredictable manner as detailed in 
Chapter IV. Deploying security measures randomly and unpredictably does not reduce 
the basic effectiveness of the measures operating in isolation, nor does it reduce their 
overall deterrence value,31 the approach simply limits the percentage of passengers 
subject to those measures. In other words, when all passengers are subject to these 
measures, the security technique is more likely than not able to pick out a terrorist 
operative in a crowd of passengers based on the behavior of that individual (60% 
probability of detection). However, when the technique is randomly applied to just one-
third of all passengers, the overall system-wide probability of detection is reduced to less 
likely than not, while the ability to identify a terrorist operative within the crowd of 
                                                 
31 When security measures are used in a truly random and unpredictable way, their deterrence value 
remains the same because the terrorist operative cannot predict whether or not he will be subject to those 
measures when on arrival at the airport for passenger screening.  
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passengers subject to these measures remains at the more-likely-than-not level. Because 
surveillance and behavior observation measures are not applied to every passenger or at 
every checkpoint, the overall effectiveness of these measures is decreased when viewed 
from the macrosystems perspective, and these measures are less likely than not able (40% 
probability of detection) to identify a terrorist operative within the system, as compared 
with consistent and non-random use of these measures. Using this same reasoning, the 
estimated effectiveness of overt/covert surveillance under the risk-based security process 
is also reduced. Each of the measures listed in Table 8 is considered a primary screening 
measure. 
Table 9 reflects the various security measures used to detect explosive 
devices and their representational probability of detecting such a device on a person or in 
their property when the device is actually present. Again, as was the case for the security 
measures listed in Table 8, the probability of detection reflects the security measure 
employed as a stand-alone function and not in combination with any other measure. For 
example, the analysis assumes that it is highly probable that using explosive trace 
detection will detect the presence of an explosive device, and the corresponding value of 
85 percent is assigned from Table 7. Whether or not the security measure is used 
predominately as a primary or secondary measure under each model is reflected by the 
parenthetical notation of P for primary and S for secondary. Items listed as secondary 
measures are principally used for alarm resolution but may also be applied randomly to 
passengers as primary screening steps. Whether or not the measure is used as a primary 
security requirement impacts the overall security effectiveness of the process as these 
measures are combined.  
As reflected in Table 9, advanced imaging technology is not used by Israel 
but is employed in both the current U.S. and proposed risk-based passenger security 
screening approaches as a primary security measure. Under the current U.S. model, any 





screening. According to the TSA, passengers who do not wish to be screened using 
advanced imaging technology can elect alternative screening that will include a physical 
pat down (TSA, 2011c).32  
 
Security Measure Detection Probability 
 Current U.S. Israeli Risk Based 
Physical Bag Search 0.75 (S) 0.75 (P) 0.75 (P) 
Explosive Trace Detection 0.85 (S) 0.85 (P) 0.85 (P) 
X-ray Screening 0.6 (P) 0.85 (P) 0.85 (P) 
Advanced Imaging Technology33 0.85 (P) NA 0.85 (P) 
Physical Pat Down 0.85 (S) 0.85 (S) 0.85 (S) 
Table 9.   Probability of Explosive Device Detection 
The assigned detection probability for X-ray screening under the current 
U.S. model, as reflected in Table 8, is lower than for the other two policy options. The 
author’s rationale for assigning different detection probabilities is based on findings that 
the longer an individual has to search a complex image for prohibited objects (such as 
guns, knives, and explosive devices), combined with frequency of exposure to the target 
objects that build recognition, the greater the accuracy in detecting the presence of these 
objects, even when they are well camouflaged (McCarley et al., 2004, pp. 302, 306). 
Several factors identified in the literature diminish detection performance, including 1) 
the amount of time the operator has to complete a visual search of the X-ray image to 
identify threat objects; 2) the frequency with which the target threat object is presented to 
the operator—how often the operator encounters the specific object impacts his ability to 
quickly recognize that object during visual search; 3) the dual target cost (DTC) 
phenomenon, which decreases operator performance in finding all anomalous target 
                                                 
32 See http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/faqs.shtm  
33 At present advanced imaging technology is not deployed across the entire domestic aviation system 
and does not support all passengers being screened with this technology. As a result, passengers are 
randomly selected for AIT screening, which decreases the system-wide probability of detection, similar to 
behavior detection officer screening conducted on a random and unpredictable manner under the current 
U.S. approach. 
 84 
objects when more than one is present and they are dissimilar in appearance (e.g., a 
handgun versus an explosive mass); and 4) the satisfaction of search (SOS) phenomenon, 
which results in operators discontinuing their visual search upon finding some other 
anomalous object in the image. A brief overview of each of these factors is provided 
below. 
In the aviation security environment, X-ray images of carry-on property 
present complex and densely cluttered images that must be visually searched for 
prohibited objects under time constraints. A variety of research studies demonstrate that 
providing more time to complete the visual search increases performance accuracy in 
detecting the presence of explosive device components and other weapons (Bruner & 
Postman, 1949, p. 210; Menneer et al., 2006, p. 930; Jackson, Chan, & Latourette, 2011, 
p. 4; Fleck, Samei, & Mitroff, 2010, p. 64). The relationship between accuracy and time 
is logarithmic, not linear, where detection error decreases exponentially as search time 
increases (Menneer et al., 2010, p. 917). Figure 9 provides a visual depiction of this 
logarithmic relationship using the equation P (t) = 1-e-yt where y represents detection error 
and t reflects the time available to search the X-ray image (Jackson, Chan, & Latourette, 
2011, p. 4). 
 
Figure 9.   Probability of Detection under Fixed Conditions (from Koopman, 1956, 
p. 506) 
Visual search performance also increases with frequency of exposure to 
images of the target objects as increased prevalence builds recognition proficiency, with 
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recognition error rates of low prevalence target objects at nearly twice the level as high 
prevalence objects (Wolfe, Horowitz, & Kenner, 2005, p. 439).  
Dual target cost (DTC) and satisfaction of search (SOS) phenomena also 
impact the time to complete the visual search and accuracy in finding target objects when 
the same image must be searched for multiple threat objects. This type of environment is 
characteristic of aviation security needs. The dual target cost (DTC) impact is particularly 
prevalent when the target objects are dissimilar (e.g., metallic threats, like guns and 
knives, and organic threat objects, like explosives) and is present even when using color 
enhanced X-ray images to display different object types as different colors (e.g., metal 
objects are displayed in a different color from organic objects). Satisfaction of search 
(SOS) reflects the fact that individuals conducting visual searches of images become 
satisfied after finding one such object and discontinue their search efforts as a result 
(Goodwin et al., 2010, p. 79; Menneer et al., 2007, p. 930; Fleck, Samei, & Mitroff, 2010, 
p. 60; Berbaum et al., 2001, p. 304). Several measures can minimize performance 
impacts stemming from SOS and DTC during critical visual search tasks for multiple 
objects in critical applications such as the aviation security environment. Research shows 
that increased operator alertness will serve to decrease the impacts of SOS and DTC on 
overall performance (Babu, Batta, & Lin, 2006, p. 634). Research also supports the need 
to provide sufficient search time, and high levels of object exposure are also necessary 
(McCarley et al., 2004, pp. 302, 306; Fleck, Samei, & Mitroff, 2010, p. 64). 
Simply stated, when the operator is aware that an individual passenger (or 
group of passengers) is more likely to present a threat by carrying an explosive device, he 
or she is more alert to the presence of such a device during X-ray screening. Because of 
the equal-risk philosophy that underpins the current U.S. passenger screening model, the 
author postulates that these four effects have a greater negative impact on X-ray operator 
performance than is present under either the RBS or Israeli models. Diminished 
performance stems from the fact that under the later two models the operator knows the 
risk category of the individual whose property is being screened, and he is not 
constrained by time to complete the visual search process. For these reasons, the 
associated time pressures and the equal-risk assumption with the current U.S. model 
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result in the decreased probability of detection value. It is the author’s judgment that the 
estimated probability of detection for X-ray performance for the current U.S. model must 
be decremented by two levels on the ten-point scale in Table 7 as compared with the 
baseline level assigned to the other two policy options. The first decrement reflects the 
impact of time constraints to complete the visual search of the image. A second 
decrement accounts for the effects of DTC and SOS on explosive-device detection. 
Applying these decrements decreases the estimated representational probability of 
detecting an explosive device during X-ray screening from “highly probable” (85 
percent) to “more likely than not” (60 percent), as compared with the other two models 
being evaluated. 
Because of the potential for catastrophic failure of a passenger aircraft, the 
threat object of greatest concern during the passenger screening process is an explosive 
device hidden either on the terrorist or accessible to the terrorist within carry-on 
property.34 Allowing an individual with the intent to commit an act of terrorism to board 
a commercial flight is of similar concern. A primary objective of passenger security 
screening is to prevent these such situations from occurring. As a result, this analysis 
confines the assessment of passenger screening system effectiveness to solely the 
conditional probability of detecting an explosive device and the conditional probability of 
identifying a terrorist operative. The conditional probability of identifying a terrorist 
operative is denoted as P1X, where X is used to specify the particular model being 
evaluated (US for Current U.S.; I for Israeli; and, RB for the Risk-Based model). P2X 
represents the conditional probability of detecting the main explosive charge or detonator 
during primary and/or secondary screening of either the passenger or his property, and X 
is assigned the same letters indicating the specific model being evaluated.  
As noted previously in this thesis, a primary difference between the 
current U.S. system and both the Israeli and RBS approaches is how the process responds 
to an alarm at any stage in the security screening system. Under the current U.S. 
                                                 
34 The potential catastrophic result from an explosive device is demonstrated by the August 2004, 
attack by two Chechen female suicide bombers, who detonated suicide explosive belts aboard two Russian 
commercial aircraft, resulting in the deaths of all individuals onboard both flights. 
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approach, alarms are not viewed as systems alarms, and response is largely limited to 
secondary measures applied to resolve just the specific alarm. As a result, the conditional 
probability of identifying a terrorist operative or detecting an explosive device is limited 
to the individual primary security measure with the highest overall probability of 
detection. Referring to the assigned values in Tables 8 and 9, the probability of 
identifying a terrorist is P1US = 85%, while the probability of identifying an explosive 
device concealed in accessible property is P2USProperty = 60%; and P2USPerson = 85%, if 
hidden on the individual.  
Both the Israeli and RBS approaches have two common elements that are 
different in comparison to the current U.S. model. First is the emphasis on identifying 
passengers deemed as posing a higher risk of committing a violent act on board the 
aircraft and subjecting these individuals to more intensive security scrutiny during 
passenger screening. Underlying this philosophy is the idea that, without an individual 
with the intent to inflict harm, there is no threat to aviation. A second key difference is 
that both the Israeli and risk-based security processes are predicated on any alarm being a 
system alarm that triggers the full extent of screening of both the person and his property. 
As a result, the overall system effectiveness increases as additional screening measures 
are added, with the conditional probability of identifying either a terrorist operative or 
explosive device based on the formula where Px is the conditional probability of the 
security program and pn is the probability of detection of the individual security measures 
included in the approach as shown in tables 8 and 9, including all primary and associated 
secondary screening measures. These results are reflected in the four equations below: 
P1I = [1.0 – [0.15*0.25*0.4*0.4*0.85)]  
P2I = [1.0 – [0.25*0.15*0.15*0.15]  
P1RB = [1.0 – [0.25*0.15*0.25*0.4*0.6*0.85)]  
P2RB = [1.0 – [0.25*0.15*0.15*0.15]  
For the Israeli model, P1I reflects that the security program has a 99.5 
percent probability of identifying a terrorist. The conditional probability of detecting an 
explosive device (P2I) for the Israeli model is 99.8 percent. Under the proposed risk-
based model, P1RB is 99.6 percent, and P2RB is 99.9 percent. This difference in alarm 
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response impacts overall system effectiveness as reflected in Table 10, where the RBS 
and Israeli models are assessed as having a higher overall probability of detecting both 
the terrorist operative, and an explosive device, regardless of whether that device is 
hidden on the passenger or in his carry-on property. 
 
 P1 Identify Terrorist P2 Identify Explosive Device 
Current U.S. Model 0.85 0.6 
Israeli Model 0.995 0.998 
Risk-Based Model 0.996 0.999 
Table 10.   Conditional Probability of Detection Comparison 
b. Probability of Deterring Terrorist Attack 
Deterrence within this thesis is the ability to dissuade a terrorist operative 
from attempting the use of a specific plot to attack commercial aviation (Bowen, 2002, 
p. 2). Whether a terrorist judges that a particular plot is likely to succeed is influenced by 
the security measures that must be overcome, which provides deterrence value to the 
system. While deterrence is traditionally considered in the context of nation states, the 
concept can and does apply to nonstate actors as well. Arguments against the efficacy of 
deterrence on terrorist groups typically include an assertion that terrorists are not rational 
actors, and therefore deterrence is of little value with respect to terrorism (Davis & 
Jenkins, 2002, p. xviii). However, more recent theories reject the assertion that terrorists 
are irrational at the individual level, holding that they therefore consider the chances of 
success or failure when selecting particular targets and tactics to achieve their desired 
results (Moghaddam, 2006, pp. 4–5; Hoffman, 2006, pp. 239–40, 251–52).  
Although there is no direct evidence that terrorists engage in conscious 
cost-benefit determination when selecting a particular attack plot over another, there is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that terrorists do assess the likely success of an attack. This 
evidence is reflected in the continued adaptation of terrorist tactics and methods in 
response to changes in aviation security procedures and indicates that terrorists may well 
be deterred from a specific method when they perceive the chances of success are low. 
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Since 9/11, we have seen several plots directed against aviation that illustrate how 
deterrence has resulted in the evolution of explosive device construction and concealment 
methods as aviation security measures tightened and were perceived by the terrorists as 
more effective. These plots include the August 2006 effort to conceal liquid explosives in 
bottles of sports drink, the December 2009 concealment of an explosive device in the 
underwear of a terrorist flying from Amsterdam to Detroit, and the July 2011 report that 
terrorists are considering surgically implanting explosives inside suicide bombers 
(Johnson & Gorman, 2011, pp. 1–3). 
The deterrent effect of passenger security screening provides a number of 
potential benefits to counterterrorism efforts. First, deterrence can result in a shift by 
terrorists to more sophisticated and difficult techniques of construction and concealment 
to avoid detection during the screening process. As evidenced by the failed attack on 
December 25, 2009, sophisticated devices and concealment methods are more prone to 
fail. Perceived effectiveness of the system can also require the terrorist to spend more 
time in preoperational surveillance and planning, thereby providing more time for the 
intelligence community and law enforcement personnel to identify and interdict the plot 
prior to its attempted execution. Finally, the deterrent effect of perceived system 
effectiveness can increase the anxiety level of the terrorist operative from fear they will 
be caught, which improves the capability of the system and “reduces the chance of an 
attack that would succeed” (Martonosi & Barnett, 2006, p. 4).  
While it is not possible to determine the deterrence threshold of any 
terrorist with respect to a given plot, Martonosi and Barnett provide a mathematic model 
to calculate deterrence. This model allows for a comparison of the deterrence of different 
approaches by calculating the probability that the terrorist attempt would be stopped by 
the security measures in place. This deterrence value is represented by the formula Q = 
[P1 + (C + (1 – C) r) ε] and is used to calculate the probability that a terrorist attempt 
would be stopped by the passenger security screening process. The definitions and 
assigned values used in this analysis are reflected in Table 11, which is followed by an 
explanation of the rationale used to establish these values. 
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 Definition US Israeli RBS 
Q The probability that a terrorist attempt is stopped by the screening process    
C 
The a priori probability that an actual 
terrorist is classified as a high-risk 
passenger by the passenger screening 
process 
0.954 0.995 0.996 
r 
The proportion of passengers 
categorized as low risk who are 
selected at random for secondary 
security screening measures 
0.05 0.05 0.05 
P1 
The conditional probability of 
detecting an explosive device during 
primary security screening of 
passengers given that the passenger 
undergoes only primary security 
measures 
0.6 0.994 0.992 
P2 
The conditional probability of 
detecting an explosive device during 
secondary security screening of 
passengers, given the passenger also 
completed primary screening 
0.94 0.998 0.999 
ε 
The opportunity of sending a terrorist 
operative to secondary security 
screening by correctly identifying him 
through a risk-assessment process, 
reflected as the difference between P2 
and P1 (P2 – P1)  
0.34 0.004 0.007 
Table 11.   Definitions and Values for Thwarting a Terrorist Attempt (from Martinosi 
& Barnett, 2006) 
“C”—the probability of categorizing a terrorist operative as high risk 
during the security screening processes—is defined by the system effectiveness 
computations above and adopted from the computation for P1 in Table 10. These 
computations reflect that the conditional probability of identifying a terrorist during the 
security screening process is “probable” under the current U.S model and is “nearly 
certain” for both the Israel and risk-based security approaches. For the Israeli and risk-
based security models, this calculation indicates near certainty of subjecting a suspect 
terrorist operative to the full scope of primary and secondary security measures for both 
the individual and his accessible property. Under the Israeli system, this result stems from 
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the multiple points of interaction between airport security personnel and passengers, 
where travelers are observed for signs of suspicious behavior. Additionally, the personal 
interview measure that underpins the security program is viewed as highly effective in 
identifying possible signs of deception or when the contents of luggage do not seem to 
match with the passenger’s responses. Under the proposed RBS model, the near certainty 
stems primarily from the systems alarm approach, where any anomalous behavior or 
equipment alarm results in full application of all primary and secondary security 
measures being applied as if the individual was initially categorized as a high-risk 
passenger. 
The proportion of passengers identified as low risk, “r,” and randomly 
selected for some secondary security screening measures is set at five percent of total 
passenger volume and is held constant at this level for each model. As explained in 
Chapter IV, the U.S. passenger screening model relies on random and unpredictable 
selection for various secondary security screening measures. The estimate is that upwards 
of five percent of all passengers are randomly selected for some secondary screening at 
the passenger security screening checkpoint. This estimate reflects the capacity 
constraints of secondary screening measures (especially the availability of the TSO to 
perform random measures) because of the high false-alarm rates associated with primary 
security measures. For both the RBS and Israeli models, the assumption is that the 
number of randomly selected passengers will be very low, since the underlying 
philosophy for these models is to focus on finding people with ill intent and not on 
randomness as a principle means of deterring a terrorist attack. For both models, “r” is 
estimated at just one percent.  
The conditional probability that primary property search methods would 
detect an explosive device, “P1,” is derived from the same formula used to compute 
conditional probability for systems effectiveness. For the U.S. model, we must split this 
category into two components—detection of the device on the person and detection of the 
device in property—because each alarm is viewed as separate and distinct, and resolution 
efforts are focused on just the trigger alarm condition and are determined by the primary 
measure with the greatest individual detection probability. For property, the value of P1 is 
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0.6, reflecting the fact that X-ray screening of property is “more likely than not” able to 
identify an explosive device. For devices hidden on the person, the value for P1 is 0.25, or 
“probably not,” reflecting the probability of device detection using AIT equipment, 
which is not in use at all security checkpoints and does not screen 100 percent of all 
passengers at those airports where the equipment is deployed; the standard walkthrough 
metal detector will not detect explosives or many IED components that are nonmetallic.  
The value for P2, the conditional probability of finding an explosive device 
during secondary screening, is set based on the results of the calculation for P2 under the 
security effectiveness analysis. Again, because of differences in viewing all alarms as 
systems alarms, the P2 values for the current U.S. model are different for an explosive 
hidden in the passenger or concealed in their accessible property.  
Given the above analysis assumptions and rationale, and using Martonosi 
and Barnett’s deterrence formula Q = [P1 + (C + (1 – C) r) ε], the deterrence value of 
each security model can be computed as shown below and reflected in Table 11: 
QUS = [0.6 + (0.954 + (1 – 0.954) 0.05) 0.34] = 0.925. 
QIsraeli  = [0.994 + (0.995 + (1 – 0.995) 0.05) 0.004] = 0.998. 
QRBS  = [0.992 + (0.996 + (1 – 0.996) 0.05) 0.007] = 0.999. 
As noted by the research team, when the value of Q exceeds the terrorist 
deterrence threshold, the terrorist group or individual operative is unlikely to proceed 
with that specific plot and will likely shift to a different attack method. The researchers 
assert that, as terrorists view the probability of success as lower than the probability of 
detection, they will be deterred from carrying out that method of attack (Martonosi  
Barnett, 2006, p. 2). Although it is not possible to determine the specific deterrence 
threshold level for any given terrorist plot and the operatives involved, it is possible to 
assess the effectiveness of the various policy options with respect to a terrorist group’s 
assessment of the difficulty of overcoming passenger security measures. Based on this 
analysis, each of the three models provides a high level of deterrence value, and the 
differences between them in this regard are deemed insignificant.  
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2. Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation assesses the reduction in overall risk to the aviation system based 
on the effectiveness of the security process. With respect to the risk mitigation evaluation 
in this thesis, risk is narrowly limited to the use of an improvised explosive device (IED) 
against a commercial aircraft introduced on board the aircraft through the passenger 
screening checkpoint. This criterion uses the standard DHS definition of risk, where risk 
is equal to the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence (R = T * V * C). 
a. Threat 
Two components comprise the assessment of threat [T]. The first is intent 
[I], which assesses the attractiveness to terrorists of an attack on a commercial passenger 
aircraft as a means of furthering their goals. The capability [C] of the terrorists to conduct 
such an attack constitutes the second component of the overall threat. For the purposes of 
analyzing the effectiveness of passenger screening under the three models being 
compared, the evaluation of threat is limited to just the use of an explosive device 
brought through the screening checkpoint. Threat is the product of intent and capability 
(T = I * C). (DHS, 2010a, p.36). Table 12 assigns a threat value to each of the four 
passenger risk categories: high risk (THIGH); unknown risk (TUNKNOWN); low risk (TLOW); 
and no risk (TNO). These categories are described in Chapter IV under the RBS model.  
 
 Intent Capability Threat Score 
THIGH 0.95 0.95 0.903 
TUNKNOWN 0.5 0.95 0.475 
TLOW 0.15 0.95 0.143 
TNO 0.05 0.95 0.048 






The values for both the intent and capability components of threat are 
derived from Table 7. Terrorists have demonstrated the ability to manufacture a variety of 
improvised explosive devices capable of destroying a commercial aircraft.35 For this 
reason, the capability components of threat are held constant across all risk categories, 
and the assessment is that it is almost certain that terrorist operatives possess this 
capability. Therefore, a threat value of 0.95 will be used. With capability held constant, 
the dominant variable that alters the threat score for each individual passenger category is 
therefore the intent component. For high risk travelers, who by definition are likely 
associated with terrorist organizations, intent to conduct such an attack is assessed as 
almost certain (under the right conditions), and a value of 0.95 will be used. Since the 
intent of the unknown-risk passenger cannot be determined, this analysis will use a 0.5 
factor to reflect that uncertainty. Intent of the low risk is assessed as “highly improbable” 
and will use the corresponding value of 0.15, while it is “almost certainly not” probable 
that the no-risk passenger intends to commit an act of terrorism using an explosive 
device, and a value of 0.5 is assigned to passengers in that category.  
b. Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is defined as the likelihood that the security system will fail 
and allow the attack to succeed (DHS, 2010a, p.38). Absent any security measures, the 
baseline vulnerability of the aviation system would be 100 percent (or 1.0), reflecting the 
fact that the system is certain to fail to detect either a terrorist operative or an explosive 
device. Each additional security measure is intended to reduce that baseline vulnerability 
to some lower level. As more security measures are added, the result is a continued 
reduction in the baseline vulnerability of the system overall, and the impact is influenced 
by the way that the measures are combined. When security measures are used in 
combination, they have a greater vulnerability reduction impact than when implemented 
as a standalone feature. This multiplier effect accounts for that reason that the United 
States uses a layered security approach and Israel employs a concentric ring approach to 
                                                 
35Two examples are the August 2004 destruction of two Russian commercial passenger aircraft by 
suicide bombers, and the 2006 liquid explosives plot. For an example of how a sports-drink-bottle–sized 
liquid explosive could destroy an aircraft in flight, as intended in the August 2006 terrorist plot from 
terrorists living in the United Kingdom, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7536167.stm  
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aviation security. The need to balance security measures with civil rights and liberties and 
to minimize the impact on business prevents reducing system vulnerability all the way to 
zero. Despite all of the criticisms regarding the effectiveness of passenger screening since 
9/11, there have been no successful attacks on commercial aviation within the United 
States, indicating that the system is “probably not” going to fail. The long record of 
success demonstrated by the Israeli aviation security system also reflects that their model 
is “probably not” going to fail. Therefore, the vulnerability component of risk is assigned 
the corresponding value of 0.25 (or 25 percent) from Table 7, and this value will be held 
constant when calculating risk throughout this thesis.  
c. Consequence 
Consequence is defined as the impact or effect of the incident (DHS, 
2010a, p.10). This thesis will use both direct and indirect economic impact. Direct 
consequences include loss of life and loss of property. The direct impact estimates are 
computed using standard program management estimation techniques, using the formula 
CN = [CH + CL + (4*CE)]/6 where C = Nominal Consequence; CH = High Estimate; CL = 
Low Estimate; and CE = Expected Consequence. The total direct-consequence estimate is 
$1,615 (million), based on the estimates reflected in Table 13 (all dollar values shown are 
in millions).  
 Low Estimate High Estimate Expected Nominal 
Aircraft36 $72.85 $261.98 $164.18 $165.26 
Deaths37 189 550 270 303 
Value of Life38 $2 $10 $5 $5.33 
Table 13.   Consequence Estimates 
                                                 
36 Aircraft replacement cost estimates are based on average replacement costs of $72.85M for a B737; 
$261.98M for an B777; and $164.18 for a B767 (retrieved March 25, 2011, from 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/prices/index.html).  
37 Estimates on the number of deaths resulting from destruction of a passenger aircraft while in flight 
are based on a low estimate equal to the capacity of a B737 aircraft; a high estimate equal to the capacity of 
a B777 aircraft; and an expected figure based on the number of actual deaths in the Pan Am 103 attack over 
Lockerbie Scotland (Schneidewind, 2005, p. 40; http://archives.syr.edu/panam/). 
38 Value-of-life estimates found in von Winterfeldt & O’Sullivan, 2006, p.67. 
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Indirect consequences reflect the economic impact of a 10 percent drop in 
air travel for a year following a successful terrorist attack. This economic impact would 
be felt across 20 business sectors identified by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau 
of Economic Analysis that have direct dependencies with the air transportation sector; it 
is calculated at $42,064 million.39 The combined consequence impact of a successful 
IED attack aboard a commercial passenger aircraft is estimated at $43,679 million 
(Santos & Haimes, 2004, p. 1447; Von Winterfeldt & O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 67). 
d. Risk 
Under the current U.S. and proposed RBS approaches, the Secure Flight 
system is used to designate specific passengers as high risk based on matching 
individuals to the biographic identifier information on individuals who are on the selectee 
screening subset of the terrorist watch list. While the exact number is classified, the 
percentage is assumed to be very small, and a value of 1 percent will be used for either 
the current U.S. and RBS models (or 0.01 of the total passenger population in the high 
risk category). Due to the increased use of demographic and ethnic profiling inherent in 
the Israeli approach, a significantly higher percentage of passengers would be categorized 
as high risk as compared with the proposed RBS model. The author assumes that the 
percentage of high-risk travelers could be as much as ten times higher than in the United 
States, and a value of 0.1 is assigned. 
Currently, there is a small percentage of individuals subject to fewer 
primary screening requirements because they are identified as low risk. The TSA recently 
announced two specific groups of passengers that fall into this low-risk category: children 
under 12 and air carrier pilots (TSA, 2011d, p. 1; TSA 2011e, p. 1). The author estimates 
that these categories currently represent a small fraction of passengers, and a value of 1 
percent is assigned to this risk group. The author also judges that under the RBS model 
TSA can categorize as many as 50 percent of the total passenger volume into the low-risk 
category, and about 3 percent of passengers can be classified as posing little to no risk. 
                                                 
39 The 20 sectors are listed in the Santos and Haimes modeling of demand reduction across the U.S. 
economy following a terrorist attack on the aviation transport sector (Santos and Haimes, 2004, p. 1449).  
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The corresponding values of 0.5 and 0.03 are assigned to the low and no-risk categories 
respectively. All remaining passengers are assigned to the unknown-risk group, which 
represents 98 percent of passengers under the current U.S. model; 88 percent of 
passengers under the Israeli model; and 46 percent of passengers under the proposed RBS 
model. Each model, and the percentage of passengers assumed to be in each of the four 
risk categories, is shown in Table 14. 
 
Risk Category Current U.S. Israeli Risk-Based 
High Risk 0.01 0.1 0.01 
Unknown Risk 0.98 0.88 0.46 
Low Risk 0.01 0.01 0.5 
No Risk 0.0 0.01 0.03 
Table 14.   Passenger Risk Category Percentages 
The two constants in the risk equation are the fixed consequence of 
$43,679 million and a vulnerability of 25 percent for the passenger screening system. 
These constants can be multiplied to reflect a consequence and vulnerability (C * V) 
constant of $10,919.75. This combined constant can then be multiplied by the threat 
component to arrive at the risk score for each risk category. Table 15 reflects the 
individual computation of risk for each category of passengers. 
 
Category C * V Threat Risk 
High Risk 10,919.75 0.903 9860.53 
Unknown Risk 10,919.75 0.475 5186.88 
Low Risk 10,919.75 0.143 1561.52 
No Risk 10,919.75 0.048 524.15 




A weighted average of risk will be used to determine the overall risk score 
for each of the three policy options, using the percentage of passengers within each risk 
category for each model. This approach uses the percentage of passengers assigned to 
each risk category from Table 14 and multiplies that percentage by the risk value for each 
category from Table 15. The results are shown in Table 16.  
 
Model High Risk Unknown Risk Low Risk No Risk 
Weighted 
Score 
U.S. 9860.53 * 0.01 5186.88 * 0.98 1561.52 * 0.01 524.15 * 0.0 5197.36 
Israeli 9860.53 * 0.1 5186.88 * 0.88 1561.52 * 0.01 524.15 * 0.01 4683.92 
RBS 9860.53 * 0.01 5186.88 * 0.46 1561.52 * 0.5 524.15 * 0.03 3281.05 
Table 16.   Weighted Risk Score 
While this quantitative analysis is solely limited to an assessment of 
security system effectiveness and risk reduction, the best policy option for passenger 
security screening stems from categorizing passengers by risk and applying the 
appropriate security measures based on that risk, as proposed under the RBS model. This 
approach results in the security effectiveness of the RBS model being approximately 
equal to that of the Israeli model. Overall weighted system risk is also reduced, with the 
RBS model providing the best risk mitigation option. The difference in risk between the 
RBS and Israeli models stems from the higher percentage of passengers categorized as 
high risk under the Israel model, as compared to either of the other two approaches 
evaluated. 
C. QUALITATIVE EVALUATION 
1. Constitutional Permissibility 
Any passenger security screening has the potential to implicate rights guaranteed 
to individuals by the U.S. Constitution. With the three models being evaluated for this 
thesis, the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution have the greatest 
potential impact. Among other rights, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from 
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enacting any law that abridges freedom of speech. Under the Fourth Amendment, 
individuals are to be free from unreasonable searches by the government. The Fifth 
Amendment protects against the deprivation of life, liberty, and property of individuals 
by the government without due process and protects an individuals from being compelled 
to be a witness against himself in any criminal matter. This section assesses the 
constitutional permissibility of the three policy options through a review of various 
federal court rulings with respect to these constitutional rights.  
a. First Amendment 
The First Amendment precludes the federal government from restricting 
certain enumerated freedoms such as speech, press, religion, assembly, and redress of 
grievances.40 Several decisions in the area of First Amendment case law have potential 
application to the passenger screening environment. In some instances, these rulings have 
very direct application to the aviation passenger screening context, while others reflect a 
context different, but analogous to the aviation security process.  
Case law has generally held that the right to active speech extends to the 
boundary where one’s exercise of active speech endangers others. The initial standard 
regarding the location of this boundary was set by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Schenk v. U.S., which established the “clear and present danger” standard (Schenk v. U.S., 
249 U.S. 47 (1919)). For nearly 50 years, the “clear and present danger” test of Schenk 
was easily applied to active speech. The underlying principle of imminent danger flowing 
from unrestrained speech was reinforced by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which 
held that government cannot place limits on speech or press freedoms—even when 
individuals advocate the use of violence or other lawlessness—“except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). This 
connection between the expression of ideas—so-called active speech—and overt action 
resulting from that expression has generally been the lens through which the courts have 
                                                 
40 In 1925, the Supreme Court held in that the due process clauses in the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments also apply to state and local governments; thus, it is not just the federal government that is 
precluded from restricting these rights. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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viewed the constitutionality of any government restrictions on First Amendment rights. 
Often overlooked in the general discussion of the right to free speech is the passive 
exercise of this right by not speaking. Chief Justice Burger noted that “the right to speak 
and the right to refrain from speaking are complimentary components of the [same] 
broader concept” (Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977)). It is the exercise of free-
speech rights by refraining from speech where the potential to intrude on First 
Amendment privilege and to restrain action is pertinent. Although the context of Wooley 
involved compelling an individual to advocate a specific opinion of a government, the 
court in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina noted that 
“compelled disclosure of fact, like matters of opinion, may infringe upon the First 
Amendment” (Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)). 
In these situations the “imminent lawless action” standard used by the courts for nearly a 
century may be impossible and certainly more difficult to apply. 
The decision to exercise the First Amendment right not to speak may 
impact the security interview processes of both the RBS and Israeli models considered in 
this thesis because both incorporate an interview of passengers by security personnel. In 
the Israeli model, this interview is applied to every passenger and varies in length and 
intensity, based on a number of factors, including unspecified demographic criteria, the 
detection of signs of deception or elevated behaviors, responses to the interview 
questions, and the travel pattern of the individual being interviewed. Under the RBS 
model, the security interview would be required for every passenger in the high-risk 
category. Two questions come to mind with respect to interviews of passengers by 
government security personnel where the First Amendment should be considered: First, 
does government have the right to include the requirement for certain (or all) passengers 
to submit to a security interview? Second, what are the implications if a passenger 
exercises his right to free speech by refusing to respond to security interview questions.  
Overcoming potential First Amendment hurdles with respect to the first 
question is relatively easy. The courts have provided the government with broad 
discretion in defining the appropriate measures required to ensure the security of 
commercial aviation. As the court held in Hartwell, “By submitting to the screening 
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process, [the] defendant impliedly consented to the search and was lawfully required to 
complete the search” (U.S. v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2003)). The 
Hartwell decision held that the entire passenger security screening process, consisting of 
several distinct primary and secondary search measures, was considered a single search 
process. Including the requirement that some or all passengers submit to a security 
interview within the passenger screening process would not make the entire process any 
less voluntary. Entering that process would continue to imply the passenger’s consent and 
that, once granted, could not be withdrawn until the process was complete. Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to declare that ‘only the least intrusive search 
practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” (EPIC v. DHS, 653 F.3d 1, 
22 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2632 (2010)).  
While requiring passengers to submit to and cooperate during a security 
interview could be viewed as intrusive by some, the level of intrusiveness is calibrated to 
the level of risk that the passenger poses to the aircraft. Concern by some advocacy 
groups or individuals that the personal nature of the questions infringes on First 
Amendment rights is diminished by the voluntary nature of the process. The court’s 
determination in Davis that the purpose of airport security searches is to deter individuals 
from attempting to carry explosives or other weapons on board a commercial aircraft 
clearly applies (U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (1973)). If an individual does not wish 
to submit to the security measures required by the government, then he can choose 
another means of transportation. That being said, the constitutionality of the security 
interview could hinge on the nature, content, and purpose of the interview questions.41 
Determining how the exercise of free speech rights through a refusal to 
respond to questions during the security interview is impacted by First Amendment rights 
is more challenging. The analysis of this question centers on several important elements: 
First, do the boundaries of active speech as established in case law apply to the exercise 
of speech rights by refusal to speak? Second, is it permissible to compel an individual to 
                                                 
41 As example, questions regarding ethnicity, religion, political opinion, association, or support of 
particular government policies would potentially violate First Amendment rights. The specific content of 
the security interview questions is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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respond to questions during the security interview? Third, is denying access beyond the 
security checkpoint, and hence to the passenger’s reserved aircraft seat, for refusing to 
answer security interview questions abridging their right to free speech?  
In 1991, the Supreme Court held that any law is presumed in violation of 
First Amendment protections if that law “imposes a financial burden on speakers because 
of the content of their speech” (Simon & Schuster v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105 (1991)). In order to be permitted past the security checkpoint and allowed 
to proceed to their departure gate, passengers must complete all defined security 
requirements. If the passenger is not permitted to proceed past the security checkpoint, he 
may be denied rebooking by the air carrier or charged a rebooking fee. Requiring a 
passenger to cooperate during the security interview as part of the screening process may 
potentially impose a financial burden on that passenger. To support different 
requirements and treatment of passengers who refuse to cooperate with the security 
interview and are thus denied entry into the sterile airport area, “the State must show that 
its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end” (Simon & Schuster, quoting Arkansas Writers’ Project, 502 U.S. 105, 
118 (1991)). This matter raises the question as to whether the government has the 
authority to impose this type of requirement and whether or not the requirement supports 
a compelling state interest.  
We turn to Haig v. Agee for an examination of the issue of whether the 
government has the authority to impose such a requirement (Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 
(1981)). In that case, the U.S. State Department revoked Agee’s passport, thereby 
restricting him from travel oversees after the individual began a campaign of identifying 
and revealing the names of undercover operatives and agents of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). During the hearing, evidence showed that, as a result of Agee’s speech, 
several CIA agents he had identified were killed. In his suit, Agee claimed that Congress 
has not expressly authorized the Secretary of State to revoke passports and that the 
infrequent exercise of the claimed power demonstrated inconsistency, which reflected 
disparate treatment of Agee by the state. Both elements of the court’s decision in Agee—
expressed congressional authority and the frequency of exercising these powers—are 
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relevant to the passenger screening context. With respect to express congressional 
authority, the court in Agee noted the “broad rule making authority” that Congress 
granted the Secretary of State and found that “congressional silence is not to be equated 
with congressional disapproval” (453 U.S. at 291). The authority granted to the TSA by 
Congress is similarly broad in scope and permits the agency to “issue, rescind, and revise 
such regulations as are necessary” to protect aircraft passengers and property on an 
aircraft from criminal violence and hijackings (49 U.S.C. §114; 49 U.S.C. §44903). This 
broad authority permits the TSA to include a security interview of some or all passengers 
as part of the screening process and to require cooperation with that interview. 
In Agee, the court found that, absent specific evidence that Congress 
intended to restrict the broad powers it granted, “the consistent administrative 
construction” in exercising those powers established a precedent that the courts should 
follow (453 U.S. at 291). As to the claim that the government had infrequently exercised 
those powers, the court found that “although a pattern of enforcement is one indicator of 
Executive policy, it suffices that the Executive has ‘openly asserted’ the power at issue” 
(453 U.S. at 301). The TSA has been similarly consistent in its application of the right to 
deny any passenger permission to pass through the security checkpoint without first 
completing the prescribed security measures. Various courts have sustained the position 
that passengers must complete the entire process once it has begun (see, e.g., Davis, 
Hartwell, U.S. v. Aukai, 440 F.3d 1168 (2006)). The TSA has also demonstrated 
consistency in asserting executive power to define and revise security requirements to 
address changes in terrorist tactics, and Congress has not restricted this power. Extending 
the logic of Agee, the consistency in asserting executive power within the aviation 
security domain provides a basis for requiring passengers identified for a security 
interview to cooperate with that interview.  
In United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit 
opined that passenger security measures were intended to deter attempts to carry 
explosives or weapons aboard an aircraft. The court’s ruling in this 1973 case occurred in 
the face of a fundamentally different threat against aviation. The wave of threats to 
commercial aviation in the late 1960s and early 1970s was characterized by hijackings 
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motivated by political ideology and largely fell into hijackings for transportation (e.g., to 
flee oppressive Communist regimes) and hijackings for extortion (either for financial 
gain or to pressure Western governments to accede to the demands of the terrorist groups) 
(Holden, 1986, p. 878). While individuals were killed during the hijackings in this era, 
the purpose of the hijackings was not the wanton murder of innocent men, women, and 
children on board the aircraft. In the face of that threat, security measures at airports were 
likely a significant deterrent to attempts to introduce weapons and explosives on board 
the aircraft. The threat environment at the time of Davis is not the threat we face in the 
present.  
Today’s terrorism threat involves religious fanaticism expressed through 
suicide martyrdom, where the goal is wanton destruction and wholesale death. When the 
deterrent effect of aviation security measures is insufficient, the process must be capable 
of detection and prevention. The purpose of the security interview within both the Israeli 
and RBS models is to detect individuals with the intent to commit an act of terrorism on 
board an aircraft and to prevent those individuals from gaining access to the aviation 
system. Adding a security interview component to the passenger screening process, with 
the requirement that passengers cooperate during that interview, would not violate First 
Amendment protections, as long as the questions did not directly address matters of 
ethnicity, religion, political opinion, association, or support of particular government 
policies.  
b. Fourth Amendment 
There is a long history of court support for warrantless searches of 
passengers at airport checkpoints. One of the most cited early cases is United States v. 
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, a 1973 case from the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
In Davis, the court held that “[airport] searches conducted as part of a general regulatory 
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal 
investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment though not supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular 
person to be searched” (482 F.2d at 908). This ruling, that warrantless airport search of 
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passengers and property for weapons or explosives is constitutionally permissible, did 
place a reasonableness provision on the conduct of such searches. The Court in Davis 
noted that “to meet the test of reasonableness, an administrative search must be limited in 
its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies 
it” (482 F.2d at 919) (emphasis supplied). A further implication of the Davis ruling is that 
airport searches “are not selective,” in that they are applied broadly to all passengers 
without regard to reasonable suspicion or probable cause; the application of such searches 
is random. In fact, the court in Davis stated that “a compelled search of persons who elect 
not to board would not contribute to barring weapons and explosives from the plane … 
[and] such searches would be criminal investigations subject to the warrant and probable 
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment” (482 F.2d at 911). This language left open 
the opportunity for an individual to withdraw consent to be searched by electing not to 
proceed past the security screening checkpoint when they feared imminent discovery.  
While the decision in Davis hinged upon the consensual nature of airport 
searches, this application of the administrative search doctrine does not depend solely 
upon consent. In United State v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), the U.S Supreme Court 
ruled that the lawfulness of warrantless searches conducted in support of a regulatory 
scheme supporting a compelling government interest does not depend on consent. The 
court held that “it is also apparent that if the law is to be properly enforced and inspection 
made effective, inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable official conduct 
under the Fourth Amendment” (406 U.S. at 316). Although the matter at hand in Biswell 
was a regulatory inspection of a gun dealer, the court’s ruling was specifically extended 
to airport searches in United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
Aukai challenged the constitutionality of secondary screening when controlled dangerous 
substances (CDS) were found on the appellant’s person after he had taken actions to 
indicate that he wanted to withdraw his consent to be searched. Citing Biswell in their 
unanimous ruling, the Aukai court held that “the constitutionality of an airport screening 
search, however, does not depend on consent, see Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, and requiring 
that a potential passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing airport security 
search makes little sense in a post 9/11 world” (497 F.3d at 960). Eliminating all 
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questions of whether or not passengers could withdraw consent after beginning the 
screening process, the Aukai ruling stated unequivocally that “our [prior] case law, 
however, has erroneously suggested that the reasonableness of airport screening searches 
is dependent upon consent, either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent” (497 
F.3d at 960). 
In a precedent-setting decision in 2006, the United States Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals also found that airport security screening searches did not violate 
Fourth Amendment protections against warrantless search. This decision in United States 
v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, held that prior court rulings, such as U.S. v. Albarado (495 
F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974)), that treated as separate searches each step in the screening 
process were incorrect and that the defendant had in fact “experienced a single 
warrantless search, which was initiated without individualized suspicion” (436 F.3d at 
178). The court’s ruling also noted that the Supreme Court in two separate instances42 
had opined that warrantless airport searches are reasonable because “the need for such 
measures to ensure public safety can be particularly acute” (436 F.3d at 178). More 
recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Electronic Privacy 
Information Center v. United States, reaffirmed the compelling governmental interest 
behind searches of airline passengers and noted that “a potentially escalating series of 
search techniques,” even when not the least intrusive methods available, were consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment (EPIC v. U.S, 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The consistency 
of federal court rulings over the past four decades regarding the permissibility of 
warrantless administrative searches in general—and airport security searches in 
particular—will not inhibit any of the three policy options.  
Clearly the post 9/11 rulings in Hartwell, Aukai, and EPIC support the 
constitutional permissibility of the current U.S passenger screening approach with respect 
to the Fourth Amendment. The Hartwell ruling in particular supports the adoption of a 
systems alarm philosophy that is key to the security effectiveness of both the RBS and 
Israeli models, where the entire process is considered a single search to which the 
                                                 
42 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
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passenger consents and cannot from which he cannot withdraw until the process is 
complete. However, the court’s language in Davis, as well as Hartwell, raises the 
question of whether subjecting some passengers to additional security measures absent an 
alarm, or allowing some passengers to undergo less security than others, could be viewed 
as individualized suspicion and stray beyond the special-needs exception carved out by 
the courts.  
The Second Circuit addressed this concern in the border security context 
in 2007. In this case, the court found that even though Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
officers required individuals who attended an Islamic conference in Canada to undergo 
extensive secondary screening measures—including being photographed, fingerprinted, 
and subject to extensive interviewing for up to two hours—“some measure of deference 
is owed to CBP due to its considered expertise in carrying out its mission of protecting 
the border” (Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). This finding was based on 
the fact that the security measures used were considered routine in nature, that preventing 
terrorists from entering the country was a compelling governmental interest, and that the 
actions were taken in response to intelligence that raised concern that terrorists would use 
the conference to switch identity documents with other conference participants and 
attempt to enter the country. Although the authority for conducting searches at the border 
derives from different case law from that of the administrative special-needs exception to 
the Fourth Amendment, the compelling nature of the governmental interest in the 
aviation passenger screening context argues for similar deference being afforded to TSA 
as is provided to CBP. In fact, in United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 
1973), the Fifth Circuit “did not differentiate between interstate and international travel” 
when considering the constitutionality of passenger screening in a purely domestic 
context, which supports extending the deference given to CBP to execute its 
counterterrorism mission to the TSA to execute its similar counterterrorism mission 
(Herzog, 2005, p. 382). 
Under the RBS model, individuals approved as either no-risk or low-risk 
passengers—and thus subject to less passenger security at the airport checkpoint than 
other passengers—should not create any undue concern. The Courts have thus far not 
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differentiated the various security screening measures applied, and as reflected in 
Edmond, the courts have not defined “the outer limits of intrusiveness in the airport 
context” (City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000)). In fact, the court in EPIC 
supported use of advanced imaging technology as consistent with the Fourth Amendment 
since this technology provides a means “of detecting, and therefore deterring, attempts to 
carry aboard airplanes explosives in liquid or powder form” that the older magnetometer 
technology is unable to detect (EPIC v. U.S, 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). As the nature 
of the threat changes and new technologies and procedures are added to the process in 
response to or in anticipation of that change, the courts have continued to sustain the 
constitutionality of airport security searches. Extending the decision in Hartwell that all 
measures in the process are considered “a single warrantless search,” even when they are 
not all applied to every passenger, provides the case law foundation for such 
differentiation. Passengers who consent to an extensive background investigation in order 
to be approved as low- or no-risk travelers are in fact undergoing security screening, with 
the background check substituting for more intrusive security measures at the airport.  
The courts have not overturned the current method of identifying high-risk 
passengers and requiring them to undergo more extensive security measures. In fact, the 
Aukai case involved the defendant’s being sent to more extensive security screening 
because he did not possess any identification and was deemed a higher-risk passenger. 
The ruling of the Ninth Circuit en banc held that “where the risk to public safety is 
substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as 
‘reasonable’—for example searches now routine at airports and at entrances to courts and 
other official buildings” (U.S. v Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). Calibrating the type and level of security 
measures to the appropriate risk posed by the individual passenger appears to be a 
reasonable and prudent measure that meets the court’s expectations. As noted by the 
court in Davis, the purpose of airport security searches “is not to detect weapons or 
explosives or to apprehend those who carry them, but to deter persons carrying such 
material from seeking to board at all” (U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)). 
The Aukai decision noted that, to be an effective deterrent, the screening process must 
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also be capable of detecting explosives. Applying more extensive measures of security to 
individuals more likely to be in possession of weapons or explosives through a risk-based 
process strengthens the degree of deterrence and applies the minimal level of 
invasiveness necessary to deter each passenger based on his assessed risk category. For 
these reasons, both the RBS and the Israeli approaches, which vary the level of security 
based on the assessed risk posed by the individual passenger, should not present any 
constitutionality concerns with respect to the Fourth Amendment.  
c. Fifth Amendment 
The Fifth Amendment provides individuals with the guarantee of due 
process, equal protection under the law, and the right to liberty. The adoption of profiling 
in the aviation security context, as is inherent in the Israeli model, may be inconsistent 
with these rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Profiling for the purposes of this 
thesis is referred to as “9/11 profiling” and consists of “subjecting people who look 
Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim to discretionary law enforcement attention as a way to 
prevent terrorist activity” (Schildkraut, 2009, p. 5). 
Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines regarding profiling do permit the 
use of race and ethnicity by federal personnel performing aviation or border security 
duties when involved in combating “threats to national security” or ensuring the integrity 
of the nation’s borders. This DOJ guidance authorizes federal personnel to use all means 
permitted by law to prevent “catastrophic events” but cautions that the claim of a national 
security compelling interest must not be a “pretext for invidious discrimination” (DOJ, 
2003, pp. 12–13). The DOJ appears to gain justification for this exception from court 
rulings that state that “it is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the Nation” (Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); 
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964). 
Several court decisions address the use of race, appearance, or ethnicity 
with respect to Fourth Amendment reasonable-suspicion matters but do not specifically 
address whether such profiling is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment. In 1975, the 
Supreme Court ruled that using one’s race was permissible when determining whether 
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reasonable suspicion for a more intrusive search was warranted when other “articulable 
facts” were present (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975)). In 
2010, the First Circuit stated that “[j]ust as it cannot be said that appearance, even ethnic 
appearance, of a suspect is never relevant, it certainly cannot be said that it is always or 
even generally relevant” (United States v. Ramos, 629 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2010)). With 
respect to the equal protection clause, the courts have determined that, even when race 
was the predominate reason for stopping a suspect, this use of profiling did not conflict 
with the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1992)). In 
Whren v. United States, the court noted that “the constitutional basis for objecting to 
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause” but did 
not rule specifically on that matter (517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). With respect to Fifth 
Amendment rights, the constitutionality of either the Israeli method of profiling or the 
9/11 profiling described above may well depend upon whether the courts determine that 
such measures satisfy the “compelling state interest” of preventing acts of terrorism 
aboard an airplane. The availability of specific intelligence information that provides 
some basis for the demographic criteria applied in the profiling approach would likely 
strengthen the justification for using these measures. This question raises concerns about 
adopting any profiling measure as part of passenger security screening and leads to the 
conclusion that the Israeli model is likely incompatible with Fifth Amendment equal 
protection guarantees.  
The other aspect of the Fifth Amendment requiring consideration is the 
right against self-incrimination. This right, that a person cannot be compelled to provide 
witness against himself, was settled by the Supreme Court, in arguably the most familiar 
of all court rulings, in the 1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In 
Miranda, the court placed limits on the admissibility of statements made by individuals 
suspected of criminal activity while in the custody of law enforcement personnel. Noting 
the significant psychological stress placed on criminal suspects when questioned in 
isolation, the court found that “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll 
on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. (384 U.S. at 455). The 
court also found that the protections afforded individuals against self-incrimination as 
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guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, extend beyond the criminal trial itself and provide 
protection against self-incrimination “in all settings” where the individual is limited in his 
freedom of movement and action. This finding led to the requirement that all individuals 
subject to a custodial interrogation be apprised of the right against self-incrimination, and 
when the individual elects to exercise those rights, they “must be fully honored” (384 
U.S. at 467). Following the decision by the Miranda court, the constitutionality of 
questions asked of individuals within the screening context hinges on two key elements: 
1) whether the situation is considered a custodial interrogation, and 2) whether the 
individual is suspected of criminal activity.  
Several rulings by federal courts directly address the question of custodial 
interrogation. The foundation for their application in the aviation passenger screening 
context rests on cases involving the questioning of individuals by customs officials in the 
border crossing environment. In a 1983 case, the Second Circuit found that routine 
immigration and customs questions asked at the border do not take place within a 
custodial environment, even in light of the fact that the individual is not allowed to 
withdraw from the process until completed by the customs or immigration officials (U.S. 
v. Silva, 715 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1983)). The Silva court found that, even though the 
defendant was sent for secondary inspection, the detention and questioning of the 
individual was routine since they were not focused on obtaining information that would 
be used against the individual in a criminal trial. Rather, the nature of the questions fell 
within the exclusions recognized by the Miranda court and were “[g]eneral on-the-scene 
questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in a 
fact-finding process” (U.S. v. Silva, 715 F.2d at 47, quoting Miranda v. Arizona). In a 
ruling rejecting the appeal of a case from the district court, the Third Circuit determined 
emphatically that, absent suspicion that the individual being questioned was involved in 
criminal activity, it was immaterial for Miranda purposes whether the questions took 
place during primary or secondary inspection settings (U.S. v. St. Vallier, 404 Fed. Appx. 
651 (3d Cir. 2010)). Citing the ruling in U.S. v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524 (2006), the court 
noted that “custody is not dispositive in the context of border questioning” as long as the 
questioning is not solely related to gathering information for criminal prosecution and 
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that the boundary between custodial and noncustodial interrogation is not violated as long 
as the questions deal with the admissibility of the individual, even when they also address 
potential criminal conduct (404 Fed. Appx. at 656). In these instances, the requirements 
of Miranda do not apply. 
Several cases have extended this reasoning to the aviation passenger 
screening environment. The Hartwell court determined that “routine questioning of 
passengers at airport security checkpoints does not amount to custodial interrogation” 
(436 F.3d at 606). While the court was willing to make this declarative statement, there 
are two elements in the Hartwell decision that have potential impact on passenger 
screening measures. First, the Hartwell court differed from the St. Vallier ruling in 
concluding that because Hartwell’s interrogation occurred in a separate room “by two 
TSA agents and a police officer blocking the exit,” Hartwell’s “freedom was thus 
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest requiring that he be Mirandized before 
[the] interrogation occur[ed]” (436 F.3d at 607). This difference could be interpreted by 
future courts to indicate that TSA should provide Miranda warnings to passengers when 
TSA requires the individual to complete secondary screening measures to resolve alarms 
in private screening room settings (as opposed to passengers who request completion of 
alarm resolution procedures in a private setting away from public view). Second, the 
decision in Hartwell noted that the emphasis placed on Hartwell’s suspicious behavior 
during the screening process had focused “the eye of suspicion” on him, which could 
imply that the questioning was no longer routine in nature but rather focused on potential 
criminality, which would require that Miranda rights be provided to the individual (436 
F.3d at 606).  
As determined in Silva, St. Vallier, and Kiam, there is a boundary between 
routine questioning that does not invoke Miranda and interrogation based on suspicion or 
in support of information for criminal prosecution, which can easily be breached during 
passenger screening. While it is clear that the courts view all questioning focused on 
criminal conduct as requiring Miranda, it is not always clear when that line has been 
crossed. Recently the district court of Nevada spelled out five elements to be considered 
in determining whether or not the questioning is custodial. These factors are “(1) the 
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language used to summon the individual; (2) the extent to which [the] defendant was 
confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (4) 
the duration of the detention; and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the 
individual” (U.S. v. Hughes, 2009 WL 4330481 *9 (D. Nev.), quoting U.S. v. Bautista, 
684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982)).  
The consistency of these various court rulings over an extended time 
period indicates that 9/11–type profiling, applied regularly as part of airport security 
measures, would likely violate the U.S. Constitution. The exception might be a narrowly 
tailored application that fell within the guidelines on profiling provided by the 
Department of Justice, which directly supported compelling state interest needs. These 
rulings appear to disallow consideration of the Israeli model, with its inherent profiling 
based on some level of demographic measures. However, they may well support the 
separation of passengers into different risk categories, as proposed in the RBS model, 
without undue concern regarding the violation of either DOJ guidance or the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee of the right to liberty. Individuals who applied for and were 
denied approval to be categorized as either low- or no-risk passengers would require 
some redress process to ensure an RBS program was not in violation of the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment, but defining such processes is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.43 
The courts have been equally consistent in determining when individuals 
must be given their Miranda rights. Case law has determined that the passenger screening 
process does not constitute a custodial interrogation environment and that general 
security questions and routine security measures do not require advising passengers of 
their right against self-incrimination. However, there are situations where the passenger 
in question is suspected of being involved in criminal activity, and further questions after 
that point could be for the purpose of gathering information in support of criminal  
 
                                                 
43 The DHS already operates traveler redress systems for individuals who believe they have been 
inappropriately placed on the selectee screening or no-fly listings, and for the CBP Global Entry program, 
and such redress programs may well be adequate to meet the due process needs of an RBS program. 
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prosecution. In these instances, the individual must be advised of his rights, as explained 
in Miranda, or the information and evidence discovered would not be admissible in any 
future criminal prosecution.  
2. Social Acceptance 
With more that 1.7 million individuals traveling via commercial aviation each day 
within the United States, there is frequent interaction between the American public and 
the TSA at airports around the country. Arguably, the American public interacts with 
TSA personnel more frequently than any other government agency and holds strong 
opinions regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of the current passenger security 
screening process. These opinions are often influenced by media criticism regarding TSA 
policies, procedures, and effectiveness, which result in the broad perception that the vast 
majority of Americans do not support current airport security measures. This perception 
may not be entirely accurate, although public acceptance of more invasive security 
procedures is declining.  
The decline in public acceptance of TSA security measures was particularly acute 
following the introduction of advanced imaging technology (AIT) whole-body scanning 
equipment and enhanced physical search procedures in November 2010. These more 
invasive measures were in direct response to the terrorist attempt on Christmas Day 2009 
on board Northwest Airlines flight 263 from Amsterdam, Holland, to Detroit, Michigan. 
The explosive device used in that attempt was specifically constructed and concealed in a 
manner that was able to defeat both the security technology and security procedures in 
place at that time. Although an early CBS News public-opinion poll conducted during 
November 7–10, 2010, showed that 81 percent of respondents supported the use of AIT 
equipment and more thorough pat downs as necessary security measures (Condon, 2010a, 
p. 1), the intense media coverage of those in opposition to these enhanced security 
procedures resulted in a quick decline of that support. Two weeks after this initial poll, 




touch my junk,” the Washington Post and ABC News conducted a similar survey on 
November 21, 2010. At that time social support for AIT use had dropped a full 17 
percentage points, to just 64 percent.  
In addition to declining support for AIT use, the survey results noted that over 
half of all respondents indicated that they felt the enhanced pat down process had gone 
too far (Condon, 2010b, p. 1) Social acceptance of these measures continued to erode, as 
noted in a public opinion survey conducted for the U.S. Travel Association in December 
2010. The results of this poll of individuals that had flown at least once in the previous 24 
months showed that a full 41 percent of respondents felt that these measures violated 
their basic civil rights. Support for continued use of AIT as a primary security measure 
for screening passengers was evidenced by only 22 percent of the respondents, and a 
mere 16 percent expressed positive support for the more thorough pat down searches 
(U.S. Travel Association [USTA], 2010, pp. 17, 21, 27). Based on these survey results, 
social acceptance of the current U.S. security approach has diminished following the 
introduction of more invasive technologies and procedures that the public perceives as 
going too far when applied broadly to all passengers. Absent some significant trigger to 
change these opinions, the current aviation security policy involving the introduction of 
more invasive procedures and technologies in reaction to increased sophistication in 
explosive-device construction and concealment techniques will continue to undermine 
social acceptance of the current TSA approach. 
The significant impact of the 9/11 attacks and the resulting surge in negative 
feelings toward Muslims and individuals from the Middle East have caused a general 
improvement in American public support for some form of demographic profiling as an 
effective counterterrorism tactic. This “9/11 profiling” consists of “subjecting people who 
look Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim to discretionary law enforcement attention as a 
way to prevent terrorist activity” (Schildkraut, 2009, p. 5). Although public support for 
law enforcement use of racial profiling to prevent crime has not changed substantially 
prior or subsequent to 9/11, support for profiling to prevent terrorism—as opposed to 
crime prevention—registers different results. In a 2004 random telephone public opinion 
survey, while 77 percent of respondents rejected traditional profiling in the crime 
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prevention context, 66 percent approved the use of 9/11 profiling for counterterrorism—
“an impressive 43 percentage point” difference according to the researcher (Schildkraut, 
2009, p. 67). This result compares favorably with both a 2002 Pew Research Center 
survey and a 2005 Gallup Poll survey that found 59 percent and 53 percent support 
respectively for 9/11–type profiling to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States 
(Johnson et al., 2011, p. 4). 
Immediately following the attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 2009, a 
CBS News poll in January 2010 found that 51 percent of respondents felt that the use of 
ethnic profiling as part of aviation security measures was justified. This support had 
declined to just 37 percent in November 2010 (Condon, 2010a). These results indicate 
that it is possible that the American public would support requiring some additional 
security scrutiny being required for passengers, based on some level of demographic or 
religious profiling, as is inherent in the Israeli model. However, the data highlights the 
potential transient nature of that support, with favorable attitudes towards profiling 
increasing following a well-publicized terrorist attempt and then social acceptance of 
ethnic profiling declining as the episode recedes into history. This transience in the social 
acceptability of the Israeli model is likely to present problems with any long-term 
implementation of this approach, absent additional terrorist attacks within the United 
States.  
The traveling public appears more accepting of security measures that subject 
different groups of passengers to varying levels of security measures. The USTA survey 
results noted that 80 percent of respondents supported a process that included background 
checks of passengers to evaluate risk, while 64 percent felt it was appropriate to include 
questioning and other intelligence methods as alternative security measures to more 
invasive physical search methods (USTA, 2010, pp. 25–26). Support for separate security 
lines for frequent travelers was indicated by 60 percent of respondents, also the number 
who felt positive about volunteering personal information for prescreening and the use of 
a “fast track” government-issued identification card to speed through airport security 
measures. Overall, 65 percent of respondents supported different security requirements 
for travelers cleared through a U.S. government background check (USTA, 2010, pp. 29, 
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30, 33). Even if such a program required up to an annual application fee, support for 
voluntary background checks to allow travelers to speed through airport security 
measures remains high. In a survey reported on by the Los Angeles Times, 45 percent of 
all respondents indicated a willingness to pay $150 annually to expedite their way 
through passenger screening. Among business travelers and “frequent leisure travelers,” 
support for such a fee-based, prescreening, risk assessment program was at 75 percent 
and 61 percent respectively (Martin, 2011, pp. 1–2). Based on these survey data, the risk-
based security model is likely to receive social acceptance by the American public. Since 
the TSA administrator publicly announced plans to implement some form of risk-based 
security program for passenger screening, media reports have been generally favorable.  
3. Political Feasibility 
Because security screening directly impacts so many citizens and private-sector 
entities alike, the topic is politically charged. Any approach to passenger screening must 
be approved and funded by Congress and the administration. Although individual 
members of Congress have offered criticism of the current approach to passenger 
screening—especially since the introduction of advanced imaging technology and 
enhanced physical pat down procedures—there has been no legislation passed that 
restricts the TSA’s authority to define requirements and procedures for aviation security. 
As noted in Agee above, one should not equate congressional silence with congressional 
disapproval. To the contrary, Congress expressly provided the TSA with broad power to 
issue, rescind, or modify any regulations deemed necessary to protect passengers from 
terrorist acts and hijackings aboard commercial aircraft (49 U.S.C. §§114, 44903). While 
it is certainly possible that Congress will find that the TSA has overreached in defining 
security requirements and procedures for passenger screening, it has thus far not done so, 
and the political feasibility of the current approach is deemed very high. 
The same cannot be said with respect to political support for adopting the Israeli 
model. Clearly, the calls to implement this approach following each major aviation 
security incident have brought the approach to the attention of Congress, but no 
legislative action has ensued to move toward implementation. Additionally, Congress has 
 118 
thus far demonstrated a reluctance to increase costs on airline passengers or air carriers to 
pay a greater share of aviation security costs through increased 9/11 security fees paid by 
the airlines or through increases in per segment passenger security fees added to the price 
of an airline ticket in order to fund the level of security provided at Ben Gurion Airport. 
Currently, passengers pay only $2.50 per flight segment and a maximum of $5.00 per 
one-way trip in security fees, generating about $2 billion in revenue to offset a portion of 
the federal cost of providing aviation security (TSA, 2011g). This fee would need to be 
raised by more than a factor of 10 to generate $50 billion. Even if Congress agreed to 
raise individual security fees, it is unlikely to double the current level of appropriations 
for the TSA to fund the remaining costs, and even less likely to provide a 10-fold 
increase in appropriations necessary to provide the entire $60 billion per year required to 
implement a system equivalent to that used in Israel. Political support for implementing 
the Israeli model is likely very low. 
Whether or not the political support exists for implementing an RBS approach is 
less clear. This model does not entail the cost increases associated with adopting the 
Israeli approach and promises to improve security effectiveness, while lessening the 
inconvenience on many passengers. However, RBS may well create a perception of 
privilege and disparate treatment as passengers are grouped in categories according to 
risk, even if the approach does not impinge on constitutional rights. As the TSA begins to 
talk publicly about its intent to shift to a risk-based security approach, there has been 
little, if any, public political opposition to this concept. Rather, this reality leads to the 
conclusion that if the general public is supportive of an RBS approach to passenger 
security measures, and such an approach does not increase the overall cost of providing 
aviation security, then political support will be strong for such measures. If the public 
rejects RBS because of concerns that risk categorization is accomplished through racial 
profiling or other socially unacceptable means, or if the public rejects the approach 
because of visible differences in the primary security requirements for passengers in each 
of the four risk categories, then political support for RBS is likely to evaporate. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The Israeli security model would improve the security effectiveness of the 
passenger screening process because more time would be provided to complete primary 
screening. This option would also effectively mitigate risk from the current threat 
stemming from Islamic terrorists by profiling passengers for additional security 
measures. This approach would create significant constitutional problems and would 
likely result in the courts’ rejection of these measures. Social acceptance would be mixed, 
with some advocating profiling and others objecting on civil rights grounds. Political 
support is unlikely for two primary reasons: First, the public backlash against profiling 
would prevent bipartisan consensus for adopting this method. Second, full 
implementation would increase the overall cost of passenger screening. Overall, the 
debatable constitutionality of this option, and the lack of social acceptance, makes the 
approach politically infeasible. Although this option is expected to provide a high level of 
security while lowering system risk in comparison to the current U.S. approach, support 
for the use of profiling inherent in the Israeli approach is not expected to garner the long-
term acceptance of the American people. This likely outcome is based on the lack of 
acceptance of current procedures that are less disruptive and intrusive on the traveling 
public than entailed in the Israeli approach. 
In contrast, the proposed RBS approach provides an equivalent level of security 
effectiveness to the Israeli model and offers the lowest level of systems risk of any of the 
three policy options. Separating passengers into risk categories based on the results of 
background investigations, and applying the appropriate primary security measures based 
on that assessed level of risk, does not conflict with First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendment 
rights. The RBS approach is also likely to enjoy the highest level of public and political 
support and is more sustainable over time than either the Israeli or current U.S. models. 
To realize the security benefits of the RBS approach requires that the TSA shift away 
from mere alarm resolution and adopt a systems alarm philosophy. 
 120 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 121 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Risk-based security … means moving further away from what may have 
seemed like a one-size-fits-all approach and establishing TSA as a high 
performing counterterrorism agency. It means focusing our resources on 
those we know the least about, and using intelligence—often classified—
in better ways to inform the physical screening process. 
Pistole, 2011 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the effectiveness of aviation 
security within the United States has been the focus of significant public and political 
attention. In the months following the attack, Congress passed the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which assigned responsibility for aviation security 
to the federal government through the creation of the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA). Although a significant number of changes have been implemented 
to improve the efficacy of security screening during the past 10 years, the underlying 
philosophy—that all passengers pose an equal risk—has remained unchanged. This 
philosophy requires that every individual travelling aboard a commercial aircraft submit 
to the same primary security requirements during the passenger screening process. Early 
attempts to categorize passengers into different risk groups were unsuccessful, and 
changes to technology and screening procedures continue to be applied broadly to all 
individuals at screening checkpoints.  
This approach has resulted in several problems that have been highlighted in a 
variety of investigative reports and media coverage. One significant challenge to 
continuing the current approach stems from the highly reactive nature of the process. As 
terrorist tactics and methods evolve, and their ability to construct and conceal explosive 
devices becomes more sophisticated, the TSA has responded by implementing ever more 
intrusive procedures and technologies that are applied to all passengers. The end result is 
a system that contains a high degree of threat uncertainty and one that requires the 
individual transportation security officer to broadly search for threat objects without 
foreknowledge of the actual risk posed by any individual passenger. Several reports by 
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the Government Accountability Office and the Inspector General for the Department of 
Homeland Security highlight the difficulties inherent in the current process in sustaining 
high levels of performance in detecting explosive devices. This continuing performance 
deficit, combined with the application of more intrusive procedures and technologies, 
generates a great deal of public and media criticism. Throughout the past decade, there 
have been frequent calls to change the current U.S. model and to adopt either the Israeli 
approach or to shift to a risk-based model. General perceptions are that the Israeli 
approach provides significantly greater security performance and that a risk-based model 
provides a commonsense solution to the aviation security problem.  
This thesis provides a comparison of these two alternative models against the 
current U.S. approach. Evaluation of the three policy options was conducted through an 
analysis of both quantitative and qualitative factors. Quantitative factors include security 
effectiveness, which assessed security performance and the deterrence value of passenger 
screening, and risk mitigation. Qualitative factors include constitutional permissibility 
with respect to First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights; social acceptance; and political 
feasibility. Collectively, these five factors allow for a direct comparison and the relative 
ranking of the models. 
B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. Security Effectiveness 
The two major categories evaluated to assess overall security effectiveness of the 
three passenger screening approaches are detection and deterrence. Detection considered 
the conditional probabilities associated with detecting either a terrorist operative or an 
explosive device hidden either on the passenger or in his carry-on property. Conditional 
probabilities were determined by evaluating the various primary screening measures 
associated with each specific policy option. In each instance, the risk-based security 
approach was determined to be the most effective of the three models, although the 
difference between the RBS and Israeli models was an insignificant one-tenth of one 
percent.  
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Two primary reasons account for the difference in system effectiveness of the 
RBS and Israeli models with respect to the current U.S. model. Perhaps the most critical 
impact stems from how alarms are treated during the screening process. Unlike the 
current U.S. process, which largely resolves the individual alarm, the other two 
approaches treat every alarm as a systems alarm. Under the systems alarm concept, an 
alarm occurring anywhere in the process automatically triggers the full scope of primary 
and secondary security measures to be applied to both the individual and his property. 
For example, if a prohibited item was identified during the X-ray screening of the 
passenger’s property, the response would entail individual explosive trace detection 
(ETD) screening of all individual items in the passenger’s bag, separate X-ray screening 
of all electronic items and the empty bag itself, ETD screening of the individual 
passenger’s hands, primary screening of the individual using both AIT and pat down 
procedures, and a security interview of the passenger and any travel companions. The 
other element that contributes to differences in system effectiveness is the time allotted to 
complete primary X-ray screening. A variety of research studies demonstrates a direct 
and logarithmic relationship between the time provided to complete visual searches and 
performance errors. When time for visual search is constrained, the impact of dual target 
cost (DTC) and satisfaction of search (SOS) phenomena increases, and detection 
performance decreases. Search performance of X-ray operators also increases when they 
know that they are screening property belonging to a passenger categorized as either a 
high or unknown risk and when they are not under any time constraints to complete the 
search. Both the Israeli and RBS models provide that search environment to improve 
operator performance.  
The relative ranking of the deterrence value of each model also results in RBS 
being the best, with the current U.S. system having the lowest level of deterrence. That 
said, the differences between the first and last ranking are insignificant at only seven-
tenths of one percent separating these models. All three models were deemed to provide 
effective deterrence to terrorist attempts to penetrate the passenger screening checkpoint 
with an explosive device. 
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2. Risk Mitigation 
Evaluation of the mitigation effects on risk to the aviation sector was narrowly 
limited to just the use of an explosive device that resulted in the catastrophic loss of the 
aircraft and all passengers. This approach permitted the isolation of the passenger 
screening process and the comparison of the three different models. Risk was computed 
using the DHS risk formula where risk is equal to the product of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence (R = T * V * C). The components of vulnerability and consequence were 
held constant in that analysis. For the vulnerability factor, each model was assessed as 
“probably not” going to fail and the vulnerability value set at 25 percent. Consequence 
assumed a combination of direct and indirect economic loss factors across the top 20 
impacted business sectors identified in the research and was set at $42,679 million. The 
threat component considered both capability, which was held constant at 95 percent, and 
intent, which varied across the four categories of passengers proposed in the RBS model. 
Using these values, a weighted risk score was computed based on the percentage 
of passengers in each of the four risk categories. This evaluation determined that the 
model with the greatest level of risk mitigation is the RBS approach, followed by the 
Israeli model, and then the current U.S. model. The difference between the RBS and 
Israeli models reflects nearly a 30 percent reduction in weighted risk scores and stems 
from the increased number of passengers identified as high risk under the Israeli 
approach. This increase in high-risk passengers stems from the use of demographic and 
ethnic profiling inherent in the Israeli model that does not exist under the RBS approach, 
which is estimated to cause a tenfold increase in the numbers of individuals categorized 
as high-risk passengers.  
3. Constitutional Permissibility 
Due to the potential impact on rights guaranteed to individuals by the U.S 
Constitution, any approach to passenger security screening must be considered with 
respect to how the screening measures potentially impact on those rights. The three areas 
assessed with respect to the constitutional permissibility of the three policy options are 
the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.  
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The rights to freedom of speech, religion, assembly, and association provided by 
the First Amendment do not present any concerns regarding the current U.S approach. 
However, there is a potential impact on First Amendment rights with respect to the 
security interview measure contained in both the Israeli or RBS models. This potential 
impact stems from the requirement that some or all passengers submit to and cooperate 
with a security interview and the implications on the right to travel for individuals who 
do not successfully complete that security step. Review of various court decisions 
indicates that under the broad authority that Congress provided to TSA, that agency has 
the authority to require this step. While the Supreme Court has ruled that the right to free 
speech includes the right to refrain from speaking, the exercise of free speech by 
refraining from speech occurs within the context of the government compelling 
individuals to support specific points of view; the courts would sustain requiring 
individuals to complete the security interview as part of the totality of the passenger 
screening process necessary to be permitted to fly aboard a commercial aircraft. Where 
the security interview could implicate First Amendment rights lies in the purpose of the 
interview and the nature of the questions asked. If the stated purpose of the security 
interview is to identify the religious or political beliefs of individuals, then the courts 
would likely see the interview as being in conflict with the First Amendment. Where the 
purpose is solely to identify individuals who may have the intent to commit violence 
aboard the aircraft, and the questions avoid matters of religion, ethnicity, or political 
beliefs, the conclusion is that the courts would find no First Amendment conflicts. 
Numerous court decisions have sustained security screening at airports as an 
appropriate and necessary administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment 
right against unreasonable searches by government. This special-needs exception allows 
the government to conduct warrantless searches of individuals at airport checkpoints due 
to the compelling government interest in protecting aircraft passengers from hijacking 
and other acts of terrorism. Court decisions since 9/11 have clarified and supported the 
appropriateness of warrantless airport screening searches, including the decision that 
these searches do rely on consent and that once screening has started, individuals cannot 
withdraw from the screening process until it has been completed. The courts have also 
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supported the application of different levels and search methods to different individuals 
based on risk, as well as the introduction of more intrusive technologies and procedures 
that have been implemented in response to changes in the terrorist threat. Although 
various court decisions have alluded to the level of intrusiveness involved in airport 
searches, they have consciously avoided establishing an outer boundary of intrusiveness 
in the aviation context. What the courts have stated is that warrantless airport searches are 
constitutionally permissible, even when the approach does not involve the least intrusive 
methods available. The consistency in court decisions over the past several decades 
sustaining the permissibility of airport searches leads to the conclusion that none of the 
three models, including adopting the systems alarm approach contained in the Israeli and 
RBS models, would violate Fourth Amendment protections. Because the RBS model 
calibrates the level of intrusiveness for each risk category by varying the type of physical 
screening measures applied, the courts may well view this approach as more 
constitutionally supportable. 
It is the Fifth Amendment guarantees to due process, equal protection, and the 
right to liberty where the models do raise constitutional concerns. In particular, the courts 
would likely determine that the use of ethnicity and other demographic criteria to profile 
passengers as high risk, as is done under the Israeli model, is incompatible with the right 
to equal protection. Some court decisions support the Department of Justice guidelines 
regarding the use of racial or ethnic profiling in the aviation security application in 
exigent circumstances to prevent catastrophic events, but the institutional application of 
racial or ethnic profiling is incompatible with the Fifth Amendment. Another potential 
constitutional conflict inherent in all three models is the issue of custodial interrogation. 
The courts have generally held that, similar to searches as part of border security, the 
airport search environment does not typically constitute a custodial environment and that 
individuals do not need to be advised of their right against self-incrimination before being 
asked questions in that environment. However, the courts are very clear that in situations 
where there is an individualized suspicion of criminality, or upon discovery of criminal 
activity, the individual must be advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, as defined in 
Miranda v. Arizona, or any evidence will be suppressed during criminal proceedings. 
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4. Social Acceptance 
The social acceptance criterion assesses the degree to which the American people 
will accept the security approaches associated with each policy option. With more than 
1.7 million individuals travelling by commercial aviation within the United States, the 
TSA arguably interacts with the general public more frequently than does any other 
government agency. Negative media stories abound regarding prohibited items getting 
past the checkpoint undetected, pat downs procedures applied to children and elderly 
individuals, and more invasive equipment like advanced imaging technology, dubbed 
“naked body scanners” by some. This negative media coverage and the frequent 
interaction with the passenger screening process in an environment absent any significant 
terrorist attack within the United States since 9/11 has caused many individuals to 
criticize the TSA and openly complain that the agency lacks common sense. To many 
frequent travelers, the checkpoint security process is an inconvenience and a cause of 
delay, and for the infrequent traveler security screening is highly stressful. In general, the 
current U.S. model is not widely accepted or supported by many individuals, with just 22 
percent of respondents supporting the use of AIT equipment and only 16 percent 
supporting more thorough pat downs in December 2010. 
The use of discretionary law enforcement counterterrorism techniques directed to 
individuals who look Muslim or Arab or who come from the Middle East, as in the Israeli 
model, appears to have transient public support. Support for these measures increased in 
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the attempted attack on December 25, 2009, but it 
quickly declined to nearly half the postincident peak levels. With less than 40 percent of 
respondents maintaining steady support for profiling as an appropriate aviation security 
measure, the long-term support for the Israeli model is questionable.  
The travelling public appears decidedly more supportive of the RBS model. In 
two separate opinion polls conducted in 2010, roughly 65 percent of respondents 
supported the idea of separate security requirements for individuals who completed a 




travelers, support for separating passengers into different categories based on risk was as 
high as 75percent—even if it required a $150 per year enrollment fee to defray the costs 
of the background check. 
Based on this research, the RBS model has the highest likelihood of being the 
most socially acceptable to individuals within the United States. This conclusion is based 
on an assessment that the public views a risk-based approach as common sense and as 
capable of minimizing the inconvenience to a large percentage of passengers placed in 
the low-risk category. The fact that a large percentage of frequent travelers expressed a 
willingness to pay for such an approach, even though they were not provided any specific 
details regarding how the screening process would be expedited for low-risk passengers, 
supports this conclusion. Although public support for the current U.S. approach is low, it 
is roughly equal to the level of public support for racial profiling for general law 
enforcement purposes, which by and large is socially unacceptable to the American 
people. The conclusion drawn is that institutionalizing profiling as part of the aviation 
security process would be less socially acceptable than the current U.S. approach, and the 
Israeli model is the least favorable from this perspective. 
5. Political Feasibility 
The topic of passenger security screening is politically charged, in part because it 
directly impacts so many citizens and private-sector entities and also because of the many 
congressional committees and subcommittees that provide oversight to the TSA. Even 
though the TSA administrator recently announced the desire to shift to a risk-based 
passenger screening approach, Congress has the ability to exercise considerable influence 
over any policy option. Therefore, the political feasibility of policy options must be 
considered.  
In some respects, it is arguably easier for Congress to continue with the current 
U.S. model than it is to adopt one of the other two options being evaluated. When the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act was enacted, placing the TSA in charge of 
aviation security, Congress provided that agency with broad authority to define and 
revise security procedures and standards in order to protect airline passengers from acts 
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of terrorism. Despite frequent criticism from individual member of Congress regarding 
the effectiveness of passenger screening and the implementation of more invasive 
procedures and technologies, the broad authority granted the TSA has not been restricted, 
and funding to implement these changes has been provided. While it is certainly possible 
that Congress will at some point determine that the TSA has overreached, it has thus far 
not done so, and the conclusion is that the political feasibility of the current U.S. model 
remains very high. 
The same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to implementing the Israeli 
security model. There have been several calls for implementing the Israeli model during 
the last decade, yet no legislative action has resulted to move toward implementation of 
that approach. This situation stems from two primary causes. First, replicating the Israeli 
model throughout the 450 federalized airports within the United States for which the TSA 
has direct security responsibility for screening commercial airline passengers and their 
baggage is cost prohibitive and represents an assessed annual cost of close to $60 billion. 
The fact that Congress has thus far resisted requests by the administration to raise the per-
ticket security fee from its current level of $2.50 per segment to $5.00 per segment leads 
to the conclusion that there is currently no political will or perceived need to broadly 
implement the Israeli model. The second reason why adopting the Israeli model is likely 
not politically feasible stems from the use of profiling that is embedded in the process 
and the low probability that political consensus to institutionalize some type of 
demographic-based profiling could be reached. The overall conclusion is that the Israeli 
model has the lowest level of political feasibility of any of the three policy options. 
The political feasibility of implementing the RBS approach is less clear. Since the 
TSA administrator testified in early 2011 that he was moving toward a risk-based 
approach, political criticism of that idea has been muted, and comments from political 
leaders have been generally supportive. The fact that the RBS model holds the promise of 
improving security effectiveness without increasing costs, and that many travel groups 
and trade associations are on record in support of an RBS approach, argues for political 
feasibility. However, if the public rejects the RBS model over concerns that categorizing 
passengers by risk creates a “privileged class” of individuals or is based on some 
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unacceptable demographic means of profiling or because the rejection of applicants for 
the low-risk category impacts employment or other aspects of individuals lives, political 
support for the approach could quickly evaporate. Considering all of these factors, the 
conclusion is that the political feasibility of the RBS model is greater than the Israeli 
approach but less certain than continuing the current U.S. process.  
6. Summary of Findings 
Table 17 provides a side-by-side comparison of the relative rankings of each of 
the three policy options with respect to the five criteria used in this evaluation. As noted 
in Chapter III, each criterion is assigned a relative ranking where 1 reflects the best 
option for achieving the desired evaluative criteria outcome and 3 reflects the least 
attractive option to achieve this outcome. As an example, under the security effectiveness 
criteria, the RBS option is considered the most effective and is assigned a value of 1. 
Conversely, the current U.S. approach is evaluated as the least effective and is assigned a 
relative value of 3.  
 











3 3 2 2 1 
Israeli 2 2 3 3 3 
Risk 
Based 
1 1 1 1 2 
Table 17.   Side-by-Side Model Comparison 
This use of relative rankings permits comparison of each option against the 
evaluative criteria by adding the respective numbers, where the model with the lowest 
total score is potentially the best of the three policy choices. For Table 17, the total scores 
for the three policy choices are: current U.S. model = 11; Israeli model = 13; and risk-
based security model = 6. Using these five criteria to evaluate each policy option in the 
narrowly defined context of the passenger screening portion of the total aviation security 
system, the risk-based security model is by far the best approach for Congress, the 
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Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, and the 
American public to consider. The benefits of the RBS model are that it offers high levels 
of security effectiveness and deterrence; it effectively mitigates the risk to aviation from 
explosive devices brought through the checkpoint; it does not conflict with rights 
guaranteed under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as 
interpreted by various court decisions; it is likely more socially acceptable than either of 
the other two approaches; and implementation is likely politically feasible. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Implementing the RBS approach is not without its challenges, which are not 
addressed in this thesis. The following provides an overview and recommendations 
related to some of these challenges.  
1. Physical Changes to Airport Checkpoints 
Physical changes will be necessary at airport checkpoints in order to efficiently 
separate individuals by risk category so that individuals are subject to the appropriate 
security measures calibrated to their risk category (Poole & Passantino, 2003, p. 14). 
These checkpoint reconfiguration changes need to support 1) the ability for individuals 
categorized as trusted and low-risk to self-select for processing through separate security 
lanes; 2) installation of biometric identity verification technology at checkpoints and 
boarding gates; and 3) the ability to separate high-risk and ordinary passengers for 
security screening using accepted protocols. Some airports have already installed 
biometric airport badge readers and designated specific lanes for employee and aircrew 
use, and it may be possible to leverage these efforts and equipment as part of the 
implementation strategy. 
2. Technology Integration and Implementation Costs 
Technology integration and RBS implementation costs involve efficiently 
integrating various existing government databases into a comprehensive database 
required to support risk-based checkpoint screening and biometric identity verification. 
Integration of databases and different technologies is likely a significant hurdle. Existing 
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identification systems such as airport access control systems, the DHS Automated 
Biometric Identification System (IDENT) data storage system,44 the Global Entry and 
US-VISIT systems operated by Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation 
Worker Identity Card (TWIC), Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-
12)45 identification card databases, and the background investigation systems operated by 
the Department of Defense and the Office of Personnel Management at a minimum 
would be necessary to fully implement the program. Additionally, the infrastructure and 
integration of a new government program for registered traveler participants would also 
be necessary.  
The complexity of this effort is believed to equal about half that of implementing 
the Secure Flight program. Using the TSA costs combined with the cost of changes 
required at the Terrorist Screening Center to support the Secure Flight implementation 
provides a basis for estimating the scope of work and costs to integrate a risk-based 
passenger screening program. According to the Department of Justice Inspector General 
(DOJ IG), the direct and indirect costs of Secure Flight for 2005 and 2006 exceeded $58 
million (DOJ, 2005, pp. 11–12). In addition to DOJ costs, the TSA received 
appropriations of nearly $300 million for the program during the five-year period from 
2004 through 2009 (Barrick, Hite, & Wilshusen, 2009, p. 8). Leveraging the lessons 
learned and the development effort already completed on Secure Flight, an estimate of 
initial implementation costs of between $180 million to $200 million over three or four 
years provides a reasonable starting point to fully develop and implement the risk-based 
passenger screening program as proposed above.  
 
                                                 
44 IDENT is a DHS-wide system for the storage and processing of biometric and biographic 
information for DHS national security, law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other DHS 
mission-related functions (Yonkers, 2006, p. 2) . 
45 HSPD-12 requires a government-wide, standardized, and secure identification card for all federal 
employees and government contractors. When fully implemented, the biometric identification card will be 
used for employees to gain access to federal facilities based on rights granted to the individual cardholder. 
HSPD-12 is also being considered for access to federal government information technology systems 
(http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1217616624097.shtm).  
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3. Background Investigations and Sustaining Program Costs 
Policy decisions are needed regarding the level of background investigation 
required for individuals to be classified as either no- or low-risk travelers. Additionally, 
there is a need to establish clear and transparent rules regarding the factors that would 
automatically disqualify an individual from these two lowest risk groups. Similar rules 
and policies are required with respect to recurrent vetting so that information from the 
intelligence or law enforcement communities that changes the risk assessment of 
individuals can be quickly applied. The scope of the initial and recurrent vetting 
requirements drives initial and annual program sustaining costs (Dillingham, 2002, p. 3), 
Policies and procedures are also required to establish a redress process, determine what 
information could be shared with individuals denied approval as a low-risk traveler, and 
set appropriate limits on how this information would be shared (Dillingham, 2002, pp. 
14–16; Poole & Passantino, 2003, pp. 19–23). 
As part of these policy decisions, Congress and the administration will also need 
to decide whether to implement a fee to offset the costs of the RBS program or whether 
the program would remain fully funded through appropriations. Making the application 
process free to all individuals would likely increase the number of people who applied for 
the program, which would improve the efficiency of the overall screening process. 
Charging an application and background investigation fee could dissuade the infrequent 
traveler from applying for program participation and potentially inhibit realizing the full 
level of efficiencies and security benefits possible with the RBS model.  
Research indicates that once the program becomes operational, a fee-based 
approach would defray most if not all operational and maintenance program costs. Initial 
estimates for Registered Traveler assumed participants would be willing to pay an initial 
$100 enrollment fee and a nominal annual user fee for perpetual vetting (Dillingham, 
2002, p. 18). Participants in the Global Entry program pay a nonrefundable enrollment 
fee of $100 for two years’ enrollment (United States Customs and Border Protection, 
2009, p. 2). The 250,000 participants in the private-sector Registered Traveler program 
paid a $200 annual fee to get head-of-the-line privileges with no decrease in security 
requirements, generating approximately $250 million annually (Franks, 2009). 
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D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis is narrowly tailored in scope to just the comparison of the current U.S., 
Israeli and risk-based passenger security screening models, using information available in 
open sources. Due to the limitations of this focus, the end result is not intended to be a 
fully implementable solution, and several areas for further research can be identified.  
1. Security Officer IED Detection Performance 
Prior research into visual search demonstrates that the time allowed for search and 
the alertness of the operator to the increased likelihood of finding a target object can 
improve detection performance, but this research was not conducted in the aviation 
security context. A specifically designed experiment on the detection of sophisticated and 
well-concealed explosive device components in the passenger screening environment 
would be beneficial to validate or dispute these assumptions.  
2. Security Interview 
The RBS model shifts away from a broad search for objects to a focus on 
individuals and the identification of passengers who intend to potentially commit an act 
of violence or terrorism aboard the aircraft. In support of this change, the RBS model 
employs a security interview of all individuals identified as high risk. Research into the 
structure of the interview process and the nature of questions to be asked that support the 
identification of intent would provide an empirical basis for the security interview and 
would guide the training development efforts needed to implement that approach. 
3. Adapting to Different Airport Configurations 
Commercial airports throughout the United States vary widely in design and 
physical constraints at passenger screening checkpoints. Application of the RBS model 
across various airport configurations would require tailored solutions that support 
implementation both at large, multiple-lane checkpoints and at smaller two-lane 
configurations. Research into the way in which the RBS model would operate across 
these different physical environments would benefit implementation and operation 
decisions. 
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4. Systems Alarm Impact 
As noted above and in Chapter V, adopting a systems alarm philosophy is key to 
realizing the security benefits of the RBS model. Implementing this approach to the 
manner in which security officers respond to alarms creates a potential impact on 
checkpoint design and equipment requirements. Research on the capacity necessary to 
address the primary and secondary search needs of the unknown- and high-risk traveler 
under the systems alarm approach applied to all four risk categories would benefit 
implementation decisions as well as checkpoint staffing requirements.  
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